Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition by Talley, Eric L.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2014 
Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory 
Competition 
Eric L. Talley 
Columbia Law School, etalley@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Securities Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW, 
VOL. 101, P. 1649, 2015; UC BERKELEY PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2511723; USC CLASS RESEARCH 
PAPER NO. CLASS14-32; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 14-475 (2014). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1888 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
TALLEY_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2015 1:40 PM 
 
1649 
CORPORATE INVERSIONS AND THE UNBUNDLING OF 
REGULATORY COMPETITION 
Eric L. Talley* 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1650 
I. FEDERAL TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL ENTITIES: A HIGH-
LEVEL PRIMER .............................................................................. 1658 
A. Nominal Tax Rates ................................................................ 1659 
B. Residency Rules ..................................................................... 1661 
C. Worldwide Income ................................................................. 1661 
D. Repatriation Reckoning ......................................................... 1663 
II. CORPORATE INVERSIONS: THE NEW, NEW (OLD) MATH ............... 1672 
A. Overview and Regulatory Evolution ...................................... 1673 
B. You Get an Inversion; YOU Get an Inversion; 
EVERYBODY Gets an Inversion? ......................................... 1685 
C. Internal Affairs, Corporate Governance, and the Loss of 
Delaware Jurisprudence ....................................................... 1689 
III. INVERSIONS THROUGH THE LENS OF REGULATORY-
COMPETITION THEORY .................................................................. 1700 
A. Framework and Preliminaries ............................................... 1702 
B. Solving the Game (Equilibrium) ............................................ 1705 
C. Variations and Robustness .................................................... 1713 
1. Greater Dimensionality of Governance .......................... 1714 
2. More Competing Jurisdictions ........................................ 1714 
3. Non-Revenue-Maximizing Competitors and  
Tax “Havens” ................................................................. 1716 
4. Multinational Earnings and Territorial Taxation ........... 1718 
5. Unbundled Regulatory Instruments ................................ 1721 
 
* Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Email:  
etalley@law.columbia.edu. Thanks to Scott Altman, John Armour, Alan Auerbach, Joe 
Bankman, Bobby Bartlett, Peter Canellos, Albert Choi, Mihir Desai, Dhammika Dhar-
mapala, Victor Fleischer, Julian Franks, Nathan Giesselman, Vic Goldberg, Victor Goldfeld, 
Jeff Gordon, Andrew Hayashi, William Jordan, Kenton King, Ed Kleinbard, Julia Mahoney, 
Ruth Mason, Alex Raskolnikov, Edward Rock, Roberta Romano, Maribel Saez, Michael 
Simkovic, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Leo Strine, and seminar participants at USC, Colum-
bia, Virginia, Yale, London School of Economics, Universidad de Chile, the Chinese Uni-
versity of Hong Kong, the 2015 American Law and Economics Association annual meeting, 
and Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP for helpful comments and discussions. Yvonne Ng and 
Samantha Strimling provided excellent research assistance. All errors are mine. 
TALLEY_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2015 2:20 PM 
1650 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:1649 
6. Does Governance Really Matter? ................................... 1722 
IV. SYNTHESIS AND SOME TENTATIVE REFORM PROPOSALS ............... 1725 
A. Pricing Federal Governance ................................................. 1726 
B. Rolling Back Federal Corporate Governance ....................... 1728 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1731 
APPENDIX A ........................................................................................ 1733 
APPENDIX B ........................................................................................ 1748 
“Even as corporate profits are as high as ever, a small but growing 
group of big corporations are fleeing the country to get out of paying 
taxes. They’re keeping most of their business inside the United States, 
but they’re basically renouncing their citizenship and declaring that 
they’re based somewhere else, just to avoid paying their fair share. 
. . . [W]hen some companies cherrypick their taxes, it damages the 
country’s finances. It adds to the deficit. It makes it harder to invest in 
the things that will keep America strong, and it sticks you with the tab 
for what they stash offshore. Right now, a loophole in our tax laws 
makes this totally legal—and I think that’s totally wrong. You don’t 
get to pick which rules you play by, or which tax rate you pay, and 
neither should these companies.  
. . . [S]topping companies from renouncing their citizenship just to get 
out of paying their fair share of taxes is something that cannot wait.”  
 -Barack Obama, President of the United States1 
INTRODUCTION 
EVERAL prominent public corporations have recently embraced a 
noteworthy (and newsworthy) type of transaction known as a “tax 
inversion.” In a typical inversion, a U.S. multinational corporation 
(“MNC”) merges with a foreign company. The entity that ultimately 
emerges from this transactional cocoon is invariably incorporated 
abroad, yet typically remains listed in U.S. securities markets under the 
erstwhile domestic issuer’s name. When structured to satisfy applicable 
tax requirements, corporate inversions permit domestic MNCs eventual-
 
1 President Barack Obama, Weekly Presidential Address: Closing Corporate Tax Loop-
holes (July 26, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2014/07/26/weekly-address-closing-corporate-tax-loopholes). 
S
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ly to replace U.S. with foreign tax treatment of their extraterritorial earn-
ings—ostensibly at far lower effective rates.  
 Most regulators and politicians have reacted to the inversion invasion 
with alarm and indignation, no doubt fearing the trend is but a harbinger 
of an immense offshore exodus by U.S. multinationals. This reaction, in 
turn, has catalyzed myriad calls for tax reform from a variety of quarters, 
ranging from the targeted tightening of tax eligibility criteria,2 to moving 
the United States to a territorial tax system,3 to declaring (yet another) 
tax “holiday” for corporate repatriations,4 to reducing significantly (if 
not entirely) American corporate tax rates.5 Like many debates in tax 
policy, there remains little consensus about what to do (or whether to do 
anything at all). 
This Article analyzes the current inversion wave (and reactions to it) 
from both practical and theoretical perspectives. From a practical van-
tage point, I will argue that while the inversion invasion is certainly a 
cause for concern, aspiring inverters already face several constraints that 
may decelerate the trend naturally, without significant regulatory inter-
vention. For example, inversions are but one of several alternative tax 
avoidance strategies available to MNCs—strategies whose relative mer-
its differ widely by firm and by industry. Inversions, moreover, are in-
variably dilutive and usually taxable to the inverter’s U.S. shareholders, 
auguring potential resistance to the deals. They virtually require “strate-
gic” (as opposed to financial) mergers between comparably sized com-
panies, making for increasingly slim pickings when searching for a 
dancing partner, and a danger of overpaying simply to meet the compa-
 
2 E.g., Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2014, S. 2360, 113th Cong. (as proposed by Sen. 
Carl Levin (D-MI) and introduced, May 20, 2014). 
3 Mihir A. Desai, A Better Way to Tax U.S. Businesses, Harv. Bus. Rev., July–Aug. 2012, 
at 135, 135, 137–38; Economic Growth and Family Fairness Tax Reform Plan, United States 
Senate Office of Marco Rubio 1, 12 (n.d.), available at http://www.rubio.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=2d839ff1-f995-427a-86e9-267365609942.  
4 James Hohmann, Rand Paul Seeks Corporate Tax Deal with Obama, Politico (Jan. 20, 2015, 
7:59 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/rand-paul-corporate-tax-deal-obama-1144
13.html.  
5 E.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, How to Fix the Corporate Tax? Repeal It, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
24, 2014, at BU7 (advocating a 0% rate). The Obama administration’s 2016 Budget, in con-
trast, proposes a more modest reduction (to 28%), paired with a flat tax on all offshore in-
come, as well as a transition tax for previously earned offshore income. See Office of Mgmt. 
& Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal 
Year 2016, at 56–57 (2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
budget/fy2016/assets/budget.pdf. 
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rable size requirements. They involve regulatory risk from competition 
authorities, foreign-direct-investment boards and takeover panels (not to 
mention from tax regulators themselves). They frequently provide only 
partial relief from extraterritorial application of U.S. taxes, especially for 
well-established U.S. multinationals. And finally, tax inversions can in-
troduce material downstream legal risk, since they move the locus of 
corporate internal affairs out of conventional jurisprudential terrain and 
into the domain of a foreign jurisdiction whose law is—by compari-
son—recondite and unfamiliar. 
Moving beyond these practical considerations, I will also consider the 
inversion wave through a theoretical lens, drawing insights from regula-
tory competition theories in public finance. Specifically, I will advance 
the notion that regulatory competition among jurisdictions can play out 
not only through tax policy, but also simultaneously through other non-
tax channels, such as corporate law and governance rules. Applying this 
framework, I will show that a strong domestic corporate governance re-
gime can provide a plausible buffer against a tax-induced incorporation 
exodus: Although U.S. multinationals clearly dislike high tax rates, they 
have traditionally valued the strength of U.S. corporate law and govern-
ance, particularly within Delaware. And, since U.S. tax policy explicitly 
ties tax residence to the state of incorporation, domestic tax authorities 
have enjoyed market power in keeping rates comparatively high while 
attracting and retaining domestic incorporations. In other words, the 
United States has for a long time remained somewhat insulated from ru-
inous tax competition because tax residency was “bundled” with corpo-
rate law in a unitary regulatory package. Viewed from this perspective, 
the most radical tax reform proposals currently being championed seem 
overzealous at best, and may even prove counterproductive. 
Nonetheless, the recent pace of inversion activity plausibly suggests 
that America’s traditional market power in regulatory competition has 
begun to slip. Although there are likely many contributing causes for 
this slippage, I will argue that a seemingly inconspicuous institution has 
played an under-acknowledged role: securities law. During the last fif-
teen years, a series of significant regulatory reforms—such as the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 20026 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 20107—have suf-
fused U.S. securities regulations with an unprecedented array of 
 
6 Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (enacted July 30, 2002). 
7 Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (enacted July 21, 2010). 
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corporate governance mandates, ranging from board independence re-
quirements to compensation reforms to internal financial controls to 
proxy access. Historically, state law served as the dominant (if not sole) 
arbiter of corporate governance. Federal law’s creeping displacement of 
state law has consequently “unbundled” domestic tax law from domestic 
corporate governance regulation, since most U.S. securities regulations 
apply to all listed companies, irrespective of their tax residence.8 Hence, 
regardless of whether recent securities law reforms have been prudent or 
misguided, I argue that federalization has effectively (if unwittingly) un-
dermined the United States’ ability to withstand tax competition from 
abroad. 
If securities market regulation helped dig this hole, then might it also 
provide the needed tools to refill it? My analysis will suggest that it 
does, and that we should consider altering the regulatory landscape in 
two possible ways: either (1) the United States should begin to tax listed 
companies (regardless of residence) for their consumption of federal 
corporate governance law, granting allowances for U.S. corporate in-
come taxes paid; and/or (2) federal law should cede corporate govern-
ance back to the states by rolling back the federal governance mandates 
of the last fifteen years. Which of these alternatives (or combination of 
them) is most attractive turns on several factors, including practical im-
plementation constraints, the value (if any) created by recent federal 
governance mandates, and the difficulty of coordinating governmental 
actors at the state and federal level. 
Moreover, to the extent my unbundling hypothesis is valid, it suggests 
that tax reform responses to “inversionitis” must also anticipate down-
stream implications for corporate governance. Although some modest 
tax reforms may be warranted (for example, measured reductions in 
headline tax rates), the most radical tax reform proposals currently on 
the table (such as moving to a territorial system, or eliminating U.S. cor-
porate income taxes altogether) are unlikely to help, and could well 
prove deleterious: Not only do such radical reforms seem likely to cost 
the U.S. Treasury sizable future tax revenues, but they respond to the 
unbundling phenomenon not by rebundling tax and governance, but ra-
ther by severing the link completely. A plausible long-term effect of 
 
8 While certain U.S.-traded foreign companies can obtain “Foreign Private Issuer” (“FPI”) 
status—exempting them from various U.S. securities law mandates—the structure of most 
U.S. inversions makes FPI status an unrealistic option for the surviving entity. See infra note 
165 and accompanying text.  
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such radical reform strategies is that the variety and quality of corporate 
governance regimes worldwide will atrophy—an outcome that is as un-
desirable for the global economy as it is for the United States.9 
Several caveats deserve explicit attention before proceeding. First, 
this is by no means the lone article to note the simultaneous operation of 
tax and corporate law within a setting of international regulatory compe-
tition.10 Although most prior contributions compare tax competition and 
corporate chartering competition in relative isolation, a handful also ex-
plicitly consider their mutual interaction. Notable among them is an arti-
cle by Mitchell Kane and Edward Rock, who observe that the marriage 
of tax residency rules with corporate law in regulatory competition can 
have distortive effects, inducing corporations to make inferior jurisdic-
tional choices when incorporating in order to reduce tax liability. Con-
cluding that such distortions undermine a competitive chartering market, 
they propose “severing” tax residence rules from corporate law regimes, 
hinging the former on the locus of firms’ real economic activity and the 
latter on the place of incorporation.11 Although I commence from a simi-
lar motivation as do Kane and Rock, my analysis will depart from theirs 
in several ways. They do not, for example, consider how the steady en-
croachment of securities law has materially altered the tax/governance 
competitive landscape. More significantly, my analysis will suggest that 
regulatory competitive forces actually push in the opposite direction 
 
9 My argument shares certain commonalities with the familiar “Tiebout” model in public 
finance, where local communities offer differentiated packages of public goods and taxes, 
and heterogeneous individuals self-sort by migrating to the site offering the package most 
suited to their preferences. See generally Wallace Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout 
Model, in The Tiebout Model at Fifty 21, 22, 27 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006) (explaining 
and offering an overview of the Tiebout framework, as well as contributions to it in recent 
economic literature). In the canonical Tiebout framework, local public goods and taxes are 
naturally bundled for geographical reasons. With regulatory competition, in contrast, bun-
dling can be a design feature. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Local Public Goods and Clubs, in 4 
Handbook of Public Economics, at 1997, 2030–31 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein 
eds., 2002). 
10 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Tax Coordination and Tax Com-
petition in the European Union: Evaluating the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation, 38 
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 677, 677–79 (2001); Jens Dammann, A New Approach to Corporate 
Choice of Law, 38 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 51, 77–79 (2005); Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. 
Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1229, 
1229–34 (2008); Wolfgang Schön, Playing Different Games? Regulatory Competition in 
Tax and Company Law Compared, 42 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 331, 359–60 (2005); Joel P. 
Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 47, 50, 59 (1993). 
11 Kane & Rock, supra note 10, at 1232, 1283. 
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from the Kane/Rock proposal. In other words, even if differential tax 
levies “distort” incorporation choices, the bundling of corporate govern-
ance and tax regimes can make chartering competition more (not less) 
robust, affording jurisdictions a means by which to appropriate some of 
the social value created by their investments in legal/regulatory infra-
structure—incentivizing them in the process to differentiate their gov-
ernance/tax offerings, thereby enriching the portfolio of choices availa-
ble to companies and adding to overall economic welfare.12 
Second, as noted above, this Article uses a regulatory competition 
framework to analyze how tax and corporate law may evolve simultane-
ously. That framework allows for the possibility that such competition 
can motivate at least some jurisdictions to “race to the top” by installing 
and maintaining governance regimes that increase firm value and attract 
incorporations. While some version of this view is common within the 
academic literature,13 others are more pessimistic about the merits of ju-
risdictional competition in corporate law, arguing, for instance, that be-
cause managers steer incorporation decisions, competition will tend to 
“race to the bottom,” catering to managerial preferences, not overall 
company value (or even share value).14 Still others have expressed am-
bivalence about whether either extreme account tends to prevail categor-
ically.15 The analytical framework developed below is broad enough to 
allow for any of these possibilities, including settings where agency 
costs dominate incorporation choices for some firms, inducing some ju-
risdictions to use their bundled taxing authority to extract a portion of 
the managerial value they create. Indeed, at its most general level, my 
 
12 It is worth observing that in any market (incorporation markets included), differential 
prices technically “distort” consumer choice. Many consumers, for instance, purchase Chev-
rolets even though they would prefer Bentleys (but for the price difference). Such price ra-
tioning can be perfectly consistent with robust competition. More to the point, my analysis 
will suggest that even when competing jurisdictions’ marginal cost of corporate law provi-
sion is approximately zero (as is plausibly the case here), differential prices—and the distor-
tions they induce—may still be worth bearing when such prices enable providers to capture 
their quasi-fixed investments in regulatory quality. 
13 See, e.g., Kane & Rock, supra note 10, at 1239; Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: 
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 225, 280–81 (1985); Ralph K. 
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal 
Stud. 251, 254–56 (1977).  
14 E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on 
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1441 (1992). 
15 See Gillian K. Hadfield & Eric L. Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of Corpo-
rate Law, 22 J.L. Econ. & Org. 414, 415–16 (2006). 
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analysis presumes a type of hybrid setting where some companies are 
attracted to corporate governance regimes that maximize overall compa-
ny value, while others prefer systems that cosset managerial interests.16 
Third, my analysis will generally presume that jurisdictions set poli-
cies noncooperatively, so as to serve their individual jurisdictional inter-
ests. While such an approach is a serviceable description of the status 
quo,17 it downplays the possibility of cooperative accords struck be-
tween otherwise competing jurisdictions that would effectively neutral-
ize—or at least dampen—the oppositional landscape (for example, in-
ternational accords among OECD countries setting uniform policies on 
tax rates or profit shifting).18 Such cooperative approaches could have 
desirable characteristics (at least in some circumstances),19 and they are 
certainly worth considering. It nevertheless remains an open question 
whether such accords are attainable in the short term and durable over 
the medium to long term. In any event, my analysis is perhaps better 
viewed as assessing an appropriate response for the United States in the 
absence of (or as a backstop to) such international accords.20 
 
 
16 Specifically, the framework I develop below presumes firms to be heterogeneous in how 
they value governance, with some being more attracted than others to governance regimes 
that increase overall company value; this heterogeneity plausibly reflects varying degrees of 
agency costs across firms. Consequently, jurisdictions within this setting also tend to behave 
heterogeneously, differentiating their regulatory offerings from one another, thereby making 
the “race” (to the extent one exists) more multi-faceted than either extreme account allows. 
That said, for those jurisdictions catering to firms dominated by agency costs, the govern-
ance systems that emerge need not be socially desirable in a larger sense. 
17 See Eric Toder & Alan D. Viard, Major Surgery Needed: A Call for Structural Reform 
of the U.S. Corporate Income Tax 19–20 (Apr. 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?ID=413090). 
18 See Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 9–13 (2013), OECD, www.oecd.org/
ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf; Dhammika Dharmapala, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Sim-
ple Conceptual Framework 3 (U. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Pa-
per No. 703, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2497770. 
19 A potential downside of cooperative accords is that they provide a platform for ineffi-
cient price fixing in tax levies, converting regulatory competition into de facto monopoly. 
See Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD’s 
Campaign Against “Harmful Tax Competition,” 4 Colum. J. Tax L. 1, 33–34 (2012).  
20 It bears noting that many observers remain skeptical that the OECD’s ongoing attempt to 
craft a Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) protocol will ever prove successful. See 
Mike Godfrey, Business Leaders Doubt Global Agreement on BEPS, Tax-News.com (August 
11, 2015), http://www.tax-news.com/news/Business_Leaders_Doubt_Global_Agreement_On_
BEPS____68830.html). 
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Finally, it is important to note that the progressive federalization of 
corporate law chronicled here has not taken place in isolation. Rather, it 
is one of several pertinent changes to the strategic landscape surrounding 
comparative corporate governance and tax over the last decade and a 
half. Most conspicuously, several developed countries outside the Unit-
ed States have progressively walked down their own headline tax rates 
during this time, gradually enlarging the evident “gap” between Ameri-
can tax rates and those of its closest international comparators.21 Along 
with the stockpile of retained foreign earnings that American MNCs 
have steadily built up, this widening gap in headline rates has no doubt 
altered the economic calculus that underlies inversion decisions. My ar-
gument is not that the federalization of governance has been more im-
portant than these tax changes in driving inversions per se, but rather 
that it has greatly facilitated and simplified that calculus: Governance 
federalization has materially reduced the incremental costs of inverting, 
just as comparative tax changes have gradually enhanced the corre-
sponding benefits. These simultaneous forces, I argue, have reinforced 
one another (perhaps unwittingly and unnecessarily).22 An appropriate 
regulatory response, therefore, should be mindful of both of them as 
well.23 
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows: Part I will pro-
vide a high-level overview of how the corporate tax system in the United 
States interacts with the structuring of both foreign and domestic MNCs. 
Of particular interest here are the creative (yet fragile) ways that domes-
tic MNCs utilize special ownership structures and intercompany transac-
tions—short of an inversion—to minimize and/or defer tax liabilities. 
While such strategies can be effective, they can also impose risks and 
costs. In Part II, I will add inversion calculus to the mix, documenting 
the advantages such transactions can sometimes have over more tradi-
tional tax management techniques. At the same time, however, the rela-
tive advantages of inversions simply do not translate to all firms and all 
settings. The Part will close by describing how securities law has, over 
 
21 See infra Figure 1. 
22 In Part III, I will provide empirical evidence that governance considerations and tax 
concerns both warrant consideration in assessing the attractiveness of inverting. 
23 In contrast, a regulatory change concentrating solely on taxes—such as a transition to a 
territorial tax regime—would do nothing to address the unbundling phenomenon. As I show 
below, such reform myopia could plausibly prove destructive of economic welfare over the 
long term. 
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the last fifteen years, incrementally displaced and preempted state corpo-
rate law through a series of federal corporate governance mandates. No-
tably, these mandates apply to all public companies, whether incorpo-
rated/taxed in the United States or not. Part III will turn to my core 
conceptual arguments, presenting and analyzing a simple, game-
theoretic framework for analyzing multi-attribute regulatory competition 
in tax and corporate governance offerings. Here I will demonstrate how 
a leader in providing strong corporate law and governance rules (such as 
the United States) may be able to withstand even substantial internation-
al tax competition without being drawn into a ruinous arms race in set-
ting tax rates. Significantly, however, my analytic framework will ex-
pose a key necessary condition for the United States to enjoy such 
competitive insulation: It must be able to bundle tax and nontax regula-
tory attributes into a single, conjoined regulatory package. Troublingly, 
many of the most radical reform efforts recently proposed lose sight of 
this point, and they would ultimately have the effect of unbundling tax 
and governance even further. Myopic attention to tax competition, while 
eschewing its interaction with other regulatory dimensions, is both 
shortsighted and misguided. Part IV then applies the insights of this 
framework, considering two plausible reform approaches from a securi-
ties market perspective.24 
I. FEDERAL TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL ENTITIES: A HIGH-LEVEL 
PRIMER 
In order to appreciate the role that inversions play in multinational 
corporate structuring—as well as to assess the prospects of success for 
proposed reforms—one must first understand some of the basic contours 
of U.S. tax law, specifically as applied to U.S. and foreign multination-
als. These basic characteristics animate myriad corporate tax minimiza-
tion and avoidance strategies—ones that include (but are hardly limited 
to) inversions. This Part endeavors to provide this overview at a high 
level, focusing on the details that are most central to the enterprise in 
 
24 A technical appendix following Part IV provides some of the more general arguments 
underlying the regulatory competition model developed in the text. See infra Appendix A. 
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this Article. (I do not endeavor to provide a comprehensive roadmap to 
all relevant dimensions of international corporate tax.25) 
Although all international tax regimes necessarily share some similar-
ities, a great part of unlocking the inversions puzzle hinges on differ-
ences—and particularly those differences that distinguish the domestic 
U.S. approach from those of most other jurisdictions. In relation to its 
comparators, the American regime is relatively unique in its combina-
tion of three central traits: (1) relatively high “headline” tax rates; (2) in-
corporation-based tax residency rules; and (3) worldwide (rather than 
territorial) reach. These three traits conspire to create significant returns 
for effective tax avoidance strategies. I discuss each of these considera-
tions (and their joint consequences) below. 
A. Nominal Tax Rates 
Consider first the nominal corporate tax rates imposed by the United 
States. For ordinary “C” corporations, the United States imposes entity-
level taxation on the net earnings a corporation generates prior to distri-
butions to shareholders (such as through dividends or share repurchas-
es). The imposition of entity-level tax itself does not make the United 
States unique. What does, however, is the significant heft of the rate that 
U.S. corporations must pay on such earnings. Although federal corporate 
income tax rates vary according to pre-tax corporate earnings from a low 
of 15% to a high of 39% , the dominant tax bracket for most moderate-
sized (or larger) corporations is 35%, which takes effect once the corpo-
ration’s taxable net earnings exceed approximately $18.3 million per 
year.26 This figure, moreover, excludes state corporate tax, which itself 
ranges between 0% and 9%. All told, most U.S. corporations of any ma-
terial size face a marginal “headline” tax rate (state and federal com-





25 Those seeking more in-depth overviews should consult detailed corporate structuring 
treatises, such as Martin D. Ginsburg, Jack S. Levin & Donald E. Rocap, Mergers, Acquisi-
tions, and Buyouts (Feb. 2012). 
26 See I.R.S. Instructions for Form 1120, at 17 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-pdf/i1120.pdf.  
27 See Corporate Tax Rates Table, KPMG, http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/
tax-tools-and-resources/pages/corporate-tax-rates-table.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). 
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Headline tax rates in the United States have always been high relative 
to other jurisdictions, but in recent years the gap has widened. As Figure 
1 illustrates, the combined headline rate in the United States far exceeds 
that in a host of other comparator jurisdictions, a list that significantly 
includes the destinations of several recent inversion transactions (such as 
Ireland at 12.5%, the UK at 21% and falling, and Canada at 26.5%).28 
Moreover, as illustrated in the figure, many of these comparator jurisdic-
tions have been progressively reducing their headline tax rates over the 
last fifteen years. And, unlike individual taxation, where income may be 
taxed at different rates depending on its source (for example, ordinary 
income versus short-term dividends versus capital gains and long-term 
dividends), corporate income tax rates generally apply to all sources of 
income. Although a variety of accounting and financing strategies exist 
to reduce U.S. corporations’ effective taxes well below the headline rate 
(described at greater length below), U.S. corporations still bear a signifi-
cant tax bill for any remaining net taxable earnings they recognize. 
 
28 See id.  
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B. Residency Rules 
In addition to its high rates, the United States explicitly links a corpo-
ration’s “residency” for tax purposes to its jurisdiction of incorpora-
tion.29 Delaware-incorporated entities, for instance, are treated as United 
States residents for tax purposes, even if they have very little operational 
or managerial activity in the United States. Here the United States ap-
pears to be in a slight minority, although some other countries also man-
date an “incorporation” rule to determine tax residency.30 Several other 
variations appear to be slightly more common, such as pegging a corpo-
ration’s tax residency on the location of its corporate “headquarters.” 
This latter inquiry tends to focus on where “central management and 
control” rest, which often coincides with the place the board generally  
meets and (possibly) where central management’s offices are located.31 
In yet other jurisdictions hybrid approaches prevail, where corporations 
can be deemed residents if either they are incorporated there or their 
headquarters are located there.32 
C. Worldwide Income 
Finally, U.S. tax rates have historically applied to a corporation’s 
worldwide income, not just that portion that is generated within domes-
tic borders. Hence, it matters not whether most of the profits of a U.S. 
corporation are generated from its activities here or abroad—the U.S. tax 
code will eventually attempt to reach and tax all its earnings (subject to 
some important caveats, discussed below).33 Although the United States 
is not unique in taxing worldwide corporate income, it is in a distinct 
minority. Most other states in the developed world utilize a “territorial” 
approach to taxing MNCs, in which they tax only that portion of the 
corporation’s net income deemed to be generated within the relevant tax 
jurisdiction, substantially exempting distributions from controlled for-
eign subsidiaries.34 
 
29 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (2012). 
30 Donald J. Marples & Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., R43568, Corporate Ex-
patriation, Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues 12 (2014).  
31 See, e.g., Robert Couzin, Corporate Residence and International Taxation 25 (2002). 
32 Id. The U.K. and Ireland, while traditionally embracing a hybrid rule, are trending pro-
spectively towards a place of incorporation rule. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
33 See I.R.C. § 951 (2012) (discussed infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text). 
34 Beyond the United States, the only other OECD countries that utilize a worldwide tax 
regime are Chile, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Korea, Poland, and Mexico. All others are general-
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Over the years, the heterogeneity of worldwide and territorial tax 
rules (as well as residency tests) has necessitated several compromises 
within many jurisdictions’ codes. For example, for countries using a ter-
ritorial regime, it is critical to determine exactly which revenues and 
costs are generated within each relevant territory. Elaborate rules that 
endeavor to prevent “base shifting” to low-tax locations have attracted 
(and continue to attract) significant attention among reformers. Although 
the worldwide income taxation approach in the United States does not 
have to contend as centrally with base-shifting problems, it necessarily 
confronts the fact that controlled foreign companies (“CFCs”) are them-
selves generally subject to the tax codes of their foreign domiciles, pay-
ing taxes on that basis. Accordingly, the U.S. tax code (as well as other 
worldwide tax regimes) grants a credit for foreign taxes already paid, 
and the foreign operations are liable only to the extent that tax liability 
under U.S. law would exceed that amount. (Given the high marginal 
rates in the United States—see above—that is frequently the case.) Sec-
ond, income recognition rules within the U.S. tax code tend to permit 
American multinationals to defer U.S. recognition of earnings in their 
CFCs, so long as those earnings remain within the foreign subsidiary’s 
coffers and are not “repatriated” to the U.S. parent (through, for exam-








ly classified as territorial systems. Thornton Matheson, Victoria Perry, & Chandara Veung, 
Territorial vs. Worldwide Corporate Taxation: Implications for Developing Countries 4 tbl.1 
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/13/205, 2013). It is worth noting that many 
territorial systems do not fully exempt 100% of repatriated foreign earnings from domestic 
taxation (usually exempting around 95%), and thus the distinction between territorial and 
worldwide taxation systems is less one of kind than of degree of exemption. Id. at 8. Moreo-
ver, when a country’s headline tax rate is relatively low (such as Ireland’s at 12.5%), the dis-
tinction between worldwide and territorial treatment ceases to be important, since such sys-
tems routinely grant an offset for foreign taxes paid (at the presumably higher foreign rates). 
See Rosanne Altshuler, Stephen Shay & Eric Toder, Tax Policy Ctr., Lessons the United 
States Can Learn From Other Countries’ Territorial Systems for Taxing Income of Multi-
national Corporations 15–16 (Jan. 21, 2015), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
publications/url.cfm?ID=2000077. 
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D. Repatriation Reckoning 
The intersection of high headline tax rates, residency rules, and the 
global reach of U.S. tax law makes it clear why incorporation in the 
United States can (all else constant) be disadvantageous to MNCs. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates this point conceptually, comparing two hypothetical 
multinational parents. The first (depicted on the left) is incorporated in 
the United States, and the second (depicted on the right) is incorporated 
abroad. Assume that the applicable corporate tax rate in the United 
States is 35% (applied on a worldwide basis), compared to 20% in the 
foreign jurisdiction (which is applied only territorially). Each company 
has two multinational subsidiaries—one doing business in the United 
States and the other doing business in the foreign jurisdiction—and each 
subsidiary generates $100 in pre-tax earnings.36 The foreign-
incorporated multinational will generally be required to pay the applica-
ble jurisdictional rate for each of its subsidiaries based on their locus of 
operation. Thus, it will pay $35 (35%) in tax to U.S. tax authorities and 
$20 (20%) to foreign tax authorities, leaving it with a total of $145 in 
 
35 The figure assumes—for illustration’s sake—a U.S. rate of 35% and a foreign rate of 
20%. 
36 The numerical values are simplified for illustrative purposes. I also assume for illustra-
tion that a territorial system grants a full exemption for foreign earnings, even though (as 
noted above) most territorial systems fall slightly short of that. 
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post-tax income (which may then be distributed upstream to the foreign 
parent tax-free under the foreign jurisdiction’s tax rules). The U.S. cor-
poration looks similar at first—it, too, owes $35 to U.S. tax authorities 
and $20 to foreign tax authorities based on each subsidiary’s earnings. 
And, just as before, it may effectively transfer the U.S. subsidiary’s 
post-tax earnings ($65) to the parent on a tax-free basis as a consolidated 
entity. However, should the U.S. parent receive a distribution of the for-
eign subsidiary’s post-tax earnings ($80), the dividend will be taxable 
and the U.S. parent will owe domestic authorities an additional tax to 
“level up” the foreign sub’s tax bill to U.S. rates of 35% (or a total of 
$35). After crediting the $20 worth of foreign tax paid by the subsidi-
ary,37 U.S. tax authorities would collect $15 in additional tax when the 
dividend is paid and the earnings repatriated. The net result for the U.S. 
multinational is $130 in post-tax earnings, falling far short of the $145 
enjoyed by its overseas comparator. Such margins are significant, par-
ticularly in highly competitive global industries. 
What (if anything) can a U.S.-incorporated parent do to avoid U.S. 
tax liability on its extraterritorial earnings? Not a lot, it turns out, so long 
as the parent insists on “upstreaming” the earnings of its CFCs.38 How-
ever, so long as a foreign subsidiary retains its earnings without distrib-
uting them to the parent, those earnings will (mostly) remain nontaxable 
in the United States.39 Moreover, the parent may not even have to recog-
 
37 See I.R.C. §§ 901–03 (2012). 
38 See I.R.C. §§ 951–52 (2012). A “CFC” is defined under Subpart F of the Code as a for-
eign corporation with “United States shareholders” (U.S. persons each owning, directly, in-
directly, or constructively, at least 10% of the voting stock of the foreign corporation) who 
together own more than 50% of the voting power or value of the foreign corporation’s out-
standing shares. (The thresholds are reduced for certain purposes in the case of insurance 
companies.) See I.R.C. §§ 951(b), 957. Thus, any 100% owned foreign subsidiary of a U.S. 
parent generally qualifies. 
 It bears reemphasizing that for all its odd features, a worldwide tax system arguably as-
suages a thorny practical issue that territorial tax systems invite: strategic profit shifting. 
Figure 2 has implicitly assumed that each of the U.S. and foreign subsidiaries generates $100 
in pre-tax earnings. However, in many multinationals, subsidiaries may do business with one 
another through various types of loans, leases, supply contracts, services contracts, and other 
transfer pricing schemes. The foreign parent in Figure 2 has a strong incentive to set the 
terms of such transactions so as to shift net income into the foreign sub, which is taxed at a 
lower rate. Such profit shifting schemes, however, may be less lucrative to the U.S. parent, 
whose subsidiaries all ultimately receive the same tax rate. (That said, U.S.-parented MNCs 
still have some incentive to shift profits to the extent they do not intend to repatriate them, as 
explained below.) 
39 See I.R.C. §§ 951–65 (2012). An exception is when a controlled foreign corporation has 
passive income, say from financial assets of other companies it owns. Here, Subpart F rules 
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nize a deferred tax liability in its financials if such CFC earnings are 
deemed “permanently reinvested earnings” under Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (“GAAP”).40 Consequently, virtually all U.S. 
multinational parents have come to favor strategies that retain extraterri-
torial earnings within their overseas CFCs. Such strategies functionally 
achieve the deferral of domestic tax liabilities, potentially indefinitely. 
Nevertheless, the practice of warehousing liquid assets within foreign 
subsidiaries is not a paragon of good capital budgeting practices for a 
variety of reasons. First, the parent may have several profitable invest-
ments that could utilize the retained earnings, but which cannot be un-
dertaken at the CFC level. While the foreign subsidiary’s retained earn-
ings could be an inexpensive source of funds, the tax cost of repatriating 
such funds can be prohibitive. More subtly, unrepatriated earnings may 
be susceptible to any number of risks from exchange rate volatility, in-
terest rate fluctuations, political risk, and the like;41 and while some of 
these risks can be hedged, the cost of doing so may be unattractive.42 Fi-
nally, the overall scale of unrepatriated earnings is appreciable. It is es-
timated that the aggregate amount of cash held by foreign-incorporated 
subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals is somewhere in the neighborhood of 
two trillion dollars.43 While much of this sum is not literally “stranded” 
 
generally cause that income to be recognized as accruing to the parent. The standard ra-
tionale for this constraint is that passive income streams are highly mobile and U.S. parents 
would have excessive incentives to move such income streams into the subsidiary to get de-
ferral. Arguably for these same reasons, most international tax regimes have something akin 
to worldwide reach as to passive income.  
40 Codification of Accounting Standards and Procedures, Recognition of Income Taxes 
No. 740, § 30-25 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2015) [hereinafter C.A.S. § 740-30-25], 
which requires recognition of deferred taxes from a CFC’s future distributed earnings. Alt-
hough recognition is a default presumption under C.A.S. § 740-30-25-3, the presumption can 
be rebutted if the U.S. parent discloses an intent and ability to reinvest the CFC’s undistrib-
uted earnings indefinitely. Id. at C.A.S. §§ 740-30-25-3, 740-30-25-17.  
41 See, e.g., Jason Shemtob, Interested in Amazon Stock? Don’t Ignore These Overlooked 
Risks, DailyFX (May 3, 2013, 2:08 AM), http://www.dailyfx.com/forex/fundamental/article/
special_report/2013/05/03/Interested_In_Amazon_Stock_Dont_Ignore_Earnings_Repatriation_
and_Currency_Translation_Risks.html. 
42 See, e.g., Chana Schoenberger, Exposed! As Currency Volatility Rises, Companies 
Scramble to Avoid Being Caught with Their Hedges Down, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 2011, at 
C10.  
43 See Kate Linebaugh, How Firms Tap Overseas Cash: U.S. Companies Can Borrow Mil-
lions of ‘Trapped’ Funds from Foreign Units if They Follow the Rules, Wall St. J. (Mar. 29, 
2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323361804578388522312624686 
(estimating the value at $1.7 trillion as of early 2013); accord Andrew Bird et al., Does the 
U.S. System of Taxation on Multinationals Advantage Foreign Acquirers? 2–4 (Rotman Sch. 
TALLEY_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2015 1:40 PM 
1666 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:1649 
overseas per se (indeed, many CFCs hold their cash substantially within 
U.S. bank accounts44), the tax-related restrictions on its deployment de-
scribed above remain intact. 
That said, U.S. multinationals have devised—over the course of many 
decades—admirably conniving strategies to access their CFCs’ ma-
rooned monetary morsels. A common tactic for tapping offshore earn-
ings is through intercompany loans from the foreign subsidiary to the 
parent. While U.S. tax rules often deem such loans to constitute divi-
dends for tax purposes45 (and therefore taxable as per Figure 2), there are 
some limited (but well-trodden) exceptions under Section 956 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, which spells out criteria under which certain inter-
company loans are deemed nontaxable.46 When implemented deftly, 
these exceptions can unlock an enormous source of stranded liquidity. 
And unlock it they have: In recent congressional testimony, for example, 
Hewlett Packard executives conceded that they utilize such tax-free in-
tercompany loans routinely, at approximately the same intensity as they 
access third-party credit through the vast commercial paper market—to 
the tune of $1.6 billion in balances on an average day.47 
Nevertheless, CFC loan loopholes can be temperamental and cantan-
kerous creatures, an artifact of their complicated habitat in the tax code. 
Most centrally, Section 956 requires any such loans to be short-term in 
nature, and they generally cannot remain outstanding beyond the end of 
the subsidiary’s fiscal quarter. Should a CFC loan remain open beyond 
the quarterly fiscal close, it may still avoid taxation if the debt is satis-
fied within thirty days of the time it is incurred. However, this thirty-day 
exception cannot be recycled without bound: if any CFC’s upstream 
loan is held open for more than sixty days during a tax year, for exam-
ple, the thirty-day tolling exception is no longer applicable to that CFC, 
and the loan will be held to constitute an “investment in U.S. property” 
 
of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2550819), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2550819; 
Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Watch What I Do, not What I Say: The Unintended Conse-
quences of the Homeland Investment Act, 66 J. Fin. 753, 753–54 (2011) (documenting pent-
up demand for repatriations at the time of the 2004 federal tax holiday). 
44 See Rob Garver, Nearly $1 Trillion in Off Shore Profits Is in U.S. Banks, The Fiscal 
Times (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/04/20/Nearly-1-Trillion-Shore-
Profits-US-Banks. 
45 See I.R.C. § 956(c)(1)(C) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.956-2(a)(1)(iii) (2013).  
46 See I.R.C. § 956(a). 
47 Linebaugh, supra note 43. 
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(and therefore taxable).48 Consequently, unlike commercial paper, repos, 
and other short-term borrowing instruments, individual CFC loans can-
not “roll over” to remain effectively outstanding on a continual basis. 
Even here, however, U.S. multinationals have devised some clever adap-
tation strategies, since Section 956 rules hinge on the identity of the spe-
cific CFC extending credit. HP, for example, has established a practice 
of taking alternating short-term loans from two different controlled for-
eign subsidiaries, a practice almost certainly designed to avoid the ap-
pearance of a continuous long-term loan.49 While undeniably creative, 
such strategies also may tempt fate by triggering anti-abuse rules, which 
give the IRS some discretion to declare technically or facially compliant 
intercompany loan schemes abusive, and therefore taxable.50 Moreover, 
such arrangements may still lock up a significant amount of cash, since 
the participating CFCs are not allowed to pool their cash (or the tech-
nique falls apart). Consequently, a parent may need upwards of $2 bil-
lion in cash reserves located at the CFC level in order to make use of $1 
billion in the United States (since each of the CFCs must have their own 
segregated source of liquidity). Finally, because these intercompany 
transactions (even the more creative ones) are constrained to be short 
term, it could remain difficult to hedge various types of exchange-rate, 
market, and regulatory risks that attend locking up assets in a foreign en-
tity. 
One last strategy that can dampen the tax sting from repatriating 
stranded assets is to embrace a leveraged capital structure at the U.S.-
 
48 See I.R.S. Notice 88-108, 1988-2 C.B. 445 (stating the basic rule); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. 
Mem. AM 2007-0016 (Sept. 25, 2007) (affirming that, after the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993, the application of § 956’s “30/60” rule now applies to fiscal quarters). 
49 Linebaugh, supra note 43. The HP technique takes advantage of the fact that § 956 piv-
ots off the CFCs’ fiscal quarter ends. Consequently, by setting up CFCs with different taxa-
ble years (and hence different quarter end dates), it is possible for one subsidiary to have 
loans outstanding over the other subsidiary’s fiscal quarter end, and thus neither subsidiary 
would trigger a tax inclusion. 
50 Treas. Reg. § 1.956-1T(b)(4)(i) (2013). Indeed, the IRS has successfully challenged 
some similar intercompany loan strategies that use a series of short-term, one-month loans 
from the same CFC that effectively replicate the cash flow patterns of a continuous long-
term loan. See Rev. Rul. 89-73, 1989-1 C.B. 258–59; Jacobs Eng’g Grp. Inc. v. United 
States, 97-1 T.C.M. (CCH) 87,855, 87,756–58 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 99-1 T.C.M. (CCH) 
87,786, 87,787 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that twelve successive month-long loans made by a 
U.S. parent company’s Panamanian unit to the U.S. parent amounted to a repatriation of 
funds). For a detailed analysis of this case, see Lowell D. Yoder & Sandra P. McGill, Treat-
ment of CFC Loans to U.S. Affiliates: The Sword and Sickle of Subpart F, 26 Tax Mgm’t 
Int’l J. 454 (1997) . 
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parent level. Holding aside any intercompany loans it receives from 
CFCs, a U.S. parent might engage in long-term borrowing from third 
parties, possibly distributing such funds to shareholders through a divi-
dend or share repurchase—sometimes known as a dividend recapitaliza-
tion—thereby increasing the parent’s overall leverage ratio. Because the 
interest expense associated with the U.S. parent’s third-party debt is de-
ductible to the parent, those debt service payments can help shield CFC 
cash repatriations from additional U.S. tax liability. Moreover, the value 
of the assets held in CFCs (reflected through their stock held by the par-
ent) can augur the parent’s general credit-worthiness, and can even pro-
vide some limited security for third-party lenders (if utilized carefully51). 
Several major U.S. MNCs have utilized this leveraging strategy to great 
effect, most notoriously Apple Inc., which in 2013 executed what was at 
the time the largest single corporate bond offering in history (over $17 
billion) at effectively triple-A rates.52 Although leverage is recognized as 
having tax advantages generally, its utility for shielding repatriated for-
eign earnings makes debt financing arguably more attractive to U.S.-
based MNCs. At the same time, in the quest to seek tax relief through 
leverage, a company may invite bankruptcy risks, debt overhang prob-
lems, and risky managerial decisions.53 
A different dimension of tax avoidance pursued by U.S.-based MNCs 
concentrates on the tax liabilities of CFCs prior to repatriation. Multina-
tionals frequently set up special structures among their affiliated subsid-
iaries to reduce the foreign tax liabilities of those subsidiaries irrespec-
tive of repatriation. Many of these arrangements hinge on a flavor of 
jurisdictional arbitrage, employing (for example) licenses or leases of 
 
51 Significant caution is warranted in pledging CFC stock or assets to secure third-party 
loans to the parent. Under § 956’s rules, third party loans may be deemed distributions from 
the CFC if the CFC acts as a guarantor, or if its assets “indirectly” serve as security for the 
loan. See Treas. Reg. § 1.956-2(c)(2). A safe harbor defense to this rule is triggered when the 
domestic parent pledges no more than 67% of the voting stock in the foreign subsidiary. Id.  
52 Katy Burne & Mike Cherney, Apple’s Record Plunge into Debt Pool: Offering Sets Rec-
ord; Demand Was More Than $50 Billion, Wall St. J. (April 30, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424127887324482504578454691936382274. Five months later, this bond 
offering was eclipsed by a $49 billion offering by Verizon, itself a large U.S.-parented MNC 
with significant foreign subsidiaries. See Matthew Robinson, Verizon Raises $49 Billion in 
Largest Corporate-Bond Sale, Bloomberg Bus. (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2013-09-11/verizon-plans-49-billion-bonds-in-largest-company-offering-ever. 
53 See, e.g., Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial 
Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. Fin. 371 (1977) (analyzing the problems posed 
by a leveraged capital structure in project choice). 
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intangible property to exploit anomalies or inconsistencies among for-
eign tax jurisdictions. The effect is to reduce (and sometimes eliminate) 
foreign tax liability. A common variant of this scheme is popularly 
known as the “Double Irish” structure, pictured in Figure 3. Under this 
approach, a U.S. parent sets up two subsidiaries (sub 1 and sub 2), both 
of which are incorporated in Ireland. sub 1’s headquarters, however, are 
in a tax haven (such as Bermuda), while sub 2’s are in Ireland. Irish tax 
law broadly permits (until recently54) the location of corporate “head-
quarters” to determine tax residence, and thus sub 1 would be considered 
a Bermudan tax entity (where there is no corporate tax).55 sub 1 is en-
dowed with rights to various of the parent’s hard-to-value intangible as-
sets (for example, patents, trademarks, copyrights, etc.) which it then li-
censes to sub 2 at relatively high (but hard to value) royalty rates.56 Sub 2 
then acts as manufacturer/distributor of all the parent’s foreign sales, 
pursuant to a manufacturing cost sharing arrangement with the U.S. par-
ent.57 Its royalty payments to sub 1 are fully deductible under Irish law, 
and thus sub 2 shows little or no net earnings, which are capitalized into 
the royalty amount. sub 1 of course shows significant earnings, but it is 















54 See infra note 59 (documenting a phased-in change in Irish tax residency rules).  
55 See Corporate Tax Rates Table, supra note 27. 
56 The two foreign subs can elect under U.S. law to be treated on a consolidated basis, and 
therefore, any royalty or other transfer payments between them are disregarded for U.S. tax 
purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2014).  
57 The cost sharing arrangement is usually required under U.S. law to keep sub 2 from be-
ing deemed a domestic subsidiary under U.S. law. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7A.  
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Figure 3: “Double-Irish” Structure for Foreign Tax Avoidance 
 
The Double Irish structure—along with its variants58—effectively 
shifts the MNC’s tax base among foreign jurisdictions in order to con-
centrate them in the jurisdiction with the most favorable tax treatment. 
As noted above, profit shifting is a dilemma endemic to territorial tax 
systems, though it is (arguably) less of a problem in systems that tax 
worldwide income. (Notably, Ireland recently imposed more significant 
constraints on the prospective use of the Double-Irish structure, substan-
tially removing prospectively the option to peg an Irish corporation’s tax 
residency on the location of its corporate headquarters59). Nevertheless, 
 
58 Figure 3 does not consider that Ireland imposes a withholding tax on all royalties paid to 
non-E.U. tax entities (which includes sub 1, a Bermuda tax entity). However, if such royal-
ties are paid to tax entities in other E.U. countries (such as the Netherlands or Malta), no 
such tax is imposed. Thus, a somewhat more common variant on the Double-Irish structure 
interposes a Dutch subsidiary between sub 1 and sub 2 to act as a pass-through entity for the 
royalty, thereby sidestepping any withholding tax. This variant is sometimes called the 
“Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” structure. See Jeffrey L. Rubinger & Summer Ayers LePree, 
Death of the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich”? Not So Fast, Taxes Without Borders (Oct. 23, 
2014), http://www.taxeswithoutbordersblog.com/2014/10/death-of-the-double-irish-dutch-
sandwich-not-so-fast. 
59 See Finance Act of 2014 (Act No. 37/2014) § 43 (Ir.), available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/
documents/bills28/acts/2014/a3714.pdf. Specifically, all corporations incorporated in Ireland 
after January 1, 2015 will be deemed to be Irish corporations, regardless of the location of 
their headquarters. Companies incorporated in Ireland before 2015 will be grandfathered in 
on January 1, 2021. Id. The reforms, however, specifically exempt bilateral treaties between 
Ireland and other jurisdictions that codify the management test. Id. at § 43(1)(a)(2). Notably, 
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note that even if a structure such as the above succeeds in reducing the 
U.S. parent’s foreign tax liabilities to zero (or near zero), it does not 
solve the problem of stranded offshore cash. If anything, successful base 
shifting between CFCs exacerbates matters: By causing the multination-
al to avoid most or all foreign taxes, base shifting results in a U.S. issu-
er’s CFCs collectively holding an even larger stock of untaxed assets. If 
or when that cash is ever repatriated, the parent will not face a modest 
“leveling up” tax equal to the difference between foreign and U.S. nom-
inal rates; rather, the tax bill associated with repatriation will be a far 
more discontinuous jump to the full 35–40% marginal rate of combined 
state and federal tax that most multinationals face in the United States. 
All told, the very foreign tax reduction strategies ingeniously pioneered 
and adopted by U.S. multinationals have significantly amplified the 
costs of repatriating those assets. 
Finally, in addition to these well-known tactics, U.S. MNCs have pur-
sued even more aggressive strategies to reduce and even eliminate their 
CFCs’ tax liabilities through the political process. Several European ju-
risdictions, for example, specifically grant favorable tax treatment to in-
come earned through intellectual property licenses as opposed to other 
corporate income (so-called “innovation boxes”).60 Such treatment, 
when combined with territorial tax treatment and the notorious difficulty 
in valuing IP rights, can facilitate base shifting among international affil-
iates.61 And bolder approaches also appear to have been pursued, usually 
 
both Malta and United Arab Emirates have such treaties with Ireland, suggesting that a mod-
est adaptation of the strategy may remain viable. See Rubinger & LePree, supra note 58.  
60 These include Belgium, France, Ireland, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Spain, the Swiss Canton of Nidwalden, the United Kingdom, Malta, and Cy-
prus. In general, these special rates are less than half the applicable corporate income tax 
rate, and in some cases (such as Malta) as low as zero. See Lisa Evers at al., Intellectual 
Property Box Regimes: Effective Tax Rates and Tax Policy Considerations 1 (Nov. 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp13070.pdf). Re-
cent legislation in the United States has similarly proposed reduced tax rates of around 10% 
on “qualifying income from patents and other intellectual property assets.” See, e.g., John D. 
McKinnon, Lawmakers Unveil Tax Plan on Intellectual Property, Wall St. J. (July 29, 2015, 
2:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-unveil-new-tax-plan-on-intellectual-
property-1438195972. 
61 Interestingly, just as the Irish Finance Act constrains the “Double Irish” structure, see 
supra note 59, the Irish Department of Finance is contemplating further relaxation of its con-
ditions on IP Box treatment, so that “monoline” Irish IP licensors could potentially achieve 
an effective tax rate as low as zero percent. See Irish Tax Alert: Finance Bill 2014: Impact 
on Multinational Corporations, Deloitte (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/
dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-alert-ireland-231014.pdf. 
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by more prominent and larger MNCs. Regulators in Brussels, for exam-
ple, recently brought charges against Apple Inc. relating to alleged ille-
gal agreements it entered with Irish authorities as early as 1991 to re-
ceive special tax-favored status (along with unusually low rates).62 These 
charges add to the stock of other creative strategies that—it has 
emerged—Apple employed to great effect, such as the creation of CFCs 
with no declared tax residence whatsoever and thus, they contended, no 
required tax liability.63 Although these investigations are still underway, 
Apple has since been joined by several other MNCs that have come un-
der similar scrutiny.64 And the fact that such activities have raised the ire 
of international tax regulators (regardless of whether any U.S. MNCs 
will ultimately be forced to answer monetarily) suggests an additional 
vulnerability of the status quo. 
Nevertheless, because this last set of strategies principally implicates 
foreign tax liabilities, they once again do little to address the problem of 
stranded overseas assets (and—as noted above—they may even exacer-
bate such problems by increasing the marginal costs of repatriation). 
Consequently, U.S. MNCs have continued to accrue significant sums of 
overseas cash that is expensive to repatriate, cumbersome to access, and 
increasingly risky and costly to hold. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, 
that issuers began to look for an alternative strategy—a strategy they 
found in the tax inversion. 
II. CORPORATE INVERSIONS: THE NEW, NEW (OLD) MATH 
Given the attendant costs and risks associated with “stranding” capital 
in CFCs (which can themselves be magnified by aggressive tax avoid-
ance strategies), the resurgence of tax inversion transactions among U.S. 
 
62 Tim Bradshaw et al., Apple Hit by Brussels Finding over Illegal Irish Tax Deals, Fin. 
Times (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ae979ad0-4708-11e4-8c50-00144fea
b7de.html#axzz3a8ZbchXp. 
63 Id. See generally Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 Tax L. 
Rev. 99 (2011) (evaluating proposals to address stateless income planning); Chris William 
Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International Tax and Ownership Neutrality 2–4 
(Feb. 26, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2394227) (ana-
lyzing the meaning and significance of “ownership nationality” to the taxation of multina-
tionals). 
64 Analogous investigations have been launched, for example, against Starbucks, Fiat, and 
Amazon. See Tom Fairless, Huge Profit Stokes Concerns over Starbucks’s Tax Practices in 
Europe, Wall St. J. (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/starbuckss-tax-practices-
draw-european-scrutiny-1428363189.  
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MNCs was perhaps unsurprising. This Part provides an overview of 
such transactions, their history, and the evolving set of regulatory con-
straints that the United States has promulgated in response. I then turn to 
a pragmatic analysis of which types of firms—in the light of these and 
other impediments—are likely the best (and worst) candidates to invert. 
The Part closes by analyzing in greater depth one such evident impedi-
ment: the requirement that inversion targets abandon U.S. (and most 
commonly Delaware) corporate law. Here, I argue that while this imped-
iment is clearly a real one historically, its significance has faded for pub-
licly traded companies over the last fifteen years, as federal mandates 
have progressively overshadowed and preempted state corporate gov-
ernance laws, effectively unbundling tax and governance. 
A. Overview and Regulatory Evolution 
The intent behind an inversion transaction is to relocate the tax resi-
dence of a U.S. MNC parent outside of U.S. jurisdiction, transplanting it 
into a jurisdiction offering a more favorable tax environment. As noted 
in the previous Part, there are a host of foreign jurisdictions that offer 
lower tax rates, territorial (rather than global) tax treatment, more flexi-
ble tax residency rules, and more liberal recognition rules than does the 
United States. The most creative forms of inversion transactions, there-
fore, attempt to capitalize on these differences in a way that is maximal-
ly beneficial—all things considered—for the inverting corporation.65 
Given the upsurge in inversion activity of late, it is important to keep 
in mind that tax-avoidance-motivated merger transactions are hardly 
new. Indeed, an early border skirmish in the public battle over inver-
sions took place over two decades ago, when in 1994, Helen of Troy, a 
publicly traded Delaware corporation in the personal care and cosmetics 
industry, formed a shell subsidiary in Bermuda (which at the time, as 
now, had no corporate income tax), causing the subsidiary to acquire the 
parent in a stock-for-stock transaction.66 Under the then-prevailing tax 
 
65 An inversion need not exploit all of these tax differences to be attractive. Ireland, for 
example, has been a popular recent inversion destination notwithstanding its worldwide tax 
regime, as its low headline rates and permissive tax avoidance rules tend to swamp other fac-
tors. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. 
66 A stock-for-stock acquisition of a parent by a wholly-owned subsidiary is a standard and 
unremarkable move in M&A (even if it has no logical parallel in, say, family law). Notably, 
another U.S. issuer, McDermott Inc., had done something similar to Helen of Troy in 1983, 
when it arguably pioneered this strategy to move its jurisdiction of incorporation to Panama. 
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rules, this transaction—like any other stock deal—was deemed nontaxa-
ble to U.S. shareholders.67 Once the transaction closed, moreover, the 
surviving parent continued to be traded in the U.S. public markets under 
Helen of Troy’s name, but with incorporation and tax residency in Ber-
muda. 
The Bermudan tax abduction of Helen of Troy raised considerable 
alarm at the time about the use of captive subsidiaries to escape U.S. tax 
treatment—sometimes known as a “naked” or “shell” inversion. The 
U.S. Department of the Treasury soon thereafter dispatched a response, 
in the form of a set of anti-inversion regulations promulgated in 1996. 
The ultimate reforms made a naked inversion decidedly more expensive 
by deeming it a taxable event to U.S. shareholders of the inverted com-
pany unless the U.S. target’s equity was diluted by new foreign owner-
ship by no less than 50%.68 
Although this first generation of reforms possibly deterred a fair 
number of inversion transactions, it proved little more than a nuisance to 
others.69 For example, the taxable nature of the transaction to sharehold-
ers mattered little if most shareholders of the inverting U.S. MNC were 
tax-exempt entities, or already had a high tax basis in their holdings, or 
were non-U.S. taxpayers. In addition, some acquisitions are designed to 
be taxable in any event (and many buyers in fact prefer taxable deals be-
 
See, e.g., Zachary Mider, The Greatest Tax Story Ever Told: How U.S. Companies Learned 
to Relocate their Official Addresses Overseas and Avoid Taxes—in One Operetta, Bloom-
berg Bus. (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2014-12-18/i-hear-
america-singing-never-pay-taxes-the-inversion-operetta (describing the transaction). 
67 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1994).  
68 See I.R.C. § 367 (2000) (allowing U.S. shareholders to recognize taxable gain (but not 
loss) in inversion transactions). Although such gain can be avoided in some circumstances, 
the § 367 implementing regulations make it effectively impossible to avoid them short of a 
significant shareholder dilution. Specifically, those conjunctive conditions are as follows: 
(a) The U.S. Target in the aggregate receives 50% or less (by vote and value) of the 
Non-U.S. Acquirer 
(b) The U.S. Target’s directors, officers, and 5% shareholders that are U.S. persons 
own 50% or less (by vote and market value) of the Non-U.S. Acquiror 
(c) The Non-U.S. Acquiror is engaged in an “active trade or business” outside the 
United States and the value of the Non-U.S. Acquiror is at least equal to the val-
ue of the U.S. Target, and 
(d) The U.S. shareholder either (i) owns less than 5% (by vote and value) of the 
Non-U.S. Acquiror or (ii) enters into a five-year “gain recognition agreement.” 
See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3, (as amended by T.D. 8702, 1997-8 I.R.B. 4). 
69 Indeed, it is possible that by clarifying the ground rules for consummating legitimate 
inversions, the reforms may have catalyzed other such transactions. See infra Figure 4 and 
accompanying text. 
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cause they involve an attractive basis adjustment to the target’s assets 
and goodwill). Finally, even if some subset of shareholders were re-
quired to recognize some tax liability at the individual level, those costs 
were arguably dwarfed in many cases by the prospect for greater tax 
savings at the corporate level. Consequently, even after the 1996 re-
forms, several public U.S. MNCs continued to pursue the strategy (ei-
ther by meeting the 50% threshold or by entering a taxable transac-
tion).70 Much of this calculus remains relevant today. 
Eight years later, through the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act,71 
Congress added a second round of double-barreled reforms that have be-
come the centerpiece for structuring most of today’s inversions. First, 
Section 4985 imposes a 15% “excise tax” on stock remuneration of of-
ficers, directors, and large block shareholders of the inverting compa-
ny—a measure clearly intended to visit direct financial consequences on 
corporate decision makers.72 The levy is triggered if the transaction re-
sults in the U.S. target’s shareholders retaining at least 60% ownership 
of the surviving entity (by vote or value).73 It is difficult to sidestep the 
excise tax in practice, although in some cases U.S. targets can accelerate 
the vesting schedules of stock options compensation packages to blunt 
its force. Many inversions also manipulate the incidence of the excise 
tax, “grossing up” the compensation of any directors, officers, or block 
shareholders for any additional tax liability owed. Though common-
place, such strategies can prove expensive, since gross-up payments are 
themselves subject to both the excise tax and personal income tax rates. 
The terms of the recent Medtronic-Covidien transaction, for example, 
required Medtronic to underwrite a $63 million dollar gross-up fund for 
 
70 Between the 1996 reforms and the subsequent 2004 reforms, nineteen public U.S. com-
panies executed inversion transactions, including Tyco (1997), Fruit of the Loom (1998), 
Ingersoll-Rand (2001), and Herbalife (2002). Appendix B contains a compilation public out-
bound inversion transactions since 1994. See Shayndi Raice, How Tax Inversions Became 
the Hottest Trend in M&A: Tax Inversions a Major Driver in Cross-Border Deals, Wall St. J. 
(Aug. 5, 2014, 3:34 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-tax-inversions-became-the-
hottest-trend-in-m-a-1407240175. 
71 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.) 
72 I.R.C. § 4985 (2012). 
73 See id. The tax applies to the equity compensation of officers, directors, and block 
shareholders of any affiliated group member who qualify as reporting persons under § 16(a) 
of the Exchange Act, as well as any fiduciary who held that position during the previous six 
months. Id. 
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its officers and directors, in order to offset (on an after-tax basis) an ini-
tial excise tax liability of no more than $23.25 million.74 
The second prong of the 2004 reforms was much more direct. Section 
7874 sets out criteria by which the IRS would simply ignore the expatri-
ation aim of the transaction, treating the surviving parent as a “surro-
gate” U.S. company—and taxing it as such—no matter where it was in-
corporated.75 Specifically, the section (and surrogate status) applies to 
transactions in which three conjunctive criteria are met: (1) the foreign 
buyer acquires (directly or indirectly) substantially all of the properties 
held by a U.S. corporation; (2) the former shareholders of the U.S. target 
end up owning at least a specified floor (either 60% or 80%) of the sur-
viving entity’s stock; and (3) the expanded affiliated group that includes 
the foreign acquiring corporation does not have “substantial business ac-
tivities” in the foreign acquiring corporation’s country of incorporation 
when compared to its overall business activities of the expanded affiliat-
ed group.76 Under the terms of Section 7874, an inversion transaction 
can still procure favorable tax treatment (and avoid U.S. taxation of the 
surviving entity) if the inverter can demonstrate that the transaction 
flunks at least one of the above three conditions. 
In many inversions, however—particularly those that are predomi-
nantly tax avoidance plays—conditions (1) and (3) are satisfied. The ac-
quiring foreign parent in a typical inversion traditionally does, in fact, 
acquire all or substantially all of the properties of the U.S. target—
indeed, the principal aim of such transactions is to remove those proper-
ties (to the extent possible) from U.S. tax treatment, which requires a 
substantial acquisition. (Moreover, standard successorship clauses in the 
target’s contractual instruments tend to require any sale to be a substan-
tial transfer.77) In addition, it is unlikely that a significant fraction of a 
U.S. inverter’s ventures will be located in the destination jurisdiction for 
the transaction (particularly if that jurisdiction is chosen predominantly 
 
74 Ajay Gupta, Grossing Up an Inversion Tax, 75 Tax Notes Int’l 806, 806 (Sept. 8, 2014). 
75 I.R.C. § 7874 (2012). 
76 Id. 
77 See Am. Bar Ass’n, Revised Model Simplified Indenture, 55 Bus. Law. 1115, §§ 5.01–
5.02, at 1134–35 (2000) (permitting substitution of acquiring company only upon consolida-
tion, merger, or transfer of all or substantially all assets). But see infra note 86 and accompa-
nying text (discussing “spinversions”). 
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for attractive tax rules), and thus the “no substantial business activities” 
criterion would be flunked only through fortunate coincidence.78 
Therefore, the surest course in most cases for an inversion to obtain 
favorable tax treatment is to focus on the ownership continuity thresh-
olds from condition (2) above. Section 7874 articulates two distinct cut-
off points for the maximum ownership stake the U.S. target’s sharehold-
ers are allowed to retain in the post-transaction entity. The resulting tax 
treatment of the surviving entity depends on which (if either) dilution 
threshold it obtains. The first (and most favorable) threshold kicks in 
when shareholders of the U.S. target retain less than 60% of the surviv-
ing foreign parent corporation (measured either by voting power or eco-
nomic value), by reason of their ownership of U.S. target corporation 
stock. When the former U.S. target shareholders are below this threshold 
(and thus their ownership is diluted by more than 40%), then the transac-
tion and the surviving entity receive extensive benefits, including full 
prospective recognition of the surviving parent by U.S. tax authorities as 
a foreign corporation. 
The benefits are still appreciable—though not quite as extensive—
when the magnitude of dilution is smaller (that is, when U.S. target 
shareholders end up owning more than 60% but less than 80% of the 
surviving parent entity). Here, the surviving entity still receives foreign 
residency tax status going forward, but there are some significant strings 
attached. In particular, certain gains recognized by the U.S. target in the 
inversion establish what amounts to a lower bound on the U.S. compa-
ny’s taxable income for the following ten years.79 Such amounts are tax-
able in full at the maximum corporate tax rate, with no standard offsets 
(such as net operating losses) to shield the liability.80 
 
78 Under new interpretive guidelines promulgated by the IRS in 2012, “substantial business 
activities” are present in any jurisdiction where the worldwide corporate group (post inversion) 
has at least 25% of its: (1) employees (including employee compensation); (2) assets; and (3) 
income. See T.D. 9592, 2012-28 I.R.B. 41, available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb12-28.pdf 
(explaining the temporary guidelines under Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-3T). Before 2012, that safe 
harbor had been 10%, a threshold that was decidedly easier to meet. Id. It is worth observing 
that a minority of recent inversions have nonetheless taken the position that the surviving 
company met the “substantial business activities” test in the incorporation site of the surviv-
ing entity. These include Aon Corp., Rowan Companies, Tim Hortons, and Western Gold-
fields.  
79 The U.S. company’s taxable income (now as a subsidiary) over this ten-year period can-
not be less than the “inversion gain,” meaning the gain recognized on its transfer of stock or 
assets plus certain royalty income from foreign affiliates. I.R.C. § 7874 (2012). 
80 Id. 
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Finally, if U.S. target shareholders retain 80% or more of the surviv-
ing parent (again measured either by voting power or value), then the 
foreign acquiring corporation is treated as a surrogate U.S. corporation 
for all U.S. tax purposes, and any of the foreign acquirer’s pre-
transaction subsidiaries become CFCs of the surrogate entity. At this 
threshold and above, the inversion not only fails as a tax avoidance 
mechanism, but it may actually invite greater tax liabilities to the extent 
that the foreign acquirer’s affiliates are now under U.S. tax jurisdiction.  
 



















Figure 4 provides a depiction of a typical inversion that is designed to 
satisfy the 60% or 80% continuity thresholds. In the figure, a foreign ac-
quirer creates a captive subsidiary (“Merger Sub”) that merges with the 
U.S. target, paying stock in the foreign acquirer as currency in the trans-
action.81 As a result of the merger, the foreign acquirer becomes the par-
 
81  While not pictured in Figure 4, keep in mind that the excise tax on compensation con-
tinues to apply when U.S. shareholders are diluted by less than 40%, and the transaction re-
mains taxable to the inverter’s shareholders when dilution falls short of 50%). The foreign 
subsidiary may formally be deemed the acquirer under the applicable merger statute (as il-
lustrated), or it may be acquired by the U.S. company in a “reverse subsidiary merger.” Alt-
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ent of the U.S. target (and all its subsidiaries). Former shareholders of 
the U.S. target emerge with stock of the foreign acquirer, and sit along-
side shareholders of the acquiring corporation with an ownership claim 
that is designed to meet the relevant threshold (either 60% or 80%, de-
pending on what tax benefits the parties are hoping to receive). 
In some transactions, it can be difficult to meet the relevant dilution 
thresholds, because the U.S. “target” is simply too large relative to the 
foreign “acquirer” to produce the desired extent of dilution at a fair ex-
change rate for the stock transaction. Consequently, many such deals 
have attempted to embellish the relative valuations of the parties—and 
thereby satisfy the threshold—through a series of transactions meant to 
put the U.S. corporation on a starvation diet and/or its foreign counter-
part on a fiscal bender. A common strategy for the former was to cause 
the U.S. target to pay a “skinny-down dividend,” such as by borrowing 
cash and paying it out as a dividend to shareholders, so as to reduce its 
net assets and equity value and make it more comparably sized to the 
target.82 Although longstanding IRS guidance dictated that such divi-
dends were to be ignored if their “principal purpose” was to avoid anti-
inversion regulations,83 there are often ways to mask the rationale behind 
the payment (including the use of cash as part of the consideration for 
the acquisition of the U.S. target in the merger itself). Another common 
strategy has been to “puff up” the evident value of the foreign acquirer 
through aggregating passive assets (such as cash or stock of other com-
panies) in retained earnings before executing the inversion.84 Other 
structuring tactics include having the U.S. target, prior to the transaction, 
spin off various divisions—or alternatively have the foreign buyer ac-
 
hough there are some tax implications of this latter structure, they are not as pertinent for the 
purposes of current discussion. 
82 Several inversion transactions, such as Argonaut/PXRE (2007) and Valeant/Biovail 
(2010), used such strategies. See, e.g., Valent Pharm. Int’l, Agreement and Plan of Merger 
(Form 8-k, Ex. 2.1), 87–88 (June 23, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/930184/000095012310060187/y85150exv2w1.htm.  
83 See I.R.C.§ 7874(c)(4) (“The transfer of properties or liabilities (including by contribu-
tion or distribution) shall be disregarded if such transfers are part of a plan a principal pur-
pose of which is to avoid the purposes of this section.”). 
84 See, e.g., William R. Pauls, Inversion Notice Boxes Out Foreign Insurers and Reinsur-
ers, 145 Tax Notes 1259, 1259–61 (Dec. 15, 2014) (noting that many foreign insurance and 
reinsurance companies that have been active in the inversions market have significant pas-
sive assets). 
TALLEY_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2015 1:40 PM 
1680 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:1649 
quire other foreign entities—to skew the balance.85 Similarly, some 
deals involved a spinoff of a portion of a U.S. target to a newly formed 
foreign corporation, distributing the stock of the new corporation to the 
target’s stockholders (also known as a “spinversion”).86 Such structures 
effectively reduce the size of the acquired entity relative to the acquiring 
foreign corporation, so as to satisfy the applicable dilution threshold un-
der Section 7874. If all else failed, one final approach would be to have 
some of the consideration come in cash, or simply to grant the foreign 
acquirer exceptionally attractive terms of exchange in the deal, so as to 
justify a valuation that appears to hit the targeted dilution threshold.87 
In addition to complying with the requisite conditions prescribed by 
the U.S. tax code, of course, the inversion transaction must also satisfy 
applicable conditions in the foreign jurisdiction where tax residency of 
the surviving entity is sought. Thus, for example, if the transaction seeks 
tax residency in a jurisdiction that utilizes a “corporate headquarters” 
test, the headquarters of the resulting entity could not remain in the 
United States, but would have to be moved to the foreign location. Many 
recent inversions with surviving Irish parent corporations (such as Med-







85 See, e.g., Ajay Gupta, News Analysis: Will PayPal’s Spinoff End in an Inversion—or 
Two?, 76 Tax Notes Int’l 188, 193–94 (Oct. 20, 2014) (analyzing the use of pre-transaction 
spinoffs for satisfying § 7874).  
86 One notable example is Mylan’s acquisition of Abbott Laboratories’ foreign generic 
drug assets. See Michelle Fay Cortez, Mylan to Add Abbott’s Generic-Drug Unit, Cut Tax 
Rate, Bloomberg Bus. (July 14, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-14/abbott-
to-sell-generic-drug-unit-to-mylan-for-5-3-billion.html. It should be noted that both spinoffs 
and “spinversions” may create problems in allocating the U.S. corporation’s debt, and some 
debt covenants specifically prohibit such piecemeal sales. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, 
Spin-Off Guide 1, 14 (2014), available at http://www.wlrk.com/files/2014/SpinOffGuide.pdf. 
87 Whether this last strategy might be a violation of fiduciary duties is a matter addressed 
below. See infra notes 108–07 and accompanying text. 
88 Joseph Walker, Medtronic’s Tax Inversion: Not as Easy as It Seems, Wall St. J. (June 19, 
2014, 7:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/medtronics-irish-jig-not-as-easy-as-it-seems-14
03220286. 
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Figure 5: Percentage Share of Surviving Inversion Entity Owned by 
Public Shareholders of the U.S. Target, by Relevant Ownership 






















Although the tax reforms of the 2000s clearly added teeth to the U.S. 
anti-inversion rules, the track record since suggests the changes were ei-
ther ineffectual or were overpowered by other factors. Indeed, in the 
decade between the Helen of Troy inversion and 2004, a total of twenty-
two inversions were announced in which a U.S. public company pro-
posed to move its tax home abroad. In the ensuing decade between the 
2004 reforms and 2014, in contrast, there have been more than twice that 
number (forty-nine), and twenty such transactions have been announced 
since 2012 alone.89 That is not to say that inversion transactions have 
been impervious to the evolving regulatory landscape: To the contrary, 
the nature and composition of deals have changed significantly in re-
sponse to the rule changes that have occurred over the last decade and a 
half. Figure 5 above illustrates one such change, summarizing the own-
 
89 See infra Appendix B; Raice, supra note 70. 
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ership fraction retained by public U.S. target shareholders of the surviv-
ing entity for announced inversions between 1994 and the end of 2014. 
As the figure demonstrates, deal structure has responded discernibly to 
the changing regulatory landscape. Before the 2004 reforms took effect, 
the vast majority (86%) of inversions skewed heavily towards “naked” 
self-inversions. That number declined significantly after the 2004 re-
forms (to 45%), as a greater fraction of deals were structured to comply 
with the relevant dilution threshold tests under Section 7874. Self-
inversions virtually disappeared from the scene after 2012, when addi-
tional IRS guidance tightened the “substantial business activities” test as 
an alternative to the dilution thresholds.90 Nevertheless, the tax ad-
vantages of inversions evidently remained too lucrative for many U.S. 
issuers to pass up. During the 2013–14 years, fully nine-tenths of an-
nounced deals fell within one of the two size dilution buckets prescribed 
under Section 7874 (60% and 80%). During the summer of 2014, just as 
President Obama was making the pronouncement reproduced at the be-
ginning of this Article, most analysts eagerly awaited what response (if 
any) would come from Congress, Treasury, or others. 
That response came in September 2014, when the U.S. Treasury is-
sued new Guidance intended to place more significant constraints on the 
attractiveness of tax inversions.91 The new Guidance did not (and indeed 
could not) alter the 60% or 80% statutory thresholds established under 
Section 7874. However, the new rules do make it harder for parties to 
engage in familiar parlor tricks designed to make a transaction compliant 
with targeted dilution thresholds. For example, the new restrictions 
heavily constrain skinny-down dividends, disregarding “extraordinary” 
dividends made during the three-year period that precedes the transac-
tion.92 Additionally, the value of the foreign acquirer must be computed 
independent of passive asset holdings (such as cash or passive invest-
 
90 See supra note 78. 
91 I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712. The Secretary of Treasury is given consider-
able authority under § 7874 to make adjustments to the application of the statute “as are nec-
essary to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of this section.” See I.R.C. § 7874(g) (2012). 
92 The Guidance defines such a dividend or dividends to be in excess of (1) all distribu-
tions made during the taxable year by the domestic target over (2) 110 percent of the average 
of all distributions during the 36-month period immediately preceding such taxable year. 
I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 714. Significantly, “distributions” is defined broadly 
in the Notice, and would implicate pre-inversion spinoffs (even if done tax-free under I.R.C. 
§ 355). See Gupta, supra note 85.  
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ments) when at least 50% of the entity’s assets are passive.93 The new 
rules also place new hurdles in the way of “spinversion” transactions by 
treating the spun-off assets (even if incorporated abroad) as a U.S. cor-
poration for tax purposes.94 Another important area where the 2014 
Guidance tightens up scrutiny is in post-inversion intercompany loans. 
The guidelines specifically deem as taxable “hopscotching” loans in 
which the CFCs owned by the U.S. target lend capital directly to the for-
eign acquirer. That is, these “hopscotching” loans are deemed for tax 
purposes to have been passed through the U.S. target—for a period of 
ten years after the inversion. Consequently, such payments continue to 
have to satisfy the I.R.C. Section 956 constraints discussed above,95 and 
are otherwise treated as taxable distributions to the U.S. target. 
It is still perhaps premature to declare definitively what durable ef-
fects the 2014 Guidance will have. On the one hand, the Guidance im-
poses nontrivial impediments for deal structuring, ones reflected in ac-
quisitions that were signed (but not closed) at the time of the rule 
change.96 In fact, the $55 billion AbbVie/Shire deal was ultimately de-
railed substantially by the new rules, with AbbVie opting to pay a $1.64 
billion break fee rather than attempt to restructure the transaction.97 
Moreover, the pace of inversions announced in the months following the 
release of the Guidance slowed to a relative trickle. The first four 
 
93 I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, 714. Prior guidelines excluded passive assets 
only if they were part of a transaction related to the merger (so-called “stuffing” transac-
tions).  
94 Specifically, the Guidance partially closes an exception in § 7874 that deals with inter-
nal group restructuring, and which had allowed U.S. parents to move assets to a foreign spin-
off entity, distributing the spun-off stock to the U.S. parent’s shareholders. The Guidance 
calls for future regulations that will deem such foreign spin-offs to be domestic corporations 
for U.S. tax purposes, thereby eviscerating the tax benefits of the restructuring transaction. 
See Fact Sheet: Treasury Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax Inversions, U.S. Department of the 
Treasury (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl2645.aspx. 
95 See supra notes 39–53 and accompanying text.  
96 These include the then-pending inversions of Abbott Labs/Mylan (a “spinversion”), 
Medtronic/Covidien, and AbbVie/Shire. Shares in each of these companies were off discern-
ibly in the hours after Treasury released the Guidance. See Maureen Farrell & Steven Rus-
solillo, The Inversion Trade: Stocks Selling Off on Treasury Guidance, Wall St. J. (Sept. 23, 
2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/09/23/the-inversion-trade-stocks-selling-off-
on-treasury-guidance. Nevertheless, only the AbbVie/Shire merger ended up being derailed 
by the new rules; the other two closed after some restructuring. See infra Appendix B. 
97 Shire Gets $1.64B Breakup Fee from AbbVie, CBS News (Oct. 20, 2014, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/shire-gets-1-64b-breakup-fee-from-abbvie. 
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months of 2015, for example, saw but two announced inversions98—far 
off the pace from a year before, even as overall M&A activity remained 
historically robust.99 
On the other hand, there are several signs that the reform may be too 
little too late for some potential targets. First, the act of clarifying the 
ground rules for inversions can, paradoxically, provide a strategic play-
book for architects of future transactions. (Perhaps consequently, more 
than a half dozen U.S. companies announced inversions after new re-
forms were proposed in September 2014.)100 Second, within some indus-
tries (such as pharmaceuticals), the emigration genie appears not only to 
be out of the bottle, but acting as a veritable M&A shadchan: Several of 
the surviving foreign entities from previous inversions (such as Activis, 
Mylan, Endo, Tim Hortons, and Valeant) are now large enough to satis-
fy relevant tax dilution thresholds with many U.S. targets. And accord-
ingly, several have been lining up for seconds (if not thirds).101 
 
98 These are Arris (April 2015) and Cyberonics (February 2015). See Cecile Daurat & Amy 
Thomson, Pace Soars as Arris Agrees to $2.1 Billion Inversion Deal, Bloomberg Bus. (Apr. 23, 
2015, 5:09 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-22/arris-agrees-to-acquire-
u-k-based-pace-for-2-1-billion. 
99 Dan Primack, M&A Mania: Deal Activity Hits 8-year High, Fortune (Mar. 31, 2015, 
3:37 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/03/31/ma-mania-deal-activity-hits-8-year-high. 
100 See All My Bags Are Packed: Corporate America’s Tax-Driven Exodus Continues, The 
Economist (August 15, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21660986-corporate-
americas-tax-driven-exodus-continues-all-my-bags-are-packed. As one commentator put it: “In 
a perverse way, Treasury’s most effective weapon may have been ambiguity . . . . [W]ith [the] 
guidance, it is likely that lawyers will attempt to restructure many transactions to satisfy the 
new rules.” Howard Gleckman, Treasury’s New Rules May Slow, But Won’t Stop Corporate 
Tax Inversions, Forbes (Sept. 23, 2014, 6:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2014/
09/23/treasurys-new-rules-may-slow-but-wont-stop-corporate-tax-inversions.  
101 The cross-border acquisitive activity of such prior inverters has thus far been limited 
however: Although the number of outbound acquisitions (inversions and others combined) in 
the months since the Treasury’s crackdown declined, the aggregate dollar volume of an-
nounced outbound deals increased somewhat. See David Crow et al., Tax Inversion Curb 
Turns Tables on U.S., Fin. Times (Mar. 15, 2015, 10:36 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
e1ba6eb0-ca5c-11e4-b8ff-00144feab7de.html#axzz3UVhNpbS5. That said, the uptick in 
outright foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms (to the extent one exists) is more likely a piece of 
a dramatic increase in overall global M&A activity during this time. See Amanda Athana-
siou, Did Treasury Cause an Increase in Foreign Takeovers?, 78 Tax Notes Int’l 514, 514 
(May 11, 2015). 
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B. You Get an Inversion; YOU Get an Inversion; EVERYBODY Gets an 
Inversion?102 
Given the tax inversion’s prominence in contemporary policy debates, 
one might conclude that it is now a dominant strategy for most/all do-
mestic MNCs. Empirical evidence does not bear out that inference: De-
spite extensive media coverage, comparatively few inversion transac-
tions have been executed during the last two decades.103 The overall 
modesty of these numbers plausibly reflects the complicated and idio-
syncratic regulatory landscape surrounding inversions. Some U.S. com-
panies are likely—even after the most recent Treasury Guidance—to 
want to pursue them still; but for others, the costs and difficulties of in-
versions are likely to be prohibitive relative to other available options. 
Put simply, inverting is not the most profitable strategy for all firms, 
suggesting that the current wave may well abate without additional regu-
latory reforms.  
Although cataloguing each consideration relevant to inversion calcu-
lus is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worthwhile noting some of 
the most significant ones briefly: 
Domestic Orientation: As noted above, the principal benefit of invert-
ing comes from the favorable tax treatment accorded to taxable in-
come earned abroad. If a U.S. corporation’s income is derived largely 
from domestic operations, most of its earnings will remain taxed at 
U.S. rates, regardless of the jurisdiction of incorporation. Similarly, 
the subsidiaries of the U.S. target often still fall under American tax 
rules after the inversion.104 
Alternative Strategies: Even for MNCs with substantial international 
operations, it is important to keep in mind that inversions are but one 
of several tax management tactics in play. The various noninversion 
strategies for reducing or deferring domestic tax liabilities (detailed at 
length above105) continue to be available alternatives to an inversion. 
Consequently, while the 2014 Guidance appears to have fallen short of 
 
102 See Look Back at Oprah’s Free-Car Giveaway, The Oprah Winfrey Show (Sept. 13, 
2004), http://www.oprah.com/oprahshow/Oprahs-Entire-Audience-Are-Surprised-with-New-
Cars-Video.  
103 By my count, there were approximately seventy inversion transactions announced be-
tween 1994 and 2014, or between three and four per year. See infra Appendix B. 
104 Walker, supra note 88.  
105 See supra notes 25–64 and accompanying text. 
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quashing the profitability of all inversions, it may still have deterred a 
significant fraction of firms from pursuing that path, simply by mak-
ing other conventional tax avoidance strategies marginally more at-
tractive by comparison. 
Stockpiled Foreign Tax Credits: The CFCs of several large U.S. mul-
tinationals—particularly in natural resource extraction industries—pay 
significant concession fees to foreign governments that are routinely 
(if controversially) characterized in part as taxes, even when the for-
eign country has otherwise miniscule corporate income tax rates.106 
Over time, such MNCs have amassed large arsenals of foreign tax 
credits that can help shield future repatriated distributions. Inverting 
would likely cause such companies to squander these considerable tax 
assets. 
Shareholder Opposition: Some U.S. shareholders may find inversion 
transactions objectionable for a variety of reasons. First, as noted 
above, the applicable tax rules require these transactions to dilute U.S. 
shareholders, thereby giving them less influence over the surviving 
company. Second, most such transactions—unless significantly dilu-
tive—are taxable to U.S. stockholders, regardless of the consideration 
paid. Should the U.S. target have significant numbers of taxable U.S. 
shareholders with large capital gains, or significant holdings by 
founders or other holders who want to maintain a modicum of influ-
ence, an inversion transaction might prove extremely unpopular, mak-
ing approval less certain.107 
A Bleak (and Expensive) Singles Scene: In some industries, the popu-
lation of acceptable foreign dancing partners is small, and potentially 
expensive. Even if a willing partner emerges, it can be hard to find one 
that is sufficiently large to meet the dilution thresholds described 
above (particularly so after the 2014 Guidance made it difficult to ma-
nipulate these boundaries). This scarcity is perhaps reflected in the 
terms of some recent deals, where the implied valuations have been 
eye-popping. AbbVie, for example, agreed to terms that valued its 
U.K. counterpart, Shire, at twenty-four times Shire’s EBITDA and 
 
106 See Exxon Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 338, 359–60 (1999); Phillips Petroleum v. 
Comm’r, 104 T.C. 256, 257–62, 316 (1995). 
107 Laura Saunders, An ‘Inversion’ Deal Could Raise Your Taxes: Shareholders Are Like-
ly to Owe Capital-Gains Tax, Wall St. J. (Aug. 1, 2014, 12:34 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/how-a-corporate-inversion-could-raise-your-taxes-1406910874. 
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Medtronic agreed to a 14.3 multiple for Covidien, discernibly above 
recent norms.108 Moreover, deals that run very close to these dilution 
margins can be risky and challenging to structure. For example, it may 
be prohibitively hard to negotiate a “floating” exchange rate in a mer-
ger (which could turn on the U.S. target’s stock price), since a sudden 
upturn in the target’s value could cause the terms of the deal to trip a 
dilution threshold (with adverse tax consequences). 
Legal Challenges: Almost all acquisitions of public companies give 
rise to some sort of legal challenge. Inversion transactions—
notwithstanding their tax benefits—are no exception. The terms of the 
acquisition may be subject to a host of potential challenges, ranging 
from complaints about the imposition of tax liability, to self-dealing, 
to Blasius-based challenges of improper manipulation of the share-
holder governance franchise, to Revlon-based challenges asserting that 
the foreign acquirer received excessively generous terms of trade 
(possibly to make the transaction meet the relevant dilution thresh-
old).109 
Technical Challenges: Because inversion transactions are virtually all 
strategic (rather than financial) mergers, there can be challenges in in-
 
108 See Soyoung Kim, Amid Tax Inversion Craze, Some U.S. Companies Get Cold Feet, 
Reuters (Aug. 25, 2014, 6:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/25/usa-tax-
inversions-bubble-idUSL2N0QR12W20140825. EBITDA stands for “earnings before inter-
est, tax, depreciation and amortization,” and such multiples are a standard benchmark for 
valuations. In recent years, mean deal multiples have tended on average to be comfortably 
below 10x. See, e.g., Am. Appraisal, Global M&A Valuation Outlook 2014, at 6, available 
at http://global.american-appraisal.com/AA-Files/Library/PDF/MAGlobalOutlook_2014.pdf.  
109 See, e.g., C & J Energy Servs. v. City of Miami Gen. Emp. and Sanitation Emp. Ret. 
Trust, 107 A.3d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. 2014); City of Miami Gen. Emp. and Sanitation Emp. 
Ret. Trust v. C & J Energy Services, No. 9980-VCN, 2014 WL 6696435 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
(applying Revlon scrutiny to an inversion transaction structured to transfer more than fifty 
percent of control of the U.S. Target to a controlled foreign acquirer, in order to satisfy dilu-
tion thresholds under I.R.C. §§ 7874 and 367). In December 2014, the Delaware Supreme 
Court reversed, holding Vice Chancellor Noble had misconstrued what Delaware law re-
quires of a target board in a Revlon transaction. The Supreme Court assumed for discussion, 
however, that Revlon was applicable, refraining from making a determination on whether 
reserving significant post-acquisition minority rights could render the Revlon test inapplica-
ble. See C & J Energy Serv., 107 A.3d at 1052–53 (Del. 2014). Shareholders have also chal-
lenged “grossing up” provisions in deals meant to make executives and directors whole for 
the inversion excise tax. Such a suit is currently in progress regarding the Medtronic deal. 
Marino Eccher, Medtronic Shareholder Sues over Merger Tax Compensation Plan, Pioneer 
Press (Oct. 6, 2014, 7:02 PM), http://www.twincities.com/business/ci_26674591/medtronic-
shareholder-sues-over-merger-tax-compensation-plan. 
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tegrating the operations of the two participants. Corporate cultures and 
legal traditions can differ significantly. Moreover, inversions can re-
quire shifting to different accounting protocols (for example, GAAP to 
IFRS), which can prove cumbersome. 
Regulatory Challenges: Particularly large transactions may face sig-
nificant regulatory risk from competition authorities, foreign-direct-
investment boards and even takeover panels. Particularly in industries 
where deal momentum has been considerable, industry concentration 
may soon grow substantial enough to invite serious antitrust scrutiny 
to new acquisitions (a factor that ultimately stymied the inversion 
transaction between Applied Materials and Tokyo Electron110). To the 
extent that such scrutiny entails some discretion by government actors, 
the current maelstrom surrounding inversions in the United States may 
heighten that risk further. Moreover, a significant form of regulatory 
risk can come from U.S. and foreign tax authorities themselves, who 
can (and do) retroactively alter the rules on tax treatment when a deal 
is part way between signing and closing (as occurred with the now-
abandoned Abbvie-Shire transaction111). 
Jurisdictional Roulette: A final possible downside to inverting—and 
one that animates much of the rest of this Article—is jurisdictional: 
Under U.S. tax rules, an inversion requires moving the firm’s incorpo-
ration home away from the familiar jurisprudential stomping grounds 
for U.S. public companies—typically Delaware law112—and into the 
domain of a foreign jurisdiction (such as Ireland, the U.K., Canada, 
etc.). Not only might that new jurisdiction be relatively unfamiliar, but 
surrendering U.S. law could prove particularly costly for those firms 
and investors that benefit by “bonding” to the contours of Delaware 
law. Moreover, the Delaware safety net likely earns its keep at pivotal 
crisis moments in a corporation’s lifetime, where both the Chancery 
Court and the Delaware Supreme Court have developed reputations 
for swift, sophisticated, principled, and relatively predictable adjudica-
 
110 See Takashi Mochizuki et al., Applied Materials, Tokyo Electron Cancel Merger Plan; 
Deal Collapses After Firms Give up on Winning Antitrust Approval, Wall St. J. (Apr. 27, 2015, 
10:42 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/applied-materials-tokyo-electron-scrap-merger-plan-
1430117758. 
111 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
112 As detailed below, approximately 64% of U.S. inversion targets since 1994 (forty-six 
of seventy-two) expatriated from Delaware—a proportion that reflects Delaware’s overall 
dominance in public company incorporations. See infra Appendix B. 
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tion.113 How a foreign jurisdiction handles similar crisis moments is 
still unclear.114 Inverting can thus carry a material collateral cost as to 
corporate internal affairs—the company must trade in a strong and 
familiar hand for a brand new deck with a brand new dealer.115 
Although it is unlikely that each of the aforementioned factors carries 
identical weight for all aspiring inverters, their aggregation can be suffi-
cient to render the tax inversion game unworthy of the candle—at least 
for some companies. Perhaps consequently, some commentators have 
pointed to signs (corroborated by early data) that the inversion frenzy 
will begin to slow on its own accord, even without an extra push from 
tax policy.116 
C. Internal Affairs, Corporate Governance, and the Loss of Delaware 
Jurisprudence 
This Part closes by offering a more in-depth analysis of the final of 
the aforementioned costs of inverting: the loss of U.S. (and often Dela-
ware) jurisprudence to expatriating corporations. How large a cost is as-
sociated with swapping Wilmington for London or Belfast? Reasonable 
minds can (and do) differ, and the issue is challenging to measure empir-
ically. Nonetheless, Delaware’s traditional dominance in attracting in-
corporations—and its record of maintaining that dominance—has been 
the topic of untold reams of academic writing. The prevailing views fall 
into one of three general camps, summarized below. 
According to one line of argument, Delaware’s focal popularity is an 
artifact of a regulatory “race to the bottom,” in which corporate manag-
ers prefer Delaware because it offers a manager-friendly structure that 
(in their minds) takes precedence over broader considerations of share-
 
113 See, e.g., Donald F. Parsons Jr. & Joseph R. Slights III, The History of Delaware’s 
Business Courts: Their Rise to Preeminence, 17 Bus. L. Today, March/April 2008, at 21, 22–
23, available at https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2008-03-04/slights.shtml. 
114 As one senior partner put it in a recent interview: “It sounds easy enough when you are 
just scheduling quarterly board meetings in some exotic locations. . . . But then if you’re in 
the middle of an M&A deal or activist situation and the board has to meet frequently, we’ve 
seen this can become an administrative burden.” Kim, supra note 108 (quoting Mario Ponce 
of Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett). 
115 As I will argue below, however, this last collateral cost may not be as large as it once 
was, due to the progressive federalization of corporate governance. See infra Section II.C. 
116 See Kim, supra note 108. 
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holder (or company) welfare.117 According to this account, corporate 
boards and CEOs—who control incorporation and reincorporation deci-
sions—are naturally drawn to jurisdictions that provide them with a 
buffer against liability and shareholder monitoring. Consequently, regu-
latory competition tends to reward jurisprudential pandering to manage-
rial self-interest and private benefits of control. 
A second camp argues that Delaware’s persistent position as a juris-
prudential juggernaut is due to path dependent network externalities, 
whatever the reasons for the state’s initial dominance.118 According to 
this account, most practicing lawyers have been traditionally schooled in 
Delaware corporate law, and they therefore have a natural inclination to 
preserving its contours. Therefore, regulatory competition is likely to 
have muted effects, since incumbent legal professionals have a stake in 
(and comfort with) the current dominant regime.119 
A third camp—and likely a measured majority of corporate law 
scholars and practitioners—tends to believe that corporate governance 
“matters,” and that Delaware’s legal framework and accompanying in-
stitutions add—all told—net economic value to public companies by en-
couraging governance practices that tend to serve shareholders’ inter-
ests.120 Even assuming managers would otherwise covet a management 
friendly (and investor unfriendly) regime, the argument goes, embracing 
such a regime would substantially impair the firm’s access to low-cost 
debt and equity capital. Other U.S. jurisdictions more unabashed in their 
 
117 E.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate 
Law?, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1775, 1783 (2002); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate 
Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 663 (1974). 
118 E.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 
55 Stan. L. Rev. 679, 738–39 (2002). 
119 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 Yale L.J. 553, 557 (2002) (ar-
guing Delaware’s powerful incumbency deters active state competition). 
120 Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 148 (1993); Robert Daines, 
Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? 62 J. Fin. Econ. 525, 533 (2001) (arguing Dela-
ware law enhances shareholder value by as much as five percent); Daniel R. Fischel, The 
“Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corpo-
ration Law, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913, 919–20 (1982); William Savitt, The Genius of the Mod-
ern Chancery System, 2012 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 570, 571; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, 
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 275–76 
(1977); Albert B. Crenshaw, Delaware Inc., Wash. Post (May 7, 2000) http://www.washington
post.com/archive/business/2000/05/07/delaware-inc/fddd53ab-ebde-4176-9ce5-6817f2af609f; 
Steven Lipin, Firms Incorporated in Delaware Are Valued More by Investors, Wall St. J. (Feb. 
28, 2000, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB951694281741477590.  
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solicitude for managerial interests, by contrast, have attracted less stable 
firms that tend to manifest more problems for investors.121 (The state of 
the literature regarding foreign jurisdictions—including popular inver-
sion destinations—remains sparse.122) 
Empirically, the proposition that Delaware law creates value (at least 
historically) enjoys some support. Through the end of the 1990s, in fact, 
Delaware incorporation tended to predict significantly greater profitabil-
ity and enterprise value than did non-Delaware incorporation.123 Later 
research, however, has begun to demonstrate that the “Delaware effect” 
has been inconsistent in the years since, with a tendency towards sub-
stantial atrophy over that time.124 Recent work by Martijn Cremers and 
Simone Sepe, for example, finds that the traditional valuation premium 
on Delaware incorporation abated substantially over the course of the 
decade from 2002 through 2012,125 an effect corroborated in other 
measures of jurisdictional quality as well.126 There are likely many rea-
sons for this atrophying trend. However, one roughly contemporaneous 
phenomenon—documented at some length by Mark Roe127 and others—
concerned the interplay between state and federal securities law (as dis-
cussed in greater detail below). 
In some contrast, substantial empirical evidence suggests that listing 
in U.S. securities markets is associated with positive and persistent eco-
nomic value creation. A large literature on cross-listed issuers, for ex-
ample, demonstrates that listing on U.S. securities markets is associated 
 
121 Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax 
Law, 27 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3593, 3594–96 (2014) (finding that Nevada incorporations are sig-
nificantly more likely to restate earnings than non-Nevada incorporators). 
122 See Manuel Ammann et al., Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance, and 
Firm Value: Evidence from the EU-Area 1–7 (Apr. 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1771622) (reviewing literature). 
123 See Daines, supra note 120, at 527–28. 
124 Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 32, 33 
(2004). 
125 K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Whither Delaware? Limited Commitment 
and the Financial Value of Corporate Law 2, 19–20 (Nov. 4, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2519238). 
126 See Brian R. Cheffins, et al., The Race to the Bottom Recalculated: Scoring Corporate 
Law Over Time 82 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 261/2014, 
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475242 (“Our deployment of leximetric analy-
sis indicates, for instance, there has been erosion of shareholder protections offered by state 
law over the past century. This erosion was generally modest, however, suggesting that if 
there was a meaningful race to the bottom, it did not occur during the twentieth century.”).  
127 Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588, 592–93 (2003). 
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with positive price reactions.128 Some of this literature suggests that a 
key driver of this market premium comes through “bonding” of foreign 
firms to the more demanding standards (including those related to corpo-
rate governance) in the United States.129 Although others have disputed 
the channels through which this premium occurs,130 the bonding hypoth-
esis continues to have significant support in the academic community.131 
Perhaps a more telling understanding of the value of U.S. incorpora-
tion versus U.S. listing lies in understanding the joint relationship be-
tween them. Well into the late twentieth century, the two were con-
ceived as legally orthogonal: Corporate law and governance matters 
were considered the unique province of state law; U.S. securities regula-
tion focused, in contrast, on maintaining a well-functioning trading mar-
ket. This division of jurisdictional labor was famously acknowledged by 
the U.S. Supreme Court nearly four decades ago: 
[W]e are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of 
corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly 
where established state policies of corporate regulation would be over-
ridden. . . . “Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors 
commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, 
except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of 
 
128 See, e.g., John Ammer et al., Why Do U.S. Cross-Listings Matter? 1–4 (May 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1146605) (reviewing the lit-
erature and independently exploring the impact of cross-listing on stock value). 
129 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Conver-
gence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641, 691–92, 706–
07 (1999) (analyzing the role of bonding in foreign issuers’ decisions to list in the U.S. mar-
kets); Craig Doidge et al., Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, 71 J. 
Fin. Econ. 205, 209–10 (2004) (arguing that cross-listing in the United States reins in expro-
priation by dominant and controlling shareholders, as well as other agency costs); René M. 
Stulz, Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital, 12 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 8, 
9 (1999) (arguing that effective corporate governance lowers the cost of capital by reducing 
information and agency costs). 
130 Amir N. Licht et al., What Makes the Bonding Stick? A Natural Experiment Involving 
the U.S. Supreme Court and Cross-Listed Firms 29–32 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 
No. 11-072, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1744905; Sergei Sarkissian & Mi-
chael J. Schill, The Nature of the Foreign Listing Premium: A Cross-Country Examination 
4–5 (Darden Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 1639848, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1639848. 
131 Moreover, even if the U.S. listing premium is due to forces other than U.S. legal struc-
ture (for example, reputational bonding, or simply the liquidity of U.S. markets), the fact that 
this benefit is not easily replicated makes it a plausible target for tax levies, as discussed fur-
ther below. 
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directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the inter-
nal affairs of the corporation.”132 
Times have indeed changed. Although the separation of corporate and 
securities law was never entirely air-tight, the acoustic separation be-
tween them began disintegrating substantially after the bursting of the 
dot-com bubble, as securities law began increasingly and progressively 
to colonize corporate governance, preempting and displacing the man-
dates of state corporate law. While this federal incursion into govern-
ance has occurred along multiple fronts, at its vanguard have been two 
landmark pieces of legislation (and their implementing regulations): the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”)133 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).134 
The substantial federalization of corporate governance is multi-
dimensional and widely acknowledged, drawing the attention of aca-
demic commentators, judges, and regulators over recent years,135 along 
with a lively—if characteristically raucous—debate about its normative 
desirability.136 This federalization trend also appears manifest empirical-
 
132 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 
66, 84 (1975) (emphasis added)). 
133 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
U.S.C.). 
134 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of U.S.C.). 
135 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance 
Round II, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1779, 1780–89, 1794–96 (2011); William W. Bratton and Joseph 
A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 
619, 622–23 (2006); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Govern-
ance, 95 Va. L. Rev. 685, 694–95 (2009); Jill E. Fisch, The New Federal Regulation of Cor-
porate Governance, 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 39, 39–41 (2004); Mark J. Roe, A Spatial 
Representation of Delaware-Washington Interaction in Corporate Lawmaking, 2012 Colum. 
Bus. L. Rev. 553, 554–56; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of 
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521, 1523–29 (2005); Joel Seligman, A Mod-
est Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1159, 1159 (2005); Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive 
Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 Bus. Law. 1079, 1081–82 (2008); Daniel M. 
Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 26th Annual Corporate Law In-
stitute, Tulane University Law School: Federal Preemption of State Corporate Governance 
(Mar. 27, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/13705413159
52#.Uzr4pRb31US. 
136 Compare Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-U.S. Companies 
Cross-Listed in the U.S., 13 J. Corp. Fin. 195, 226 (2007) (showing negative effects of SOX 
on foreign companies cross-listed in the U.S. exchanges), with Marcelo Bianconi et al., Firm 
Value, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Cross-Listing in the U.S., Germany, and Hong Kong 
Destinations, 24 N. Am. J. Econ. & Fin. 25, 42–43 (2013) (finding that SOX appears to have 
TALLEY_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2015 1:40 PM 
1694 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:1649 
ly, as federal law has increasingly begun to overshadow state law in 
providing the investor protections that are commonly included in stand-
ard corporate governance indexes.137 In some instances, the SOX-Dodd 
Frank-era reforms extended or sharpened preexisting state law man-
dates; more often, however, the new rules entered arenas where state law 
was silent—implicitly permitting issuer flexibility. Consider a sampling 
of the corporate governance mandates that have become enshrined in 
federal securities law during the last fifteen years alone: 
Internal Controls: Perhaps the most notorious mandate introduced by 
SOX is a requirement to include in the firm’s annual report assess-
ments by the chief executive officer, chief financial officer, and an 
outside auditor of the effectiveness of the firm’s internal controls over 
the accuracy of financial statements.138 
Certification of Financial Statements: Chief executive officers and 
chief financial officers of U.S. issuers are required to certify the accu-
racy of the firm’s periodic reports, and are subject to criminal penal-
ties for false certifications.139 
Executive Compensation Restrictions: Senior officers and directors are 
now precluded from receiving many types of loans from their corpora-
tions.140 Moreover, such fiduciaries are now required to make a signif-
icantly more complete disclosure of the elements of their executive 
pay,141 as well as a clear exposition of the relationship between execu-
 
discouraged U.S.-destination cross-listings, but that firms already cross-listed in the U.S. 
“commanded a premium, due to the market perception of higher standards”). 
137 See, e.g., Cheffins et al., supra note 126 (conducting a historical “leximetric” analysis 
of shareholder protections in Delaware, Illinois, and the collection of Model Business Corpo-
ration Act states, and finding that federal mandates have become the dominant driver of 
shareholder protections in the modern era).  
138 17 C.F.R. §§ 299, 308 (2011); see Management’s Report on Internal Control over Fi-
nancial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 36,636, 36,636 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 
270, and 274). 
139 See Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 57,276, 57,280 (Sept. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 
270, and 274).  
140 SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 403, 116 Stat. 745, 787 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78m(k) (2012)). 
141 See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 
53,168–70, 53,208–09 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 232, 239, 
240, 245, 249, and 274). 
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tive compensation and the issuer’s financial performance.142 Under a 
recent SEC rule change pursuant to Dodd-Frank, moreover, issuers 
will be required to disclose the ratio of their CEO’s pay to that of the 
median employee.143 In addition, in the event of an accounting re-
statement, the CEO and CFO must return to the issuer bonuses, incen-
tives, or equity-based compensation they received prior to the issuance 
of the restated financials, along with any profits they realized from the 
sale of corporate stock during that period.144 Further regulations re-
garding “pay for performance” of CEOs also appear to be in the works 
as of this writing.145 
Board & Committee Structure: All publicly traded U.S. firms were re-
quired under SOX to have audit committees composed exclusively of 
independent directors.146 Later reforms from the exchanges required 
majority independence of public companies’ boards,147 as well as in-
dependence of all members of an issuer’s compensation committee 
(and its advisers), the latter reform required by Dodd-Frank.148 
Broker Voting of Shares: Under a series of NYSE rule changes, bro-
ker-dealers are no longer permitted to vote “uninstructed” shares of 
beneficial owners who have not submitted proxy instructions related 
to directorial elections149 and executive compensation matters.150 
 
142 Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 953, 124 Stat. 1376, 1903 (2010) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78n (2012)).  
143 Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9877, Exchange Act Release No. 
75610, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,104 (Aug. 18, 2018). 
144 Id. § 954, 124 Stat. at 1904 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4(b) (2012)); SOX § 304, 116 
Stat. at 778 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2012)). 
145 See, e.g., Sunshine Act Meeting Notice, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 22, 2015), http://
www.sec.gov/news/openmeetings/2015/ssamtg042915.htm (announcing plans to consider a 
regulation “requiring registrants to disclose in a clear manner the relationship between exec-
utive compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the registrant”). 
146 SOX § 301, 116 Stat. at 775–76 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2012)). 
147 See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes and Amendments Relating to Corporate 
Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,154–55, 64,175–76 (Nov. 12, 2003). 
148 17 C.F.R. § 240.10C-1(b) (2014); see Listing Standards for Compensation Committees, 
77 Fed. Reg. 38,422, 38,428 (June 27, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 229 and 240). 
149 Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 4, to Amend 
NYSE Rule 452 and Corresponding Listed Company Manual Section 402.08 to Eliminate 
Broker Discretionary Voting for the Election of Directors, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,293, 33,293 (July 
1, 2009). 
150 Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Eliminate Broker Discre-
tionary Voting on Executive Compensation Matters, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,152, 56,152–54 (Sept. 
15, 2010). 
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Say on Pay: Under Dodd-Frank, issuers are required to conduct a non-
binding vote of shareholders no less frequently than once every three 
years to approve the compensation of a public company’s named ex-
ecutive officers.151 
Proxy Access: The SEC was given authority under Dodd-Frank to alter 
the rules relating to shareholder proxy voting of issuers.152 Shortly af-
ter its passage, the SEC promulgated several proxy access rules related 
to shareholder proposals and director nominations, although the most 
potent among them, Rule 14a-11, was subsequently challenged and 
(controversially) invalidated in the D.C. Circuit.153 Left intact, howev-
er, was a provision explicitly permitting shareholders to propose by-
law amendments that would require granting nomination power to 
qualifying shareholders.154 
CEO/Chair Identities: Public companies are required to disclose 
whether the same person or different persons hold the positions of 
CEO and Chairman of the Board.155 
Fiduciary Duties: The common law fiduciary obligations imposed on 
officers, directors, and dominant shareholders are a defining characteris-
tic of state corporate law. Even here, however, several post-Dodd-Frank 
judicial decisions involving information management and insider trad-
ing have begun to embrace explicitly a federal standard for fiduciary du-
ties, purportedly drawn from “federal common law.”156 
 
151 Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1900 (2010) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)). 
152  § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012)). 
153 For an analysis of the challenge to Rule 14a-11, see Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, On 
Experimentation and Real Options in Financial Regulation, 43 J. Legal Stud. S121 (2014). 
154 After initially siding with issuers’ attempts to exclude such proposals under the provi-
sions of Rule 14a-8(i)(9) (dealing with proposals that conflict directly with management 
proposals), the SEC has since retrenched to study the proper scope and application of the 
section. See Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement from Chair White Di-
recting Staff to Review Commission Rule for Excluding Conflicting Proxy Proposals (Jan. 
16, 2015) (available at http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-conflicting-proxy-
proposals.html). 
155 Dodd-Frank § 972, 124 Stat. at 1915 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-2 (2012)). 
156 See, e.g., United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 367, 371 (2d Cir. 2014); cf. Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. 
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Related Party Transactions: Public companies are required to conduct 
appropriate oversight and disclosure of all related party transactions 
for potential conflicts of interest.157 
Shareholder Dilution: Public companies are required to obtain a 
shareholder vote before any transaction or issuance of securities that 
would result in a dilution of shareholders by twenty percent or 
more.158 
Whistleblower Protections: The SEC is required to pay bounties (of 
between ten and thirty percent of the amount collected) to individuals 
who voluntarily provide original information leading to the successful 
SEC enforcement of a violation of federal securities laws resulting in 
monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million.159 
It is important to acknowledge that the progressive federalization of 
corporate governance—while substantial—has not been absolute, and 
certain core tenets of state law have remained important factors in firm 
governance. One domain where state law arguably retains appreciable 
mojo is in antitakeover jurisprudence, where the Delaware Chancery 
Court is an acknowledged bellwether, and where securities law has thus 
far remained largely peripheral. An expatriated U.S. company could eas-
ily find itself the target of a hostile suitor, and beholden to the mandates 
of an adopted jurisdiction that is both unfamiliar and relatively unfriend-
ly towards antitakeover devices (such as poison pills, staggered boards, 
and other “embedded” defenses160). The vast majority of recent inver-
 
Reserve Bank of N.Y., 742 F.3d 37, 38, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding federal common law 
fiduciary duty principles trump Delaware state law when a “federal instrumentality” is the 
purported defendant). This trend was arguably invited by the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 
10b5-2 in 2000, setting out federal standards for duties of “trust and confidence” in insider 
trading contexts. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2014). 
157 Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,252–
54 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.404). Although disclosure of a related 
party had been mandatory in some form since the early 1980s, the 2006 reform was substan-
tial and defended by the SEC as justified because of the “many developments since then, in-
cluding the increasing focus on corporate governance and director independence.” Id. at 
53,161.  
158 NYSE Listed Co. Manual R. 312.03 (2015); see also NASDAQ Listing R. 5635 (2009). 
While these rules predated Sarbanes-Oxley, both were amended in the years since. 
159 Dodd-Frank § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841–42 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)). 
160 See generally Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of 
Shareholder Choice, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577 (2003) (describing various forms of explicit and 
embedded takeover defenses). 
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sions, for example, have incorporated in European Union states, and are 
potentially subject both to the E.U. Takeover Directive, as well as the 
jurisdiction of country-specific takeover panels, both of which take a 
dim (if not prohibitory) view of measures that “frustrate” hostile suit-
ors.161 For U.S. MNCs contemplating inversions, then, the loss of anti-
takeover protections may impose a price that is excessively steep. 
That said, the cost of forsaking American antitakeover law may be 
tolerable—even trivial—for many U.S. targets for several reasons. First, 
controlled U.S. targets that remain controlled after an inversion transac-
tion have little to fear from takeover battles to begin with. Second, in 
some prominent inversion destinations, the company may be able to 
elude local takeover regulations with an assortment of tactics. In the 
U.K., for example, it is possible to avoid falling under the jurisdiction of 
the Takeover Panel and E.U. Directive by remaining listed outside of 
Europe.162 Alternatively, inverters to the Netherlands have made use of a 
longstanding legal structure known as a stichting, which can be em-
ployed as a functional equivalent of a poison pill that can temporarily 
block hostile suitors.163 Third, significant hostile acquisition activity in 
the United States has shifted over the last decade to proxy contests, an 
area that has long been governed disproportionately by federal securities 
law. And finally, recent legal scholarship has raised new questions about 
whether federal law could be interpreted to preempt many of Delaware’s 
 
161 See, e.g., Gleiss Lutz, European Directive Takeover Guide 1, 9–11 (2014), available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=D999E949-ED7C-44AE-
86B1-2F2E8A36C069; Bonelli Erede Pappalardo et al., Guide to Public Takeovers in Eu-
rope 21, 23 (2013), available at http://www.debrauw.com/wp-content/uploads/NEWS%20-
%20PUBLICATIONS/Guide-to-Public-Takeovers-in-Europe-2013.pdf. 
162 See, e.g., The Panel on Takeovers & Mergers, The Takeover Code, at A3–A5 (11th ed. 
2013), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf. 
But see Irish Takeover Panel, Irish Takeover Act 1997, Takeover Rules And Substantial Ac-
quisition Rules, at T5 (2013), available at http://irishtakeoverpanel.ie/wp-content/uploads/
2014/01/ITP-Takeover-Rules.pdf (directing that even solely U.S.-exchange-traded Irish 
companies are subject to the panel’s jurisdiction).  
163 The stichting is an independently governed “foundation” established by the board, which 
receives an ongoing option to purchase a significant block of voting preferred shares, effective-
ly allowing it to veto any hostile bid (at least temporarily). See 2 B.W. §§ 285, 291 (2015), 
available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0003045/Boek2/Titel6/Artikel285/geldigheids
datum_12-05-2015 and http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0003045/Boek2/Titel6/Artikel291/
geldigheidsdatum_12-05-2015. Mylan NV, a recent U.S. inverter to the Netherlands, activated 
a stichting when it received hostile interest from Teva Pharmaceuticals (itself a previous in-
verter to Israel). See Shayndi Raice & Margot Patrick, The Rise of the ‘Stichting,’ an Obscure 
Takeover Defense, Wall St. J. (Apr. 22, 2015, 12:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-rise-
of-the-stichting-an-obscure-takeover-defense-1429716204.  
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most historically important takeover rules, suggesting that federalization 
may already be on the verge of expanding to that domain as well.164 
Although there is room for debate about the precise extent of the fed-
eralization of corporate law, few would quibble with the proposition that 
the new federal mandates described above have decidedly displaced 
and/or preempted a large and important swath of state law related to 
corporate governance. At the very least, the steady federal involvement 
in corporate governance has upended the conceptual distinction that 
business law has traditionally drawn between securities law and corpo-
rate law. 
The steady march of federal law into the realm of corporate govern-
ance—for good or for ill—is highly relevant to tax inversion calculus in 
at least two respects. Primarily, it suggests that the loss of Delaware law 
simply does not represent the same kind of cost today for aspiring in-
verters that it might have two decades ago, when securities law carried 
far less weight in dictating the contours of corporate governance. To the 
extent that federal law has appropriated from Delaware (and other states) 
large sectors of corporate governance jurisprudence, most of the benefits 
from domestic incorporation can be retained simply by remaining listed 
in U.S. securities markets (governed by federal securities laws), which 
inverting companies have overwhelmingly opted to do. 
Secondly, the availability of U.S.-style corporate governance struc-
tures through securities laws (independent of corporate law) substantial-
ly undermines the incorporation-centered approach in the United States 
for determining tax residency. In other words, tax status is now no long-
er mandatorily “bundled” with a company’s corporate governance re-
gime. A public company is free to choose its tax jurisdiction largely in-
dependent of concerns about governance; it need not accept them (at 
least from the United States) as a fully conjoined package. And, since 
the vast majority of U.S. inversions are structured to retain substantial 
voting control, management, and assets within the United States, the 
surviving entity from an inversion typically remains subject to the same 
set of federal securities mandates as was its U.S.-incorporated fore-
 
164 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional Review 
of the Poison Pill, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1549, 1551–52 (2014); Guhan Subramanian, Steven 
Herscovici & Brian Barbetta, Is Delaware’s Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional? Evidence 
from 1988–2008, 65 Bus. Law. 685, 686–88 (2010). 
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bear.165 As I demonstrate in the next Part, the federal unbundling of tax 
from corporate governance can have significant implications for regula-
tory competition—implications that bear centrally on the inversion inva-
sion, and how best to address it. 
III. INVERSIONS THROUGH THE LENS OF REGULATORY-COMPETITION 
THEORY 
This Part abstracts from the practical details of tax inversions, and in-
to a conceptual and analytic assessment of the role that inversions play 
on a larger policy stage: regulatory competition. Specifically, I develop 
and analyze a framework that builds on (and in some ways extends) the 
regulatory competition literature166 to study competitive dynamics when 
jurisdictions install and offer multi-attribute regulatory products. My at-
tention—unsurprisingly—will highlight two such attributes: tax policy 
 
165 Foreign-incorporated companies listed in the United States may, under some circum-
stances, be exempt from certain federal governance and disclosure mandates if deemed to be 
“Foreign Private Issuers” (“FPIs”) for purposes of securities law. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 
(2013) (defining FPIs). The exemptions include more liberal disclosure mandates, exemp-
tions from most proxy rules, and greater flexibility in choice of accounting regime. For most 
U.S. inverters, however, FPI status is not a realistic option for the surviving entity, since it 
requires, inter alia, a majority of voting shareholders to be non-U.S. residents, a majority of 
directors (as well as a majority of executive officers) to be non-U.S. citizens and non-U.S. 
residents, a majority of assets to be located outside the United States, and the company’s lo-
cus of business administration to be outside the United States. Moreover, the predicate con-
ditions for FPI status must be reestablished on an annual basis. Id. For an overview of the 
FPI rules, see Div. of Corp. Fin., Accessing the U.S. Capital Markets—A Brief Overview for 
Foreign Private Issuers, Sec & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfin/internatl/foreign-private-issuers-overview.shtml. 
166 The analysis below tracks the general approach in the framework for regulatory compe-
tition developed in Gillian Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of 
Corporate Law, 22 J.L. Econ. & Org. 414, 419–20 (2006) (reviewing the corporate law regu-
latory competition literature); Joel Slemrod & John D. Wilson, Tax Competition with Para-
sitic Tax Havens 4–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12225, 2006), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12225 (reviewing the tax competition literature); 
see also Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-
the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 
(1992) (situating regulatory competition in environmental contexts). However, here I situate 
the analysis differently, drawing inspiration from more general theories of oligopolistic 
competition in multidimensional product space. See, e.g., Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff, 
Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium, 59 Econometrica 
25, 28–34 (1991); Andrew S. Caplin & Barry J. Nalebuff, Multi-Dimensional Product Dif-
ferentiation and Price Competition, 38 Oxford Econ. Papers 129, 132–34 (1986); Avner 
Shaked & John Sutton, Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation, 49 
Rev. Econ. Stud. 3 (1982).  
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and corporate governance regulations. Specifically, I will consider con-
ditions under which jurisdictions offering packages of tax and govern-
ance regulations may differentiate themselves from one another, and 
what implications follow for such differentiation when firms enjoy ju-
risdictional mobility. Although the analysis below explores a specific, 
numerical example with a variety of simplifying assumptions, the exam-
ple is surprisingly adaptable to far more generalized (and technically 
complicated) settings, yielding qualitatively similar conclusions.167 
Several central intuitions emerge from this analysis. First, I demon-
strate that bundling ultimately enriches firm choice: That is, when juris-
dictions can bundle governance and tax regulations, they will tend to dif-
ferentiate themselves in their offerings, with some jurisdictions serving 
as market “leaders” in governance while others serve as market “lag-
gards.” Second, jurisdictions that enjoy a position as market leaders will 
rationally attempt to capture the value they have created through their 
tax policies, appearing less generous in their tax treatment of domestic 
firms. Third, by dint of their attractive governance regimes, leaders can 
afford to moderate their responses to tax competition from other juris-
dictions, and thus a market leader need not be drawn into ruinous com-
petition with tax “havens” or other low-tax jurisdictions. Rather, a lead-
er’s optimal response to another jurisdiction’s aggressive tax policies 
may be muted, possibly substantially. Finally (and significantly), the ad-
vantageous strategic position that a governance leader enjoys persists 
only insofar as the tax and governance attributes offered by the leader 
remain “bundled”—that is, firms must be forced to accept the leader’s 
tax policy as they embrace its governance rules, and they cannot selec-
tively assemble a collage of the best pieces of different jurisdictions’ 
regulatory frameworks. Unbundling tax from governance (as I argue has 
substantially happened through U.S. securities law reforms) not only ne-
gates the leader’s market power, but it likely induces long-term reduc-
tion in regulatory differentiation—a clear negative when firms have het-
erogeneous needs and capabilities. 
 
167 The model introduced in the text below is deliberately kept simple for the sake of expo-
sition. Extensions to it are discussed in succeeding subsections, and Appendix A to this Arti-
cle offers a more generalized analysis for curious (and masochistic) readers. 
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A. Framework and Preliminaries 
Consider a population of for-profit corporate entities (“firms”) mak-
ing strategic decisions about their regulatory home. To ease exposition, I 
normalize the total size of the population of entities at 1 (although any 
other normalization would work too).168 For purposes of current discus-
sion, suppose each firm chooses among “bundled” regulatory goods, and 
that its chosen jurisdiction commits it both to that jurisdiction’s corpo-
rate governance rules and to its tax regime.169 Each firm in the popula-
tion is assumed to generate baseline “gross” profit of  > 0, which is 
constant across all firms. That said, a firm’s net payoff is subject to both 
upward and downward revisions away from this baseline as a byproduct 
of the regulatory environment it selects. Accordingly, I assume that 
firms in the population choose their regulatory environment in order to 
maximize firm value net of such revisions to their baseline.170 
To focus on the most basic ingredients of regulatory competition, I 
suppose in this example that there are two jurisdictions—Jurisdiction 1 
(“J1”) and Jurisdiction 2 (“J2”), which compete with each other for in-
corporations and resulting tax revenue.171 The jurisdictions are interested 
in maximizing their tax revenues less the administrative cost of building 
and maintaining their regulatory structure. 
As noted above, regulatory competition plays out through a bundle of 
regulatory attributes offered by each jurisdiction to firms that are incor-
porated there, which I denote as (x1, 1) and (x2, 2), for the respective 
 
168 For example, if there were 38,000 firms in the population, then one need only multiply 
all of the total revenue numbers below by 38,000. Normalizing the market size to 1 econo-
mizes on notation with no loss in generality. 
169 In this baseline model, I assume these two choices are necessarily bundled, and moreo-
ver I assume that all the taxes an entity pays are determined by its state of incorporation. 
Both assumptions are easy to relax without changing any of the important insights. Later, 
Subsection III.C.v will return to this caveat and demonstrate how the model can accommo-
date it.  
170 The alert reader will note that a firm’s choice of regulatory environment may itself be 
subject to agency costs, so that a firm’s choice of regulatory environment may not fully re-
flect an aim to maximize firm value. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Mis-
reporting Corporate Performance (2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=354141) (describing the effect of regulatory environments on the 
ability of managers to misreport corporate performance). Although this argument is not the 
core focus of this Article, the framework introduced below is capable of folding in agency 
costs in the choice of incorporation as well. Such concerns might be reflected, say, by firms 
that have a lower willingness to pay for corporate governance (denoted as  below). 
171 The analysis is easily generalizable to n jurisdictions. See Appendix A for details. 
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jurisdictions. The terms 1 and 2 are the tax elements of regulatory 
competition, and they represent the per-firm tax levies imposed by each 
respective jurisdiction on firms it regulates.172 Intuitively, higher values 
of 1 and 2 correspond to larger per-firm tax levies in the respective ju-
risdiction. Tax levies are normalized to be non-negative (and thus 1 ≥0 
and 2 ≥ 0).173 
The terms x1 and x2 embody the nontax elements of corporate regula-
tion, to which I refer collectively as the “corporate governance” attrib-
utes of each jurisdiction. These variables embody canonical corporate 
law/regulation commitments thought to affect firm value (such as minor-
ity shareholder protections, fiduciary duties, judicial quality, board 
structure, shareholder governance rights, network externalities, and the 
like). Although the framework developed below is general enough to 
analyze corporate governance as a set (or vector) of traits, for simplicity 
I suppose that all relevant traits can be collapsed into a single, scalar 
numerical value (x1 and x2). In this vein, larger values of x1 and x2 corre-
spond to “better” packages of corporate governance rules. Like tax lev-
ies, governance regimes are normalized to be non-negative: That is, val-
ues of x1 or x2 set equal to zero correspond to the minimal possible effort 
by the jurisdiction to build a value-creating governance framework. 
Although taxes play an obvious role in a firm’s profitability, it is im-
portant to acknowledge that governance matters too. Indeed, a growing 
(and already sizeable) literature in empirical corporate finance has made 
a persuasive case that “good” corporate governance can and frequently 
does reduce intra-firm agency costs and firms’ cost of capital, thereby 
enhancing shareholder value.174 At the same time, neither theory nor 
empirical evidence suggests that “good governance” has the homoge-
nous effects across all firms. For some firms, the ability to commit (or 
 
172 Expressing taxes in terms of total tax levy (rather than rates) makes the analysis some-
what straightforward without altering the core intuitions.  
173 This is little more than a normalization, since subsidies received in the jurisdictions can 
be represented by adjusting the value of  upwards. 
174 See supra Section II.C; see also Mihir A. Desai, The Decentering of the Global Firm, 32 
World Econ. 1271, 1281 (2009) (“Legal homes can . . . determine the rights for a firm’s inves-
tors and workers, wherever they are located.”); Paul A. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance 
and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. Econ. 107 (2003) (finding that firms with stronger shareholder 
rights had increased value and returns); Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate 
Governance?, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 783 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423 
(finding that corporate bylaws that allowed for board entrenchment, such as poison pills, re-
duced firm value). 
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bond) into a strong governance scheme can be highly valuable. In other 
firms, governance is less prized.175 
Accordingly, in what follows I suppose that firms value corporate 
governance heterogeneously. In particular, suppose the responsiveness 
of firm value to governance structure can be summarized as a point on a 
scale ranging from a low of 0 (unresponsive) to a high of 1 (maximally 
responsive). A firm’s position on this scale (the firm’s “type”) is denoted 
by the variable , which is simply a point on the unit scale between 0 
and 1. To capture the interaction between the jurisdiction’s corporate 
governance regulation (xi) and the firm’s type ( ), a firm can increase 
its value beyond its baseline by xi. I assume that firms’ types are uni-
formly distributed in the population between extreme endpoints of 0 and 
1.176 
Given that all firms value corporate governance to some degree (and 
thus would be willing to pay for it), jurisdictions may naturally be inter-
ested in offering high-quality governance regulation. However, strong 
regulatory regimes require resources to build and maintain. In particular, 
I suppose that for both jurisdictions, installing corporate governance in-
stitutions requires expending real resources—expenditures that become 
less effective (that is, have decreasing returns) as the state’s corporate 
governance protections grow. In particular, suppose that installing a cor-
porate governance structure of (xi) necessitates an expenditure of ½(xi)
2 
for Jurisdiction i (where i = 1, 2). 
Finally, in order to capture the idea that Delaware holds a dominant 
position in the arena of corporate governance, I assume that J1 has an in-
cumbency advantage over J2, and therefore enjoys a first-mover ad-
vantage in installing its governance regime (x1) before J2 chooses its 
own regime (x2). In this sense, the incumbent jurisdiction effectively es-
tablishes a beachhead in regulatory space to which the entrant jurisdic-
tion must attempt profitably to respond. The second mover (J2) must 
consequently choose whether to emulate the incumbent or to differenti-
ate itself with a distinct governance regime. Once both jurisdictions have 
 
175 This latter group may include firms for which governance is in principle value-
enhancing, but in which agency costs or private benefits of control swamp those benefits in 
affecting incorporation decisions. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. In fact, as 
shown in Appendix A, the framework presented here extends, easily allowing some or all 
firms to place a negative value on governance (that is,  < 0). See infra Appendix A. 
176 Although this is in some ways a restrictive assumption, the analysis easily generalizes 
to any distribution F() satisfying (so-called) “monotone hazard rate” properties. For de-
tails, see Appendix A. 
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each committed to a governance regime, they simultaneously set the 
terms of their tax regimes (1 and 2). This sequence is deliberate, and it 
is meant to capture the idea that governance regimes are more complex 
to build—and harder to dismantle—than a simple change in corporate 
tax levies. The sequential structure of the model is illustrated in Figure 
6. 
 

















Reiterating, the analysis at this stage makes two critical assumptions: 
(1) that each jurisdiction’s regulatory offerings are mandatorily “bun-
dled,” and thus firms cannot assemble hybrid regulatory structures, 
adopting the tax attributes of one jurisdiction and the governance attrib-
utes of another; and (2) that the competing jurisdictions endeavor to 
maximize their expected tax revenues net of their costs of installing their 
regulatory corporate governance structures. I will explicitly relax each of 
these assumptions in a later subsection; indeed, doing so will help to il-
lustrate some of the key points for my argument. 
B. Solving the Game (Equilibrium) 
With this structure in mind, I now proceed to solve the game by 
standard backwards induction techniques, beginning at the final stage, 
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with the firms’ choices of regulatory regime.177 At this stage, firms 
choose their governance regimes from among the two providers that 
have already selected their regulatory packages. For a firm of type , the 
expected payoffs from incorporating in Jurisdictions 1 and 2 (respective-
ly) consists of (a) the firm’s baseline profits, plus (b) the value contrib-
uted by the chosen jurisdiction’s corporate governance regime, less (c) 
the tax levy imposed by the chosen jurisdiction. These payoffs can be 
represented by the following expressions: 
 
Firm’s payoff from incorporating in J1:  
 
Firm’s payoff from incorporating in J2:  
 
A profit-maximizing firm will simply choose the jurisdiction that of-
fers it a package of governance and tax resulting in the larger of the 
above payoffs. 
Comparing the above expressions, it becomes immediately clear that 
if the two jurisdictions were to offer identical governance regimes 
(x1 = x2), then all firms (regardless of type) would flock en masse to the 
jurisdiction imposing the lowest taxes. Thus, if (say) Jurisdiction 2 were 
charging a tax levy of $100,000, Jurisdiction 1 could steal the entire in-
corporation market by imposing a levy of $99,999. Anticipating this 
competition, of course, Jurisdiction 2 would reduce its levy further, and 
so forth, all the way to the point where there is no profitable deviation 
left, and both jurisdictions impose a tax levy of zero.178 This logic gives 
rise to the following intuitive proposition: 
Proposition 1: When jurisdictions offer identical corporate govern-
ance regulations, competition in tax rates will enter a ruinous “death 
spiral,” driving firm-level tax levies as well as total tax revenues in 
both jurisdictions to zero. 
 
177 The solution exposited below corresponds to the unique “Bayesian perfect” equilibrium 
of the game. See Appendix A for details. 
178 This is a version of the well-known “Bertrand paradox” from industrial organization, 
which states that when two or more firms engage in pure price competition with no capacity 
constraints and bounded monopoly profits, the only equilibrium (in pure or mixed strategies) 
consists of marginal-cost pricing. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., A Re-Evaluation of Perfect 
Competition as the Solution to the Bertrand Price Game, 17 Mathematical Soc. Sci. 315, 315 
(1989). Here, when J1 and J2 offer the same corporate governance rules, all of these condi-
tions are met. The marginal cost of providing a preexisting established regulatory regime is 
zero (and therefore so is the tax levy). 
(x1,1 |)   x1 1
(x2,2 |)   x2 2
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The intuition embodied in Proposition 1 reflects what many perceive 
to be the largest concern in the current inversion wave—that it has invit-
ed a type of “ruinous” tax competition, inevitably driving tax rates 
across all jurisdictions to zero. It will also, by implication, drive total tax 
revenues to zero in both jurisdictions, a factor that would clearly deter 
jurisdictions offering copycat corporate governance regimes to begin 
with (as explored below). 
Now consider the situation where the competing jurisdictions differ-
entiate their corporate governance regimes (so that x1 ≠ x2). Suppose fur-
ther (somewhat arbitrarily) that x1 > x2 and thus the incumbent jurisdic-
tion is the corporate governance “leader” offering the strongest 
governance protections (the analysis of the case where x1 < x2 is entirely 
symmetric).179 When jurisdictions have differentiated governance regu-
lations, choosing between them involves comparing both the corporate 
governance and tax attributes of each. Once again revisiting and com-
paring the expressions above, a representative firm of type  is willing to 
incorporate in J1 if and only if its expected payoff from J1 exceeds its 
expected payoff from J2, which is equivalent to the following choice 
condition180: 
 
Choose J1 over J2 if and only if: 
 
In other words, the corporate governance leader (assumed provision-
ally to be J1) will be systematically the most attractive—all else con-
stant—to those firms whose valuations are relatively responsive to 
strong governance rules—or in terms of the model, with high values of  
that exceed a critical cutoff value, *, as defined above. 
There are a few noteworthy features that emerge from the above 
choice condition. First, because firm types are distributed uniformly, the 
jurisdictions’ market shares for incorporations can be tidily summarized 
by *, so long as 0 <* < 1. Specifically, the corporate governance leader 
(J1 here) will capture a (1 – *) share of the market, while the laggard (J2 
here) will capture the remaining * share. Second, note from the above 
 
179 As will become apparent below, the incumbent firm will generally have an incentive to 
select the most protective corporate governance, and thus this ordering will not, in the end, 
be arbitrary. 
180 The condition from the text is an algebraic rearrangement of the condition stating that 
the firm’s payoff in J1 (that is,  + x1 – 1) is at least as large as its payoff in J2 (that is, 
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expression that whenever the jurisdictions split the market (that is, when 
0 <* < 1), it must be the case that the leader imposes a higher tax than 
the follower—that is (1 – 2) > 0. Finally, although it is not obvious a 
priori, it turns out that in any equilibrium of this game, * will be be-
tween 0 and 1 (and thus the jurisdictions divide the market).181 Indeed, 
unlike competing oligopolists in a production market (who generally 
must cover their marginal costs of production), with regulatory competi-
tion the predominant costs for the jurisdiction are quasi-fixed (building 
and maintaining the system), and the governance regulations can be pro-
vided to one more incorporating firm at effectively zero (or very low) 
marginal cost. Consequently, should either jurisdiction find itself ex-
cluded entirely from the market by a competitor charging a positive 
price, there will be a way for it to respond profitably in equilibrium 
through tax cuts or better governance regimes (or both), recapturing 
some market share. Therefore, in any plausible equilibrium of the tax 
competition stage, it will be the case that 0 < * < 1. Collectively, these 
observations give rise to a second proposition182: 
Proposition 2: When jurisdictions offer differentiated corporate gov-
ernance regulations, they will in equilibrium split the market and im-
pose differentiated taxes as well, with the corporate governance lead-
er imposing a tax premium relative to the corporate governance 
laggard. 
Moving backwards, consider next the equilibrium of the tax game. 
The governance leader and laggard each simultaneously choose a tax to 
impose in a manner that maximizes its expected tax revenues weighted 
by the market share captured by the jurisdiction (holding constant the 
other jurisdiction’s conjectured imposed tax). Equivalently, the jurisdic-
tions’ respective taxation problems are as follows: 
 
J1’s Taxation Problem:  
 
 
J2’s Taxation Problem:  
 
 
181 This turns out no longer to hold when tax law and corporate governance are “unbun-
dled”—a key argument of this Article. See infra Subsection III.C.5. 
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From the above maximization problems, one can derive a (so-called) 
“best response correspondence” (“BRC”) for each jurisdiction.183 The 
BRC addresses a simple question: For each possible conjectured tax levy 
that the “competing” jurisdiction might impose, what is the optimal, rev-
enue-maximizing tax levy to charge in response? 
Figure 7 below plots the BRCs for each jurisdiction on the same set of 
axes. In the figure, J1’s imposed tax is represented by the vertical axis, 
and J2’s by the horizontal axis. As can be seen from the figure, each of 
the jurisdictions imposes a tax levy that is partially (but not completely) 
responsive to its competitor’s. Jurisdiction 2 (the governance laggard), 
for example, always charges half the tax it predicts that J1 will impose. 
In contrast, J1 (the leader) charges a strictly positive baseline tax (of 
½ (x1 – x2)) regardless of what J2 imposes, even if it believes that J2 will 
impose a tax of zero. Above that level, J1 increases its tax by fifty cents 
for every dollar of increase by J2. Note that each jurisdiction’s profit-
maximizing tax levy increases as the other jurisdiction’s levy increases, 
effectively reinforcing one another.184 
 















183 The BRCs are derived from partially differentiating J1’s and J2’s expected payoffs in 
the taxation game with respect to 1 and 2, respectively, and setting each partial derivative 
equal to zero. Because the expected payoff functions are strictly concave, the solutions to 
those first order conditions will be maxima. 
184 In game theoretic terms, the jurisdictions’ taxation strategies are said be “strategic 
complements”—a setting where competition can prove quite severe. See, e.g., Jeremy I. Bu-
low et al., Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 
488, 489, 494 (1985). 
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Moreover, as Figure 7 reveals, there is a unique point where the 
levied taxes are the mutual best responses of one anonther—that is, the 
point where the BRCs of each jurisdiction intersect. This is the unique 
equilibrium of the taxation stage of the game. It corresponds to the 
point where each jurisdiction is playing a best response to its opponent, 
and thus there is no reason for either to change. In the above example, 
the unique taxation equilibrium corresponds to a tax imposed by the 
leader of ⅔ (x1 – x2), whereas the laggard imposes a smaller tax levy  
of ⅓ (x1 – x2). Note from this equilibrium that the jurisdictions always 
split the market, with resulting market shares of * = ⅓ for the laggard 
and (1 – *) = ⅔ for the leader. At these equilibrium tax levies, the 
laggard and leader will realize expected tax revenues of 1/9 (x1 – x2) and 
4/9 (x1 – x2), respectively. 
Proposition 3: When jurisdictions have differentiated corporate govern-
ance rules, the unique equilibrium in the taxation stage involves positive 
levies by both jurisdictions. Moreover, the taxes imposed and total tax 
revenues in both jurisdictions grow as the corporate governance 
offerings become increasingly distinct. Both jurisdictions enjoy strictly 
positive payoffs. 
A noteworthy feature of the tax equilibrium described in Proposition 
3 is that the taxes levied and total tax revenues for the jurisdictions grow 
as the magnitude of differentiation (captured by (x1 – x2)) increases. This 
effect is true even for the corporate governance laggard, who stands to 
collect greater tax revenues the worse its governance regime becomes 
relative to the leader’s. The reason for this seemingly counterintuitive 
effect is simple, and it is an artifact of oligopolistic market dynamics 
more generally: When the extent of product differentiation grows in any 
market, the providers are less likely to be competing for the same buy-
ers. The leader tries to extract higher levies from firms that value gov-
ernance highly (that is, those with high values of ), making its product 
more expensive and less attractive to low and moderate valuers. Since 
the laggard is the only other choice available, it is also able to raise its 
levy modestly without losing significant market share. 
As noted above, although the foregoing analysis presumes that J1 is 
the leader in corporate governance (and thus x1 > x2), the analysis is 
identical if J1 were the laggard. In either case, what is clear from the 
above discussion is that both jurisdictions are decidedly better off when 
they offer differentiated governance regulations as opposed to when they 
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emulate one another (and ruinous price competition ensues). According-
ly, absent a coordination failure, the jurisdictions will have strong incen-
tives to offer differentiated regulatory structures. The one remaining 
question concerns which jurisdiction emerges as the leader and which 
becomes the laggard. 
Accordingly, let us move back one more stage in the sequence, in or-
der to determine how the jurisdictions will select their corporate govern-
ance rules anticipating the later tax competition described above. Here, 
as noted above, the model assumes a strategic advantage for J1, viewing 
it as somewhat akin to Delaware’s incumbency status in the corporate 
governance world. Although this incumbency could take on numerous 
instantiations in this model (for example, J1 might face a lower marginal 
cost of installing governance than J2), I capture the effect here by giving 
J1 a first-mover advantage over J2 in setting its governance structure. 
Recall that for either jurisdiction, installing corporate governance xi im-
poses a cost of ½ xi
2, which drags down gross tax revenues that the ju-
risdiction will collect in the taxation game (more so for the leader than 
the laggard). 
Thus, consider the strategy of J2, after J1 has committed to a govern-
ance structure of x1  0. Jurisdiction 2 will attempt to compute its best 
strategy in two contingencies: (1) it lags, installing governance rules 
x2 < x1 at a cost of ½ x2
2, thereby generating gross tax revenues of 
1/9 (x1 – x2) as per the discussion above; or (2) it leapfrogs J1 to lead, in-
stalling governance rules x2 > x1 again at a cost of ½ x2
2, and generating 
gross tax revenues of 4/9 (x2 – x1). 
Should J2 choose to lag, its optimal strategy is counterintitively 
simple: It should adopt the most lax (that is, the “worst”) governance 
scheme possible, setting x2 = 0, which it can implement at no cost. The 
reasoning here is closely related to the discussion surrounding 
Proposition 3 above—so long as J2 is destined to be a laggard, its tax 
revenues (as well as the leader’s) increase the more it differentiates itself 
from the leader’s regime—even if that differentiation is in the downward 
direction. Thus, reducing x2 not only increases J2’s revenues in the tax 
stage, but it also reduces its total up-front costs of installing governance 
to begin with. And the maximal degree to which J2 can differentiate it-
self as a laggard is to “go big” (as it were), setting x2 = 0, and securing a 
payoff for itself equal to 1/9 (x1 – 0) = 
1/9(x1). (Note once again that this 
payoff increases as J1’s governance regime improves.) 
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Should J2 attempt to lead, in contrast, it will select a governance 
structure x2 > x1 that maximizes its tax revenues (
4/9 (x2 – x1)), less its up-
front costs of implementing that structure (½ x2
2). Here, it is easy to con-
firm185 that J2’s optimal choice is to set x2 = 
4/9, which generates net tax 
revenues equal to 4/9 (x2 – x1) = (
16/81 – 
4/9 x1). Note here that J2’s payoff 
as a leader decreases as J1’s installed level of governance improves (and 
thus becomes less differentiated from and more competitive with J2’s). 
Comparing this payoff to the profit maximizing from becoming a 
laggard, then, it is clear that J2 will choose to become a leader only if J1 
has not installed a level of governance that is “too high” to make it 
unprofitable for J2 to become a governance leader. In this example 
specifically, this means that J2 will become a leader only if J1 chooses a 
relatively lax governance regime, so that x1 < 
16/45, and lagging becomes 
more profitable for J2 than leading.
186 
Finally, step back to the beginning of the game to determine how the 
first mover, J1, will design its governance structure. From the analysis 
above, it is clear that if J1 installs any value x1 < 
16/45, it will induce J2 
to lead, and it will become the laggard. Similar to the above analysis, 
the highest attainable payoff for J1 if it wishes to be a laggard is to set 
x1 = 0, generating a net payoff for J1 of 
1/9 (x2 – x1) = 
4/81. In contrast, if 
J1 selects any x1 > 
16/45, J2 will be content to lag, setting x2 = 0. Here, 
similar to the analysis for J2 above, J1 will optimally set x1 = 
4/9, charg-
ing a levy of ⅔ (x1 – x2) = 
8/27, and generating net tax revenues of 
4/9 (x1 – x2) =
 4/9 (
4/9 – 0) = 
16/81. Because this payoff is four times that 
which J1 would realize as a laggard, it is clear that J1 will use its first-
mover advantage to become a governance leader. The foregoing dis-
cussion is summarized in the following Proposition: 
Proposition 4: The unique equilibrium of the game involves differenti-
ated bundles of governance regime and tax levy, in which the incum-
bent/first mover becomes a governance leader, installing a relatively 
high quality of governance, and the entrant/second mover becomes a 
laggard, installing the lowest quality of governance possible. The 
leader and laggard divide the market, and both impose positive tax 
 
185 The result comes immediately from setting J2’s marginal revenues from increasing x2 
(or 4/9) equal to its marginal costs (x2).  
186 To see this, note that J2’s payoff as a leader, (
16/81 – 
4/9 x1), exceeds its payoff as a lag-
gard, 1/9 (x1), when and only when the following condition holds: (
16/81 – 
4/9 x1) >
 1/9 (x1). 
Solving this condition for x1 yields the numerical figure stated in the text. 
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levies on incorporating firms, with the leader imposing a tax premium 
over the laggard. 
One notable aspect of the equilibrium described above is that compe-
tition induces jurisdictions to differentiate their offerings to cater to 
firms’ heterogeneous preferences for governance. The leader jurisdiction 
delivers greater value to firms that place the greatest value on strong 
governance (extracting more tax revenue from them in the process). 
Firms that place relatively low value on governance, in contrast, are 
priced out of the leader’s regime, and incorporate instead with the lag-
gard. Although this equilibrium is not fully efficient, it may be the best 
practically attainable outcome in a regulatory competition setting.187 
C. Variations and Robustness 
Although the discussion above completes the description of the mod-
el’s equilibrium, the framework above has developed its core intuitions 
in a relatively simplified setting, with particular assumptions about 
structure, players, payoffs, sequence, and so forth. It is important to un-
derstand how critical these simplifications are for the analysis—in fact, 
many of the core arguments in this Article are exposed only through re-
laxing several of these assumptions. I therefore turn for the remainder of 
this Part to a series of extensions to the baseline model that explore the 
robustness of the arguments above to alternative strategic environments. 
 
187 My discussion thus far has concentrated on equilibrium behavior, rather than on social 
welfare concerns. Given the nature of my thesis, this focus is appropriate. Nevertheless, it 
warrants observing that within this framework, governance is a pure public good with a fixed 
cost of provision (and no marginal costs or congestion costs). Consequently, a benevolent 
social planner would optimally eschew duplicating regulatory investments in multiple juris-
dictions, and would instead concentrate governance infrastructure in a single jurisdiction, 
sweeping in all firms (without rationing out relatively low valuers). It is easily confirmed 
that the social planner’s optimal level of governance in this example is E() = 1/2, applied to 
all firms. The above equilibrium does not fully achieve that benchmark, since (1) the leader 
slightly underinvests in governance relative to the social optimum (4/9 rather than 
1/2 ), and 
(2) the leader prices out the lowest valuing one-third of firms. See generally Truman F. Bew-
ley, A Critique of Tiebout’s Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 49 Econometrica 713, 
715–17 (1981) (defining pure public good as independent of population and noting that, in a 
pure public good Tiebout model with a government concerned about public welfare, the Pa-
reto optimum is achieved when public goods are concentrated in a single region). That said, 
one can show that the equilibrium described above delivers greater social value than either a 
profit-maximizing monopoly jurisdiction structure or a structure with more than two compet-
ing jurisdictions (discussed below). 
TALLEY_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2015 1:40 PM 
1714 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:1649 
1. Greater Dimensionality of Governance 
One potential extension to the model would be to expand the dimen-
sionality of “governance” regimes. In the baseline model above, the 
competing jurisdictions’ choice of governance regime was effectively a 
scalar. However, governance is itself a multidimensional phenomenon, 
and Jurisdiction 1’s governance regime might better be viewed in some 
cases as a “vector” of instruments. For example, suppose each jurisdic-
tion could separately install a level of “judicial quality” (“yi”) independ-
ent of “minority shareholder protections” (“zi”). Now each of jurisdic-
tions 1 and 2 would offer a package with three attributes—{y1, z1, 1} 
and {y2, z2, 2}, respectively. Other dimensions (or additional subdivi-
sions of the above) are possible as well. 
It turns out that greater dimensionality in governance is easily handled 
in the model. As in the baseline case above, if firms have differentiated 
preferences among different dimensions of governance, then much turns 
on whether a firm’s preference for one governance attribute (say judicial 
quality) is highly correlated with its preference for others (say minority 
protections). When such correlations are strong, very little changes from 
the discussion above. Conversely, when these correlations are weaker 
(or even reversed), it could turn out that J1 and J2 differentiate them-
selves along different governance dimensions, say with J1 leading in ju-
dicial quality and J2 leading in minority protections. Nevertheless, the 
notion that the jurisdictions differentiate from one another in their bun-
dled offerings—ultimately serving different market segments—remains 
intact. 
2. More Competing Jurisdictions 
Another extension concerns the addition of more jurisdictions beyond 
J1 and J2. For example, how would the inclusion of, say, a third or fourth 
jurisdiction alter the equilibrium? As demonstrated in Appendix A, the 
core insights from the two-jurisdiction case remain robust (with some 
caveats). First, even when there are n > 2 jurisdictions in competition, no 
two jurisdictions will emulate one another’s corporate governance rules. 
So doing would immediately invite ruinous tax competition between 
those two jurisdictions, driving their gross revenues to zero (along with 
all those with inferior governance regimes). Consequently, all jurisdic-
tions will embrace differentiated governance and tax regimes, effective-
ly dividing the market into n segments, in a manner that stratifies the 
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population according to the firms’ demand for good governance (the 
value of ). For example, extending the analysis above to three jurisdic-
tions, and assuming (as above) the jurisdictions continue to choose their 
governance structure sequentially (starting with J1, then J2, then J3), the 
unique equilibrium strategies and payoffs are as depicted in the table be-
low188: 
 
Table 1: Regulatory Competition Equilibrium with Three Jurisdic-
tions 
 i xi Mkt. Shr. Net Rev.  
J1 0.098897 0.24095 54.00% 0.024374  
J2 0.014645 0.05780 33.33% 0.003212  
J3 0.007323 0.00000 12.67% 0.000928  
 
As in the two-jurisdiction case, the early movers establish themselves 
as “leaders” in a manner that matches the sequence of jurisdictional 
choices. Accordingly, the last mover will serve the market as the lag-
gard, setting x3 = 0 just like the baseline model. 
A notable change introduced by the inclusion of n > 2 jurisdictions is 
the emergence of “middling” governance providers (J2 in the three-
jurisdiction case) who sit below the leader and above the laggard in their 
offerings. For middling jurisdictions, tax strategy is slightly more com-
plicated, since a change in tax levels now interacts on the margin with 
competitors on either “side” of the middling jurisdiction. Consequently, 
for such jurisdictions, tax changes will tend to play a more powerful role 
in building (or losing) market share, and they will therefore respond 
somewhat more vigorously to price changes among their immediate 
neighbors. 
Perhaps more interesting is the effect that additional competition has 
on jurisdictional heterogeneity. Somewhat surprisingly, the addition of a 
third jurisdiction actually reduces the range of governance options that 
firms have available to them. In particular, the leader jurisdiction (J1) 
now optimally installs x1 = 0.24095 (rather than 0.44444 as in the base-
line case), charges a levy 1=0.098897 (rather than 0.29630), and re-
 
188 For the derivations underlying this table, see Appendix A. 
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ceives net tax revenues of 0.024374 (rather than 0.19753). Although the 
leader retains a robust market share (54%) in equilibrium, it is unable to 
convert its market dominance into appreciable net economic rents. 
Moreover, notwithstanding the presence of more jurisdictions providing 
governance and the continued incentives jurisdictions have to differenti-
ate from one another, they tend to cluster more tightly around the “low 
quality” end of the governance spectrum. While possibly counterintui-
tive, the reason for this effect is straightforward—more jurisdictional 
players means more price competition; more price competition, in turn, 
means lower gross revenues; and lower gross revenues, in turn, dampen 
early movers’ ex ante incentives to invest in strong governance. 
3. Non-Revenue-Maximizing Competitors and Tax “Havens” 
A related extension concerns how predicted behavior would change if 
one relaxed the assumption that jurisdictions are motivated solely by 
maximizing their expected tax revenues net of regulatory installation 
costs. Specifically, suppose the laggard jurisdiction (J2) had preferences 
that caused it to compete on tax levies differently—and far more aggres-
sively—than predicted in the previous section. This is an important ex-
tension, since much of the competition for U.S. incorporations is said to 
come from “tax havens” whose objectives appear to have little to do 
with tax earnings maximization. Such behavior may emerge, for exam-
ple, if regulators are captured by interests wishing to minimize tax liabil-
ities, or alternatively crave international fame and prominence that 
comes with a high market share of incorporations. Or such jurisdictions 
may simply have preferences that are the function of political constraints 
and commitments on taxes. Alternatively, the initial costs of installing 
anything more than “minimal” corporate governance may be prohibitive 
for “late mover” jurisdictions, inducing many of them (rationally) to 
cluster at xi = 0, and inducing stiff price competition that drives their tax 
levies towards zero.189 Understanding how regulatory competition works 
when one’s competitors are extremely aggressive, are captured, or pur-
sue other goals can be helpful in disentangling the current situation. 
 
189 In the example above, the cost of installing governance was quadratic, so that c′(0) = 0. 
In a more general setting, it might be that c′(0) > 0, inducing late-moving jurisdictions to 
choose (rationally) to install minimal governance, impose no taxes, and earn no positive (or 
negative) net revenues. See Appendix A for details. 
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Accordingly, suppose that the laggard jurisdiction J2 has an incentive 
(for whatever reason) to fix 2 far below the predicted equilibrium level 
derived above, such as 2 = 0 (while still choosing location x2 = 0).190 
How should the leader J1 react (if at all) to such behavior? As it hap-
pens, insights into this question can be divined from the analysis already 
conducted. So long as J1 remains a governance leader and revenue max-
imizer itself, its optimal strategy is readily gleaned from the best re-
sponse correspondence depicted in Figure 6. In particular, recall from 
the figure that for every dollar by which J2 reduces its tax levy, J1 should 
respond in a muted fashion, reducing its own levy by only fifty cents. 
Even in the extreme case, where J2 levies a tax of zero (to capture max-
imal market share), J1 would still continue to impose a positive tax of 
½ (x1) > 0. While slightly less than its previous equilibrium value of 
2/3 (x1 – x2), this model still allows J1 to collect positive tax revenues and 
secure a fifty percent market share. At the same time, however, the 
additional competition by J2 will introduce enhanced price competition 
on the leader, reducing ex ante returns for J1 to investment in 
governance. In this scenario, J1’s optimal governance regime would be 
to install a governance regime of x1 = 0.25, charge a tax of 1 = 0.125 
and garner net tax revenues of 0.03125 (as compared to 0.4444, 0.29630, 
and 0.19753, respectively, in the baseline case). All told, the leader 
would rationally respond to a single, aggressive competitor in much the 
same way that it would have to respond to multiple competitors: 
reducing taxes (but not elimating them), dialing down its own 
governance protections (but not completely), and realizing less net 
income. 
Moreover, if this extension is added onto the prior extension, a non-
revenue-maximizing laggard jurisdiction may have even less of an effect 
on the leader than on others. Indeed, if, say, the market laggard reduced 
its price to zero to capture market share, that decision would be 
primarily visited on the laggard’s immediate neighbor, who would 
respond (as described above) in a somewhat muted fashion. This effect 
would propagate sequentially towards the leader, but with somewhat 
dampened responses at each successive juncture. By the time the shock 
 
190 This assertion that J2 continues to fix x2 = 0 is reasonable for many types of alternative 
objectives that J2 might entertain; analyzing all such possibilities, however, is beyond the 
scope of this discussion. It should also be noted that some tax “havens” that levy no corpo-
rate income taxes do assess fees and/or franchise taxes that serve a similar purpose. 
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reached the market leader, the laggard’s aggressive behavior may well 
have been diluted through other jurisdictions’ responses. 
It is important to note that the arguments above are no longer valid 
when the market leader (rather than a laggard) begins reducing price in a 
non-revenue-maximizing way. Here, because the leader already offers a 
higher quality governance regime, reducing price (say to zero) allows 
the leader to capture the entire market. Nevertheless, it remains the case 
that if a more aggressive laggard competitor induces some downward 
pressure on the incumbent’s revenue-maximizing tax, such behavior 
need not cause the incumbent to slip into ruinous tax competition.191 
4. Multinational Earnings and Territorial Taxation 
A notable simplifying assumption of the baseline model analyzed 
above was that it represented firms’ tax levies as being paid to a single 
jurisdiction, and it therefore did not need to distinguish the sources of 
the firms’ profits (that is, how much was earned in each jurisdiction). 
This assumption clearly requires additional scrutiny. Indeed, as 
demonstrated in Part II, inverting U.S. issuers are by hypothesis 
multinational firms generating earnings from across jurisdictions—a fact 
that clearly is in tension with the framework analyzed above. Moreover, 
a central tax policy debate surrounding inversions concerns the manner 
in which U.S. tax law approaches extraterritorial earnings and the global 
reach of U.S. corporate tax law (as compared to the territorial reach of 
other jurisdictions). In the baseline model, all income was effectively 
territorial, and thus there was no distinction between territorial and 
worldwide systems. Once again, practical observation is in clear tension 
with the baseline model. Hence, the intuitions developed above are 
likley to be pertinent only if they carry over to settings where corporate 
income is earned (and is taxed) across multiple jurisdictions. 
Luckily, both of these generalizations are easy to incorporate into the 
model (at the cost of some additoinal notation). One way to do so is as 
follows: Suppose that each firm’s baseline earnings—denoted earlier as 
—could be decomposed into the sum of two different income streams, 
 
191 It should be acknowledged that if the entrant jurisdiction were truly insensitive to costs, 
it could potentially install an arbitrarily strong governance regime (for example, a value of x2 
approaching infinity) and charge no taxes, dominating the market. This possibility seems far-
fetched in the tax haven context, and in any event, the problem of “tax havens with prohibi-
tively good governance rules” does not appear to be a fear that anyone has expressed in the 
current debate over inversions. 
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1 and 2, which the firm receives (exogenously) from operations in 
Jurisdictions 1 and 2, respectively. Further, let t1 and t2 denote the taxes 
that Jurisdictions 1 and 2 impose on that portion of profits generated 
from within the jurisdiction (regardless of where the firm is 
incorporated). Finally, redefine 1 and 2 slightly from the earlier 
analysis to denote an additional or extraordinary tax levy that each of 
Jurisdictions 1 and 2 can impose only on corprations choosing to 
incroporate in that juriusdiction. These additional surcharges could take 
any number of institutional forms, but one obvious one is that they 
proxy for tax levies imposed by the jurisdiction in question on the 
extraterritorial earnings of domestically incorporated entities. Thus, one 
potential factor in selecting one’s place of incorporation would be to 
minimize the additional tax burden placed on firms that choose to 
incorporate in each jurisdiciton (a consideration that maps comfortably 
into the current debate on U.S. tax law and inversion incentives). 
Within this modified setup of the basic framework, each firm’s payoff 
from incorporating in J1 and J2 now would become: 
 
Firm’s payoff from incorporating in J1: 
 
Π , , , |  
 
Firm’s payoff from incorporating in J2: 
 
Π , , , |  
 
The terms in the parentheses are simply the after-tax revenues that the 
firm receives from its operations in each of Jurisdictions 1 and 2. Com-
paring the two expressions above, it becomes clear that a representative 
firm of type  is willing to incorporate in J1 if and only if the following 
choice condition holds: 
 
Choose J1 over J2 if and only if:  
 
Note that this is precisely the same expression that defined the market 
shares of each jurisdiction in the basic model above. And indeed, all the 
rest of the insights follow precisely the same too, including the nature of 
“bundled” regulatory competition. In other words: 
  * 
1 2
x1  x2
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Proposition 5: When firms receive earnings streams from multina-
tional sources, and are taxed on those earnings by the jurisdiction 
where they are earned, jurisdictional competition remains viable, and 
a corporate governance leader can extract value by bundling its gov-
ernance regime with an extraordinary tax on firms choosing to incor-
porate with the leader. The unique equilibrium involves differentiated 
corporate governance rules and positive extraordinary levies (with the 
leader’s levy exceeding the laggard’s). Both jurisdictions enjoy 
strictly positive payoffs. 
Although the “extraordinary tax” referenced in the proposition above 
could take any number of institutional forms, one such form is to charac-
terize it as a domestic tax on a company’s foreign earnings. And thus a 
worldwide corporate tax system—such as the one that prevails in the 
United States—would be perfectly consistent with this bundled form of 
competition (as well as the additional premium levied by the corporate 
governance leader). 
Perhaps even more intriguingly, the above extension delivers imme-
diate insights as to whether (and how) a jurisdiction that taxes on a 
worldwide basis might compete with jurisdictions that employ territorial 
approaches. Suppose, for example, that Jurisdiction 2 (the laggard) 
adopted a territorial system, and therefore imposed a uniform tax only 
on that income earned by a firm inside J2, regardless of the firm’s tax 
residence. In other words, J2 would choose not to levy an extraordinary 
tax on firms’ extraterritorial earnings, and it effectively sets 2 = 0. In 
terms of the baseline model, this corresponds to the case when J2 be-
haved in an aggressive or non-profit-maximizing fashion, exactly like 
the extension analyzed in Subsection (3) above. However, just as before, 
the corporate governance leader (J1) can still compete profitably by im-
posing a positive extraordinary levy on firms choosing to incorporate 
there in the amount 1 = ½(x1 – x2) > 0. It therefore becomes immediately 
apparent that it would be destructive of J1’s interests to mimic J2’s terri-
torial tax regime, which would constrain J1 to set 1 = 0 as well. 
Proposition 6: When the laggard jurisdiction is constrained to utilize 
a territorial tax regime, the optimal response of the leader to is con-
tinue to levy extraordinary taxes on domestically incorporated firms 
(albeit at slightly moderated levels relative to when all regimes can 
impose extraordinary tax levies). 
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5. Unbundled Regulatory Instruments 
A fifth—and critical—assumption in the foregoing analysis was that 
tax and nontax attributes of each jurisdiction’s regulatory offerings were 
mandatorily “bundled” into a conjoined package. That is, when opting 
into their preferred regulatory environment, firms had to choose between 
J1’s regulatory package on the one hand, and J2’s package on the other. 
They did not have the option to combine regulatory instruments between 
the jurisdictions. 
How would the nature of regulatory competition change if firms were 
able to debundle their regulatory packages? Depending on the 
mechanism of debundling, the effect could be significant (and 
undesirable). In the extreme case, unbundling would prescribe granting 
firms the discretion to mix and match at will, likely by choosing J1’s 
desirable governance regime and J2’s lower tax rate. From J1’s 
perspective, this would be like competing against a jurisdiction offering 
package (x1,2), thereby imposing a lower tax levy for identical 
governance dimensions. As shown above, J1 and J2 would then be 
compelled to compete solely in tax levies, and the only equilibrium 
would be a form of “ruinous” tax competition such that 1 = 2 = 0. 
Moreover, anticipating that unbundling will augur ruinous 
competition, neither jurisdiction will have an incentive ex ante to invest 
in assembling (or maintaining) a strong corporate goverance regime. 
Consequently, in the first stage of the game, both the leader and the 
laggard will install the minimum level of corporate governance, so that 
x1 = x2 = 0. This logic can be summarized as follows: 
Proposition 7: If firms were pemitted to “unbundle” tax from 
governance attributes, then all firms will opt to be taxed in the lowest-
tax jurisdiction and governed through the corporate governance 
leader. The unique equilibrium in this setting involves all jurisdictions 
installing the lowest possible level of corporate governance, levying 
no taxes, and generating no tax revenue. 
What might the technology of unbundling look like? Although 
examples abound, two in particular stand out in the light of current 
debates. The first is a territorial tax system, which effectively makes tax 
levies on a firm independent of where it incorporates. As shown above, a 
corporate governance leader would never have an incentive to adopt 
such a system, even if all other competitors had previously done so. 
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A second technology for unbundling is perhaps even more focal for 
purposes of this Article: J1 might simply permit it, by supplying its 
corporate governance regime—mostly free of charge—to any foreign-
incorporated firm wishing to use it. Although this strategy seemingly 
runs counter to the leader’s interests, as Part III has argued, U.S. 
securities law has been doing something like it (even if unwittingly) 
over the last decade and a half. The next Part tentatively explores some 
institutional responses to this generous governance giveaway. 
6. Does Governance Really Matter? 
A final consideration warranting attention concerns an empirical 
assessment as to whether corporate law considerations really “matter” 
relative to tax benefits in firms’ inversion calculus. In other words, given 
the much-heralded magnitude of stranded off-shore earnings and high 
relative tax rates as core drivers of corporate expatriations, do corporate 
governance considerations represent anything more than rounding error 
in assessing the costs and benefits of inverting? This is an imporant 
question, since much of the conceptual analysis above turns on the 
heterogeneity of firms’ valuations of governance causing them to “sort” 
into different tax/governance regimes, and the simultaneous importance 
of a tax and governance tradeoff for the “marginal” firm. If the tax 
incentives were simply too overpowering to resist, then it would cast 
doubt on whether there are any marginal firms to begin with: Instead, all 
firms with a substantial foreign CFC footprint would stand to gain an 
inframarginal benefit by inverting, irrespective of governance. 
Although a detailed empirical analysis of this issue is beyond the 
scope of this Article, there are several reasons to believe that governance 
concerns can and do play a role in modulating the rate of corporate 
inversions. First, recall from the previous Part that inversions are but one 
of many alternative tax strategies that MNCs can use to manage off-
shore earnings (including intercompany loans, debt financing, and the 
like). As the magnitude of stranded CFC earnings has grown, so too has 
the incentive to pursue these alternative strategies as well; thus, it is far 
from clear that inversions would invariably emerge as the dominant 
strategy, even when the aggregate amount of offshore earnings grows 
large. What is clear, however, is that (a) the principal alternative 
strategies to inversion do not also require corporate expatriation; and (b) 
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the corporate-governance costs of inverting have waned in recent years 
due to the federalization of corporate law.192 
Second—and relatedly—it is instructive to consider the raw numbers: 
As illustrated in Appendix B, despite the significant popular attention 
inversions have garnered, the total number of announced transactions 
over the last two decades has been surprisingly modest (around seventy 
by the count offered in Appendix B, or around 3.3 per year). This figure 
constitutes approximately five hundredths of one percent of the average 
number of public companies traded in U.S. securities markets each year 
during that same interval of time (thousands of which have multinational 
earnings).193 If the the force of tax incentives were as irresistable as is 
popularly claimed, then it is perplexing indeed that such a miniscule 
fraction of U.S. MNCs have taken the bait. A plausible alternative 
hypothesis is that some firms were deterred from inverting (possibly 
channeled into alternative strategies) by nontax considerations, with 
corporate governance concerns constituting one of them, particularly 
prior to SOX and Dodd-Frank.194 
Third, consider the market’s reactions to inversion announcements. If 
all inverting firms are in fact “inframarginal,” harvesting a bounty of 
considerable tax benefits with negligible costs, then it follows that such 
firms should have experienced a strong and persistent windfall in their 
stock price upon the announcement of a planned inversion. Indeed, 
given the curiously small overall number of inverting companies noted 
above, the announcement of an intent to expatriate should be both 
newsworthy and significant to the lucky shareholders of those firms. On 
the other hand, the existence of appreciable governance tradeoffs 
coinciding with inverting would tend to dampen the tax benefits from 
inverting—particularly during those years where securities law did not 
play a significant role in arbitrating corporate governance. 
 
192 It is perhaps worth noting that the fraction of inverters that left Delaware after SOX 
increased from 58% to 64%. See infra Appendix B. Although this is not a drastic sea change, 
it is consistent with the claim that Delaware’s market power in governance began to erode as 
federal law expanded through the 2000s and beyond.  
193 Although the total number of public companies in the United States has fluctuated, a 
ballpark estimate puts the average at around 6,000 during this two-decade span. See Dan 
Strumpf, U.S. Public Companies Rise Again: Stock-Market Listings Grow for First Time 
Since Internet Boom, Wall St. J. (Feb. 5, 2014, 3:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304851104579363272107177430. 
194 It is worth noting that all of the companies announcing an inversion also manifested an 
intent to remain listed on U.S. exchanges (in some cases as a dual listing).  
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Figure 8 plots the three-day cumulative abnormal return (“CAR”) of 
stock prices for U.S. inverters over two decades (through the end of 
2014), centered on the date of announcement.195 It is immediately 
apparent from the figure that announcement returns are highly 
heterogeneous, and by no means are they categorically rosy: While some 
issuers experience robust positive returns upon declaring an intent to 
invert, others experince strong negative stock-price reactions, and many 
barely register much of a reacton in either direction. This overall 
heterogeneity—punctuated by the frequency of strongly negative 
CARs—appears inconsistent with the view that inverters categorically 
create immediate, unalloyed value for shareholders: Evidently, even 
with tax incentives, the market discounts tax gains against other factors 
 
195 An “abnormal return” reflects the extent to which the return on a company’s equity ex-
ceeds what one would predict given observed market movements on that day. See Appendix 
B for more details. The figure plots each inverter’s “cumulative” abnormal returns over the 
three-day trading period that spans the trading days before and after the announcement date. 
The figure includes firms that announced but ultimately did not close an acquisition. (Ap-
































































Mean 0.77% 1.35% 6.99%
Median -1.07% 0.76% 5.24%
StDev 7.95% 8.94% 8.70%
Min -9.72% -10.02% -7.04%
Max 25.99% 28.10% 27.04%
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(such as governance considerations).196 Note further that the CAR pattern 
associated with inversion announcements—while remaining heterogeneous 
throughout—grows more positive overall as time progresses. While 
announcement returns before SOX are statistically indistinguishable 
from zero, the overall presence and magnitude of positive CARs on 
announcement grows in time, and is the strongest after Dodd-Frank. 
This pattern is consistent with the thesis articulated above—that over the 
last fifteen years, federal law has substantially displaced state law as the 
central arbiter of corporate governance, thereby removing one of the key 
impediments to inverting.197 
IV. SYNTHESIS AND SOME TENTATIVE REFORM PROPOSALS 
The results from Part III reveal several intuitions that are relevant to 
understanding some policy tradeoffs inherent in the recent inversion 
wave. Most centrally, the analysis suggests that, so long as U.S. corpo-
rate law offers a more attractive regime for corporate governance than 
do salient jurisdictional competitors, then U.S. tax authorities perhaps 
need not engage in hasty, tit-for-tat responses to the tax policies of for-
eign authorities. In particular, the most radical reforms currently on the 
table—such as the complete elimination of corporate taxes or the migra-
tion to a territorial system of taxes—are dubious responses (at best) to 
the existing trend, and may even prove counterproductive (both to the 
United States and to general social welfare). Assuming the United States 
is still able to offer a distinct (and attractive) governance product, then it 
can likely afford to impose a tax premium as well. Domestic policymak-
ers may therefore have the flexibility to approach responsive tax reform 
 
196 One could argue that the inverters experiencing strongly negative abnormal returns rep-
resent examples of managerial agency costs, whereby managers pursue their own interests 
(while also freeing up firm capital) by inverting to a less stringent jurisdiction. Such a theo-
ry, however, would be inconsistent with the claim that governance is of second order im-
portance. It is, in contrast, highly consistent with many of the arguments I have offered 
above. 
197 One could also argue, of course, that this pattern could be consistent with tax incentives 
too, since during this same period of time off-shore earnings grew considerably too as did 
the international gap in headline tax rates. Nevertheless, as noted above, the enhanced tax-
avoidance stakes would also render alternative tax management strategies more attractive. 
Moreover, the tax eligibility rules governing inversions over this period also ballooned sig-
nificantly, which could well push in the opposite direction—making inversions less profita-
ble and attractive than other strategies. In addition, recall from Figure 1 that Ireland’s attrac-
tive 12.5% tax rate is not a new phenomenon, but has been in place since 2003 (well before 
the most recent trends). 
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in a more incremental fashion, embracing changes similar to approaches 
that were recently undertaken in the 2014 anti-inversion reforms without 
re-imagining the entire corporate tax philosophy of the United States. 
This of course does not imply that utter passivity is the optimal U.S. 
response to recent extraterritorial migrations either. Clearly, something 
has induced a discernible inversion exodus to take hold. To be sure, the 
large (and growing) differences in nominal tax rates imposed on U.S. 
resident corporations are part of this problem (see Figure 1 above), and 
the U.S. may well wish to consider reducing nominal rates by some 
margin to narrow (though not eliminate) the gap. However, the analysis 
offered above suggests that tax differentials are perhaps only part of the 
problem, and that an analogously significant concern is the extent to 
which the U.S. has unwittingly undermined its own ability to secure 
corporate tax revenues by unbundling corporate governance from tax 
residence. As argued in Part II, over the last fifteen years, U.S. securities 
law has gradually supplanted state corporate governance laws as the lin-
gua franca (and lex franca) of U.S.-traded companies, independent of 
incorporation jurisdiction. By unbundling governance from tax, the fed-
eral government has arguably compromised its ability to extract tax rev-
enues in exchange for offering value-enhancing governance. To the ex-
tent that this unbundling trend continues, moreover, the inversion wave 
could actually grow worse. 
My analysis therefore suggests at least two alternative measures as 
promising responses to this trend: either (1) the United States should de-
vise a means for “pricing out” the governance services that it increasing-
ly gives away to public companies; and/or (2) the federal government 
should reverse course in its longstanding program to suffuse securities 
law with a series of corporate governance requirements. I address each 
(briefly and tentatively) below. 
A. Pricing Federal Governance 
One potential response for re-bundling tax and governance would be 
for the U.S. government to charge foreign corporations for their access 
to U.S. securities laws, markets, courts, regulators and jurisprudence. 
Perhaps the most effective way to do this would be to assess an extraor-
dinary tax surcharge to issuers who list (or cross-list) on U.S. exchanges, 
subject to an allowance for issuers who, by virtue of U.S. incorporation, 
are subject to U.S. tax treatment at the parent level. 
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At present, the fees charged to foreign issuers by U.S. exchanges are 
not subject to any extraordinary U.S. tax, and they are trivial by compar-
ison to typical U.S. tax obligations. For example, the NASDAQ ex-
change imposes an annual fee ranging from $45,000 to $155,000, de-
pending on the market and number of shares,198 while the NYSE charges 
a per-share fee ranging from a total of $25,000 to a top-end of 
$500,000.199 Other exchanges, such as BATS, offer no fees, other than 
an initial $5,000 listing fee, at all for securities that are traded in suffi-
cient volumes.200 While certainly not pocket change, none of these fees 
comes remotely close to the type of tax liability of most U.S. multina-
tionals. Moreover, given the multiplicity of exchanges in the U.S. (and 
their common regulatory mandates imposed by securities law), it is per-
haps not surprising that listing fees appear to reflect significant price 
competition, and are not effective conduits to extract the value of U.S. 
corporate governance. (A similar observation applies, at least in princi-
ple, to other intermediary actors such as investment bankers and the cor-
porate bar.) Imposing an extraordinary levy on foreign issuers, then, 
might well reduce the difference in tax burden between domestic and 
foreign incorporations, effectively re-bundling the benefits of U.S. list-
ings with tax revenues. 
One potentially significant drawback to a special tax levy on foreign 
issuers comes from preexisting constraints the United States faces under 
international law. Although levying a listing surcharge on listed foreign 
corporations may not carry the same constitutional implications as when 
U.S. states discriminate against out-of-state corporations, it could face 
significant challenges elsewhere. In particular, international tax treaties 
typically prohibit (or heavily constrain) tax discrimination against for-
eign incorporated entities.201 To the extent that such taxes abrogate these 
 
198 NASDAQ, Initial Listing Guide 13 (Jan. 2015), available at https://listingcenter.
nasdaq.com/assets/initialguide.pdf. 
199 NYSE Listed Co. Manual, at 902.02, 902.03 (2015), available at http://nysemanual.
nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_10&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsectio
ns%2Flcm-sections%2F. 
200 See Listings, BATS, http://www.batstrading.com/listings/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).  
201 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Convention of No-
vember 15, 2006, at art. 24 (“Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the 
other Contracting State to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith that is more 
burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of that other 
State in the same circumstances, in particular with respect to residence, are or may be sub-
jected.”); The Joint Comm. on Taxation, Explanation of Proposed Income Tax Treaty Be-
tween the United States and Poland (JCX-68-14) at 3 (June 17, 2014) (adopting provisions 
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treaty provisions, they could well be unenforceable. This particular 
problem might be addressed, however, by double-barrel reforms: simul-
taneously reducing tax liability for U.S. incorporated issuers (such as 
through a material reduction in tax rates or transitioning to a territorial 
system), combined with a uniform listing surcharge for all listed compa-
nies, foreign and domestic. Nevertheless, such fixes involve time, effort, 
and creativity and may themselves run various types of risks to en-
forcement. 
A second (and perhaps more imposing) challenge, however, might 
remain. As noted above, my central thesis in this Article turns on federal 
securities law displacing state corporate law, but not on whether the dis-
placing elements of federal securities law are desirable or not. Either 
way, both foreign and domestic listing entities are subject to the same 
governance restrictions, and consequently the cost of leaving U.S. cor-
porate law jurisprudence goes down. Nevertheless, if one is convinced 
that the governance reforms in SOX and Dodd-Frank were an affirma-
tively misguided (and the jury is still out on this one—and haggling with 
one another),202 then imposing a listing surcharge comes with an at-
tendant risk: flight from U.S. securities markets as well as state corpo-
rate law. Indeed, if the governance changes during the last fifteen years 
have been misguided, then they have eroded the value of a U.S. listing 
writ large. Accordingly, an overly aggressive attempt to extract rents 
from U.S. listed companies might bring about an undesirable conse-
quence—flight to foreign exchanges. Thus, while a listings surcharge 
may be one way to approach the unbundling dilemma, it is a potentially 
risky proposition. 
B. Rolling Back Federal Corporate Governance 
A second possible policy option to re-bundle tax and governance 
would entail “rolling back” (either retrenching or repealing) many of the 
governance reforms introduced by SOX, Dodd-Frank, and their progeny, 
which—as argued above—have squeezed out state law in several do-
mains where states were traditionally dominant. Several of the federal 
 
substantially similar to the U.S. Model treaty, which contains nondiscrimination provisions 
on tax treatment of foreign entities relative to domestic entities). 
202 See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
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governance mandates delineated in Part II, for example, could be candi-
dates for the chopping block under this approach.203 
Although roll-backs are, in some ways, less legally fraught than new 
tax levies, they carry appreciable risks and obstacles of their own. One 
such impediment stems from task of coordinating state and federal legal 
actors. When the federal government is the chief authority for both taxa-
tion and provision of governance (as is plausibly the case now), it is easier 
to develop a coherent strategy for bundling the two policy instruments. In 
contrast, when states (such as Delaware) are the primary producers of 
corporate governance, while the federal government retains primary tax 
authority, it becomes unclear whether the relevant actors have adequate 
incentives and abilities to coordinate with one another in a way that in-
ternalizes relevant costs and benefits. Put simply, how strong is Dela-
ware’s incentive to build and maintain a valuable corporate governance 
regime if the federal government proceeds to extract the lion’s share of 
that value through federal taxation? 
Granted, states likely internalize some revenue benefits from offering 
strong governance regimes (such as nurturing a strong regional legal 
services market), but many states raise somewhat little capital from cor-
porate taxes on domestic corporations, particularly when such business-
es do their business elsewhere.204 All else constant, the coordination 
problems that would ensue from ceding governance back to the states 
represent a distinct drawback to using federal roll-backs to re-bundle tax 
with company law. 
Yet another impediment to using federal rollbacks to re-bundle tax 
and corporate law—and an artifact of federal-state coordination prob-
lems noted above—potentially comes from firms themselves. Increas-
ingly, incorporated entities are going to extraordinary lengths to “con-
tractualize” their corporate governance regimes, which can have the 
effect of instituting a form of private unbundling. For example, the Med-
tronic-Covidien inversion included a term in the surviving entity’s Irish 
articles of association that largely replicates a U.S.-style business com-
 
203 See supra notes 117–64 and accompanying text. 
204 Under Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1902(a) (2015), domestic and foreign corporations are 
required to pay a tax of 8.7% of federal taxable income allocated and apportioned to Dela-
ware. The apportionment formula is based on an equally weighted three-factor method of 
property, wages, and sales in Delaware as a ratio of property, wages, and sales everywhere. 
See id. § 1903(b)(6). 
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bination statute.205 In addition, U.S. companies have increasingly insert-
ed choice of forum clauses in their governing bylaws, usually to steer in-
ternal affairs litigation back to their own state of incorporation.206 How-
ever, it is plausible that inverting companies may employ similar tactics 
to effect the opposite result, steering corporate litigation away from their 
unfamiliar new foreign home, and back into U.S. (and Delaware) courts. 
It is unclear how receptive the Delaware Chancery Court would be to 
adjudicating, say, corporate litigation involving the internal affairs of an 
Irish or British corporation. However, it seems plausible that at least 
some Delaware judges—who do not personally benefit from federal tax 
revenues and who enjoy being at the helm of high-profile business liti-
gation—might be willing to entertain such cases. It bears noting, for ex-
ample, that the Delaware Chancery Court recently recognized the validi-
ty of an unconventional forum-selection bylaw for a Delaware 
corporation that had opted into North Carolina courts to litigating inter-
nal affairs disputes.207 Chancellor Bouchard appealed to principles of 
comity to justify the uniform interpretation of forum-selection bylaws, 
no matter what their directionality.208 
To the extent such self-help strategies become routine and accepted, a 
roll-back of federal corporate governance mandates would face long 
odds in reclaiming U.S. market power in the regulatory competition 
market. It seems plausible, then, that a federal governance roll-back 
 
205 See Medtronic Holdings Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-4), Annex D at D-46 to 
D-52 (July 14, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1613103/00011
9312514267867/d741931ds4.htm#rom741931_133. The provision was fashioned after the 
business combination statute in Minnesota, Medtronic’s place of incorporation. See Minn. 
Stat. § 302A.673 (2014). 
206 See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939–40 
(Del. Ch. 2013). 
207 City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 231 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
208 As Chancellor Bouchard concludes: 
 Further supporting my conclusion are important interests of judicial comity. If Del-
aware corporations are to expect, after Chevron, that foreign courts will enforce valid 
bylaws that designate Delaware as the exclusive forum for intra-corporate disputes, 
then, as a matter of comity, so too should this Court enforce a Delaware corporation’s 
bylaw that does not designate Delaware as the exclusive forum. In my opinion, to 
conclude otherwise would stray too far from the harmony that fundamental principles 
of judicial comity seek to maintain. 
Id. at 242 (footnote omitted). Motivated partially in response to City of Providence, Dela-
ware has recently amended its corporate code to allow Delaware corporations to place a fo-
rum selection clause favoring Delaware in their charter or bylaws, while disallowing any 
such provision that would prohibit Delaware courts from having jurisdiction. See Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 8, § 115 (2015). 
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would have to be coupled with a stronger mandate (from Congress, the 
Supreme Court, or some other actor) on the sanctity of the internal af-
fairs doctrine in the face of such “inverted” choice of law/forum provi-
sions. 
Finally, a strategy of rolling back of federal corporate governance 
mandates poses challenges in prioritizing which particular mandates 
should be subject to repeal. It seems plausible that at least some recent 
federal mandates have enhanced average company value, while others 
have been value-eroding. (The relative mixture of beneficial and mis-
guided mandates is, as noted above, still subject to considerable debate.) 
One might have an intuitive inclination to target those federal mandates 
that are generally thought the least successful in enhancing company 
value. However, the calculus of unbundling calls even this intuitive logic 
into question. Recall that both good and bad governance mandates can 
effectively displace state law, and in that sense both types incrementally 
unbundle tax from governance. Somewhat counter-intuitively, one could 
argue that it is paramount to pull the plug first on the most valuable fed-
eral governance mandates, since those rules represent the most signifi-
cant areas where federal law provides the maximal benefit to foreign is-
suers without attempting to extract tax revenues. Consequently, as with 
levies in U.S. listings, the option of regulatory roll-backs also presents a 
variety of practical challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
Tax inversions have been at the center of a significant legal policy 
debate for at least the last two years and one that has sporadically flared 
up for decades. Such transactions have proven extraordinarily difficult 
for policy makers to address, because they represent a complex intersec-
tion of tax law, capital mobility, public finance, corporate law and gov-
ernance, securities law, and perfervid political jockeying about the ap-
propriate role (if any) of corporate taxes. This Article has approached 
the subject using the lens of regulatory-competition theory, arguing our 
current bout with “inversionitis” is an artifact—at least in part—of a 
fundamental (and largely self-inflicted) shift in the competitive land-
scape, where the United States has traditionally enjoyed market power 
by “bundling” its tax residency rules with a strong system of state corpo-
rate law and governance, utilizing the latter to extract rents through the 
former. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, U.S. market power in 
the regulatory competition sphere has dwindled—perhaps unwittingly—
TALLEY_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2015 1:40 PM 
1732 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:1649 
as securities law has progressively unbundled these two policy levers 
through a steady colonization of corporate governance. An effective pal-
liative for our current malaise, then, may lay in securities market re-
forms that address the unbundling phenomenon squarely (rather than a 
radical reimagining of U.S. corporate tax policy). The precise shape of 
prescriptive reform, however, turns crucially on one’s assessment of 
(among other things) whether our fifteen-year-long experiment in feder-
al corporate governance has been innovatively creative, or irresponsibly 
destructive. And concededly, this latter question is still open to some 
speculation and debate; but the dilemmas it poses may be far more trac-
table (and politically manageable) than those presented by radical tax re-
form proposals. 
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APPENDIX A 
This appendix extends and analyzes in greater detail the regulatory 
competition framework underlying the illustrative example discussed in the 
text. 
A. General Framework 
Consider a continuum of profit maximizing business organizations 
(firms) that make strategic decisions about their regulatory jurisdiction. 
The total size of the population of firms is normalized at size 1. Each 
firm chooses from a “menu” of regulatory offerings of various jurisdic-
tions, and in particular a firm's choice commits it to the jurisdiction's 
corporate governance regime as well as its tax rules (that is, tax and cor-
porate governance are bundled). Each firm in the population generates a 
baseline gross payoff of  > 0,which is assumed constant across all 
firms in the population. Each firm's payoff, however, is subject to both 
upward and downward revisions from this baseline as a by-product of 
the regulatory and tax environment it selects (detailed below). I assume 
that firms in the population choose their regulatory environment in order 
to maximize their payoffs net of such revisions.
Firms select their regulatory home from among n ≥ 2 jurisdictions, 
indexed as Ji, where i	 ∈ {1, 2 . . . , n}. The jurisdictions are assumed to 
compete with one another for incorporations and the resulting tax reve-
nues. Specifically, I suppose that jurisdictions are interested in maximiz-
ing their expected tax revenues less the administrative cost of installing 
and maintaining their regulatory structure. 
Interjurisdictional competition plays out through a bundle of regulato-
ry attributes offered by each jurisdiction to firms that are incorporated 
there. Each jurisdiction offers a package of regulatory instruments de-
noted i,i). The term i denotes a tax levy imposed on firms incorpo-
rating in Ji. Intuitively, higher values of i correspond to larger per-firm 
tax levies in Ji. Tax levies are normalized to be non-negative. The vector 
i embodies the nontax elements of corporate regulation, to which I refer 
collectively as the "corporate governance" attributes of each jurisdiction. 
In the most general setting, i would have h ≥ 1 elements, and thus i 
can be decomposed into its components { i1,	 i2 , . . . ,	 ih}. These varia-
bles embody canonical corporate law and other regulation commitments 
thought to affect firm value (such as minority shareholder protections, 
fiduciary duties, judicial quality, board structure, shareholder govern-
TALLEY_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2015 1:40 PM 
1734 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:1649 
ance rights, network externalities, and the like). For the purposes of this 
analysis, however, I will concentrate on the case of h = 1 (so that corpo-
rate governance is reflected along a scalar index), but it is relatively 
straightforward to extend the model to higher order dimensions, with lit-
tle change to the core analytic results derived below. 
The net profits of each firm stem from two deviations away from their 
gross values. Specifically, for a firm choosing jurisdiction i, net profits 




where  denotes the marginal value that the firm places on the quality of 
the governance regime. I assume that firms are heterogeneous, and that 
,  is distributed according to probability density function f() > 0, 
and associated cumulative distribution function F(Moreover, assume 
that f(.) and F(.) satisfy conventional monotone hazard rate properties 
(so that F()/f() is non-decreasing in , and [1 – F()]/f() is non-
increasing in ). 
Although incorporating firms value strong governance (high values of 
xi), installing and maintaining high quality governance is costly to the 
jurisdictions. Specifically, I assume that in order to install governance 
level xi, Ji must expend c(xi) in costs, where c(0) = 0, c′(xi ) ≥ 0, and 
c″(xi ) > 0. I also assume that → 0, so that sufficiently 
small investments in corporate governance visit—in the limit—
arbitrarily small costs on the jurisdiction.209  
 
The order of the game proceeds in three stages:  
 
In Stage 1, jurisdictions sequentially choose their governance regimes 
{x1, x2, . . . , xn }. I normalize the sequence to follow the jurisdictions’ 
index numbers, so that J1 is the first mover, followed by J2, and so 
forth. 
In Stage 2, once jurisdictions have committed to a governance regime, 
all jurisdictions simultaneously choose tax levies {1, 2, . . . ,  n }, 
which are assumed to be bundled with governance. 
 
209 I explore the implications of relaxing this last assumption below. 
iix  
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In Stage 3, firms select their jurisdiction so as to maximize expected 
net profits, paying corresponding jurisdictional taxes. 
 
I analyze Bayesian perfect equilibria of the above extensive form, char-
acterizing optimal strategies and associated payoffs moving backwards 
through the stages of the game. 
 
1. Firms’ Jurisdictional Choice 
Consider first the final stage, where firms choose their incorporation 
jurisdiction, assuming all jurisdictions have committed both to a govern-
ance regime and a tax levy. If firms are value maximizing, then each 
strictly prefers to incorporate in Jk if that jurisdiction offers a net value 




(I assume that if the maximal attainable net value for a firm is offered by 
two or more jurisdictions, the firm randomizes in choosing between 
them). Consequently, a firm of type  will strictly favor jurisdiction k 




Note that this condition immediately suggests that were two jurisdictions 
Ji and Jk to offer identical corporate governance regimes (xi = xk), then 
those jurisdictions will compete for firms on the basis of tax rates alone 
(i and k), with firms strictly favoring the lower-tax jurisdiction. (As 
noted in the text, a similar argument holds for any jurisdictions that un-
bundle their governance regimes from their tax regimes.) 
Alternatively, when jurisdictions offer differentiated regimes (so that, 
say, xi < xk without loss of generality), a firm of type  will favor juris-





.   kixx iikk  












    ˆ ,

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The variable represents the type of firm (in  space) that would be 
indifferent between the bundled offerings of Ji and Jk. As is immediately 
evident from condition (4), should any jurisdiction i offer a corporate 
governance regime that is weaker than that offered by some other juris-
diction k (and thus xi < xk), then a necessary condition for jurisdiction i 
to have a non-zero market share of incorporations is that it levies a 
strictly lower tax than jurisdiction k (and thusi < k). 
2. Tax Levy Stage 
Moving back to Stage 2, suppose all jurisdictions have installed gov-
ernance regimes (in Stage 1), and they must set tax levies simultaneous-
ly in the light of these installed regimes and firms' anticipated jurisdic-
tional preferences (described above). It facilitates exposition to develop 
an alternative indexing scheme, where jurisdictions are ranked according 
to their chosen governance regimes, from "highest" to "lowest." Specifi-
cally, let x(1) denote the highest-quality regime chosen by any jurisdic-
tion, x(2) the second-highest regime, and so forth.
210 Note that these al-
ternative indexes {x(1), x(2), . . . , x(n)} need not coincide with the 
sequential indexing of the firms above (that is, {x1, x2, . . . , xn }), since it 
is not clear (at least yet) how the quality of installed governance relates 
to the sequential order of play in Stage 1—a topic taken up below.  
The first important insight comes from understanding how tax 
competition between jurisdictions relates to the similarity of their 
governance regimes. In particular, suppose that two (or more) juris-
dictions had chosen identical governance regimes (so that, say, 
x(m + 1) = x(m + 2) = . . . = x(m + i)). As noted above, in selecting between 
these jurisdictions, firms will concentrate solely on minimizing tax lia-
bilities, since there is no difference in governance. Accordingly, the ju-
risdictions will face pure price competition in taxes, and the only equi-
librium entails both jurisdictions charging zero taxes. This intuition is 
stated formally in Lemma 1.  
Lemma 1: If any subsequence of ordered jurisdictions 
{m + 1, . . . ,m + i} install identical governance structures (and thus 
x(m + 1) = x(m + 2) = . . . = x(m + i)), then in equilibrium all such 
jurisdictions levy taxes of  (m + 1) =  (m + 2) = . . . =  (m + i) = 0, 
and realize zero gross payoff. 
 
210 This notation may appear unintuitive at first, since it implies the ordering 
x(1) ≥ x(2) ≥ . . . ≥ x(N) which is the reverse indexing from conventional “order statistics” with-
in sampling theory. As shall become apparent below, however, this convention makes for a 
more natural alignment of the two indexing schemes in equilibrium. 
ki,̂
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Lemma 1 is analogous to the familiar result in Bertrand competition 
models, where total market size is bounded (as is present here). As is 
well known in the literature,211 the only equilibrium in such situations 
involves marginal cost pricing—and in this framework all costs are qua-
si-fixed, and thus marginal costs are zero. Alternatively, if jurisdictions 
offer differentiated governance regimes, then firms may sort depending 
on their marginal values of governance. In particular, firms that value 
governance relatively little (and thus is close to zero) will tend to 
choose the lowest tax regimes, while firms that value governance more 
(and is relatively high) are willing to pay more for governance through 
taxes, and thus may choose to be governed by a higher tax regime. 
A concomitant of the reasoning above is that if any jurisdiction with 
governance regime x(m) assesses a levy of (m) = 0, then this strategy will 
have significant “trickle-down” effects on any jurisdictions that have in-
stalled a less attractive governance policy.  
 
Lemma 2: If any jurisdiction with profile x(m) charges levy of 
(m) = 0, then in equilibrium all jurisdictions with strictly weaker 
governance regimes (that is, {i | x(i) < x(m)}) realize zero gross pay-
off and zero market share. 
 
Lemma 2 establishes the vulnerability of laggard jurisdictions to strong 
price competition from jurisdictions with stronger governance regimes. 
Indeed, because of the ordering of the x(i), we know that x(i) < x(m) for all 
i > m. All such jurisdictions are not able to offer a stronger governance 
regime than x(m), and even if they reduced their tax levy to zero, con-
sumers would prefer to incorporate under regime x(m) and pay (m) = 0.  
 
Combining Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately yields the following: 
Lemma 3: If any subsequence of ordered jurisdictions 
{m + 1, . . . ,m + i} installs identical governance structures (and thus 
x(m + 1) = x(m + 2) = . . . = x(m + i)), then in equilibrium all jurisdictions 
with strictly weaker governance regimes (that is, {i | x(i) < x(m)}) real-
ize zero profits and zero market share. 
 
211 Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, A Folk Theorem for One-Shot Bertrand Games, 65 
Econ. Letters 59, 59–60 (1999); Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, The Possibility of 
Mixed-Strategy Equilibria with Constant-Returns-to-Scale Technology Under Bertrand 
Competition, 2 Span. Econ. Rev. 65, 65–66 (2000). 
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The above lemmas convey different ways in which the tax levy game 
can devolve into “ruinous” competition (via Bertrand pricing). However, 
ruinous competition need not follow when jurisdictions are differentiat-
ed, and can therefore exercise some market power, as elucidated below.  
For the sake of precision, I introduce two definitions. First, let  
denote the largest non-unique value in the sequence {x(1), x(2), . . . , x(n)} 
(and thus by implication 1 	 ). Lemmas 1–3 imply 
that (m +1) = 0, and moreover that all firms with governance structures 
weaker than  must enjoy zero profits and zero market share. By 
construction, then, all jurisdictions offering governance regimes {x(1), 
x(2), . . . , x(m)} offer governance regimes that are fully differentiated from 
one another, so that x(1) > x(2) > . . . > x(m). If all jurisdictions have posi-
tive market share (an assumption that will be borne out in equilibrium), 
firms will tend to favor regime x(i) over those of its immediate ordinal 




With these definitions in hand, the equilibrium of the taxation stage 
game can be characterized as follows: 
Proposition 1a: Suppose x  = ø and thus all n governance re-
gimes are distinct. The unique equilibrium of the tax levy stage game 
involves all jurisdictions capturing positive market share, all making 
positive profits, and all imposing taxes of (1) >(2) > . . . >(n) charac-
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Proposition 1b: Suppose x  > x(n) and thus at least two govern-
ance regimes are not unique. The unique set of payoff-equivalent equi-
libria of the tax levy stage is as follows: 
All jurisdictions with governance regimes x(i) = x  levy tax of 
(i) = 0, capturing zero profits; 
All jurisdictions with governance regimes x(i) < x  capture ze-
ro profits and zero market share; 
All jurisdictions with governance regimes x(i) > x  earn posi-





Proof: Consider first Proposition 1a, and thus assume that all values of 
x(i) are distinct. First, realize that (1)  > 0 in any equilibrium. To see this, 
suppose that there exists an equilibrium where the leader charges (1) = 0. 
By Lemmas 1 and 2 above, in equilibrium all other jurisdictions must 
either also charge (i) = 0, or have no market share (or both). Here, how-
ever, if x(1) is distinct from others, there exists a profitable unilateral de-
viation for the leader away from zero pricing. Indeed, note that the lead-





Note that if (1) = 0 (as is assumed arguendo) the leader must have posi-
tive market share in this posited equilibrium (indeed 100%), and thus 
when evaluated at (1) = 0, the leader's marginal profit must be strictly 
positive; consequently, the leader will have an incentive to deviate by 
increasing its assessed levy. This exposes a contradiction, and thus in 
any equilibrium, it must be the case that (1) > 0. The remainder of the 
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proof of Proposition 1a is by induction. Suppose there were an equilibri-
um in which (i) > 0 for all i ={1, . . . , k – 1}, but that the jurisdiction 
with governance regime x(k) levies a tax of (k) = 0. Jurisdiction k’s mar-





Because x(k) is unique by hypothesis, it follows that x(k – 1) > x(k) > x(k + 1). 
Consequently, it also follows that  for all j ≥ k, since x(k) pro-
vides a better governance structure at zero price (see Lemma 3). Moreo-
ver, because (k – 1) > 0, by hypothesis, it also follows that when evaluat-
ed at (k) = 0,  The above marginal profit condition is 
therefore strictly positive at (k) = 0, and thus the jurisdiction offering x(k) 
will have an incentive to deviate by increasing its assessed levy up to 
some level strictly (k)  (0, (k – 1)). By induction then, it becomes clear 
that if all firms are fully differentiated in governance, all will charge 
positive levies of (1) > . . . >(n) > 0, claim positive market share, and 
make positive gross profits. The conditions in Proposition 1a are simply 
the first order conditions for an optimum, assuming all firms have posi-
tive market share (as shown above). 
The proof of Proposition 1b is identical to Proposition 1a, up to the 
consideration of the jurisdiction offering . This jurisdiction (by 
definition) offers a non-unique governance structure that is identical to 
at least one other jurisdiction’s offering. By Lemma 1, we know all such 
jurisdictions offering  must charge levies of (i) = 0, dividing what 
is left of the market but making no profits. All others in the market with 
inferior governance regimes fail to capture market share (regardless of 
the levy they charge).
3. Governance Regime Choice Stage 
Finally, consider how jurisdictions will select their regime choice at 
the ex ante stage. Recall here, under the alternative indexing regime, J1 
moves first, installing corporate governance regime x1, followed by J2 
with x2, and so forth. Recall also that installing regime xi requires an ex-
penditure (of effort and/or monetary resources) of c(xi), where c(0) = 0, 
c′ (xi ) ≥ 0, and c″ (xi ) > 0, and → 0. This observation, in 
turn, generates the following result: 
        
    
 



































̂ j1, j  0
̂k, k1 
 k1 
x k1 x k 
 0.
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Proposition 2: In any equilibrium of the regime choice game, all ju-
risdictions install unique governance regimes in which xi  ≥ 0, with 
one jurisdiction installing a regime of xi = 0. Equilibrium levies in-
crease in the quality of the governance regime offered by the jurisdic-
tion. 
Proof: First note that no jurisdiction Ji would install a strictly positive 
regime choice xi coinciding with the regime choice of some earlier mov-
er, Ji. Indeed, by setting xi = xk, jurisdiction i incurs strictly positive 
costs of c(xk) and generates zero gross profits in equilibrium (see Propo-
sition 1b). Consequently, Ji’s expected net payoff would be -c(xk), which 
cannot be an equilibrium since a payoff of no less than zero was obtain-
able by setting xi = 0. To show that only one jurisdiction installs a gov-
ernance regime of xi = 0, suppose in equilibrium some set of m jurisdic-
tions selected identical regimes of xi = 0 for all I  m. Applying Lemma 
1, it follows that all such jurisdictions must generate zero net profits. Let 
xmin constitute the lowest governance regime selected by any jurisdiction 
outside of m. Some member of m would find a profitable deviation by 
selecting xi =, where 0 < < xmin. By Proposition 1b, such a jurisdic-
tion would earn strictly positive gross profits, and because 
→ 0, there exists a value of  sufficiently small that in-
stalling such a regime would generate strictly positive net profits.212 This 
logic remains valid for any m > 1, and thus at most one jurisdiction will 
install a regime of xi = 0. Because all jurisdictions earn strictly positive 
profits, they must capture market share as well, and this is possible only if 
equilibrium tax levies (i) are increasing in the quality of governance (xi). 
Proposition 2 demonstrates that any equilibrium of the regime choice 
stage will involve differentiated locations. Moreover, we know that such 
an equilibrium exists, since both the maximum tax levy and the maxi-
mum governance level are effectively bounded by the structure of the 
jurisdictions' payoffs.213 However, as with other endogenous entry 
 
212 If the limiting conditions on c′(xi) are not satisfied, then there may not be a profitable 
deviation for a laggard jurisdiction offering xi = 0 to separate from other laggards also offer-
ing xi = 0. In this case, the equilibria would be similar to Proposition 2, but there would be a 
cluster of “tax haven” jurisdictions each offering regime xi = 0 and charging zero equilibrium 
levies. So long as c′(xi) is sufficiently small, however, the first moving jurisdiction will find 
it profitable to separate from the havens, installing x1 > 0 and earning positive net revenues 
in equilibrium. 
213 As to tax levies, it is clear that the most any firm would be willing to pay to incorporate 
in Ji would be , and this is the maximal bound on any tax levy that any jurisdiction 
could charge. As to locations, although the choice of xi is unbounded the convexity of c(xi) 
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games with quality differentiation in industrial organization,214 there 
may be many equilibria of the regime choice game. In the special case of 
the uniform distribution, there turns out to be a unique equilibrium, 
which can be computed using numerical methods. Moreover, in that 
context, it turns out that sequential order corresponds with governance 
order, so that xi = x(i) for all i  {1, 2, . . . , n}. The next subsection ex-
plores this special case in detail. 
B. Numerical Example for Three Jurisdictions  
This subsection utilizes the analysis above to compute the equilibrium 
of the three-jurisdiction model where  ~ U[0,1]. As noted above, in 
equilibrium no two jurisdictions offer duplicative governance. The dis-
cussion below distinguishes between the "laggard" jurisdiction (J3), the 
"middling" jurisdiction (J2), and the "leader" jurisdiction (J1). I assume 
(arbitrarily at this stage) that x1 > x2 > x3—an assumption that must be 
verified in equilibrium. Because the firm choice stage remains identical 
to the general case, we begin with Stage 2 (the Tax Levy Stage). 
1. Laggard Jurisdiction’s Tax Levy Problem  
Consider first the laggard jurisdiction J3, and assume that it has in-
stalled the lowest governance level x3. At the taxation stage, J3 chooses 
3 to maximize its expected gross revenues, given its opponents' strate-





The first order conditions associated with maximizing this expression 






similarly applies that there a critical value of xi beyond which not even a monopolistic juris-
diction would venture. 
214 W. J. Lane, Product Differentiation in a Market with Endogenous Sequential Entry, 11 






















TALLEY_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2015 1:40 PM 
2015] Corporate Inversions 1743 
which defines J3’s reaction as a function of other players’ conjectured 
taxation strategies. Note that the laggard jurisdiction responds only to 
the conjectured strategy of its immediate neighbor (the middling juris-
diction J2), and thus any shocks to the leader’s (J1’s) strategy affects the 
laggard only indirectly (through J2’s reaction, as analyzed below). 
2. Middling Jurisdiction’s Tax Levy Problem 
Recall that the middling jurisdiction's market is defined by an interior 










The first order conditions associated with maximizing this expression 





which defines J2’s best response correspondence. Note that a conjec-
tured strategy change by either J1 or J3 elicits a reaction from the mid-
dling jurisdiction, but the reaction is more attenuated for any specific 
shock than in the previous case of the laggard. In particular, the mid-
dling jurisdiction is most responsive to strategic shocks by one of her 
immediate neighbors if her location is relatively distant from her other 
immediate neighbor (allowing her to respond to the former without can-
nibalizing her competitive posture with the latter). Note as well that a 
version of this condition holds for any intermediate jurisdiction in the 
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3. Leader Jurisdiction’s Tax Levy Problem 





For J1, the conditions associated with a maximum yield the following 





Notice that, like the laggard, the leader responds only to conjectured 
changes in the middling jurisdiction’s strategy, and the laggard’s does 
not directly enter. Note further that the leader is the only jurisdiction 
charging a positive price regardless of other players' strategies. That is, 
even if the laggard and the middling jurisdiction charge zero levy, the 
leader imposes a minimal levy of ½(x1 – x2) > 0. 
4. Tax Levy Stage Game 
Collecting the best response functions for the jurisdictions (denoted 
above), it is possible to solve for the equilibrium tax, market share, and 
profitability values for each jurisdiction (as a function of the chosen ju-
risdictional regimes), recorded in the following table: 
 
Table 2: Equilibrium Tax, Market Share, and Profitability for 
Three Jurisdictions 
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A few aspects of this table are worth noting. First, it is clear that levied 
taxes increase in the quality of corporate governance, with J1 (the leader) 
charging the most. Second, note that the leader always commands at 
least half the market, while the laggard controls no more than one-sixth. 
5. Investment Stage 
Finally, we move back to the first stage of the game, in which juris-
dictions sequentially install corporate governance regimes to maximize 
their expected net payoff (that is, their gross payoff less costs of installa-
tion). Following the assumption from the text that the costs of installing 
xi are quadratic, and given by c(xi) = ½(xi)
2, the net payoffs of the re-




Start with last mover, J3, who installs its regime observing what first 
two movers have already installed; that is, x1 > x2 > 0. Assuming the last 
mover is a laggard, and sets x3 < x2 (an assumption that must be con-




Note that this expression is strictly negative215 if x3 > 2x2 – x1, which is 
always satisfied if x2 < ½ x1, in which case the optimal value of x3 is a 
 
215 Note the marginal profit is also strictly negative if x3 > x1, but in this case the above 
profit function would no longer be appropriate because J3 would no longer be a laggard. This 
possibility is discussed later. 
    
 
 
     
 
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corner solution at x3 = 0. (As will be shown below, the unique equilibri-
um of this game satisfies the above sufficiency condition, and thus the 
laggard will optimally choose to install the minimum quality corporate 
governance regime). 
Now consider the middling jurisdiction, which observes x1 and con-
jectures that the laggard will install x1 as above. Assuming this jurisdic-









It is straightforward to show that the above condition implies ∗ < ½ x1,
216 
and thus x3
* = 0. Imposing this condition allows one to simplify the mid-




Anticipating the behavior of the middling and laggard jurisdictions 





216 Given the above optimality condition, we know that  	 		so long as 
 
For this condition to hold, however, it must be the case that 	 	 . However, it is easi-
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Subject to the backwards induction conditions that when called into 
play, suggest that J2 and J3 will play their equilibrium governance strat-
egies derived above, and that the equilibrium of the resulting tax levy 





The associated maximum of this function occurs at x1 = 0.24095, which 
then allows one to generate the remaining equilibrium values, as reflect-
ed in the table from the main text. 
Finally, to confirm this is an equilibrium, it is necessary to check that 
neither J2 nor J3 would have an incentive to leapfrog any other jurisdic-
tion in installing its corporate governance regime. Consider first whether 
the middling jurisdiction would have an incentive to leapfrog J1, in-
stalling a governance regime x2 > x1 in order to become the leader. As-
suming the leader acted according to the above equilibrium, installing 
x1 = 0.24095, the optimal governance value for x2 to install if she were 
interested in leading would be given by x2 = 0.3397. J2's resulting profits 
in this case would be -0.01996 < 0, clearly less than her profits under the 
posited equilibrium. Consequently, J2 is better off by not leapfrogging 
the leader.  
Similarly, consider the laggard’s incentive to leapfrog J1. Here J3 
would set x3 to maximize its profits as a leader given the installed gov-
ernance of the other jurisdictions. Similarly, the optimal leapfrogging 
governance level for J3 is x3 = 0.3298, yielding profits of -0.02108 < 0. 
As before, the laggard would not have an incentive to leapfrog the lead-
er. Finally, it is necessary to check whether the laggard might attempt to 
leapfrog only the middling jurisdiction. In this case, the laggard would 
set x3 = 0.081887, yielding profits of -0.01029 < 0. Once again, it is not 
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APPENDIX B: ANNOUNCED INVERSION TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING U.S. 




















Helen of Troy 
Corp. 
TX Self Bermuda Dec-93 1994 100% -0.05% 
Triton Energy 
Corp. 
DE Self Cayman Is. Feb-96 1996 100% -0.59% 
Loral Space & 
Commun. Inc. 
NY Self Bermuda Jan-96 1996 100% 25.99% 
Tyco Interna-
tional Ltd. 
MA ADT Ltd. Bermuda Mar-97 1997 64% -4.34% 
Playstar Corp. DE Self Antigua May-98 1998 100% N/A 
Xoma Ltd. DE Self Bermuda Nov-98 1999 100% -4.18% 
Gold Reserve 
Corp. 
WA Self Canada Feb-99 1999 100% 6.13% 
Fruit of the 
Loom, Inc. 
DE Self Cayman Is. Mar-99 1999 100% -3.13% 
Transocean Off-
shore Inc. 




DE Self Bermuda Oct-99 1999 100% -2.87% 











DE Self Bermuda Sep-99 2000 100% 0.97% 
Applied Power 
Inc. 
WI Self Bermuda Jul-00 2000 100% -1.94% 
 
217 Source: SEC Edgar Filings (URLs on file with author). The criteria for identifying an 
outbound inversion were (1) the transaction involved an acquisition of a publicly traded U.S. 
company; (2) the surviving entity was incorporated abroad; (3) the surviving entity remained 
traded in at least one public securities market; and (4) owners of the U.S. target retained at 
least 45% ownership (by value) of the surviving entity. Cumulative abnormal returns were 
estimated with available CRSP data, using a boot-strapped market model estimated prior to 
the event window; the event window consists of the trading day immediately before an-
nouncement plus the following two trading days. 
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DE Self Bermuda Sep-00 2000 100% -1.55% 
Foster Wheeler 
Corp. 






Cayman Is. Sep-01 2001 50% N/A 
Ingersoll-Rand 
Co. 
NJ Self Bermuda Oct-01 2001 100% 0.91% 
Cooper Indus-
tries, Inc. 
OH Self Bermuda Jun-01 2002 100% -2.04% 
Noble Drilling 
Corp. 
DE Self Cayman Is. Jan-02 2002 100% 7.65% 
Weatherford 
Int'l Inc. 
DE Self Bermuda Jun-02 2002 100% -9.71% 
Nabors Indus-
tries Inc. 
DE Self Bermuda Jun-02 2002 100% 4.64% 
Luna Gold Corp. WY Self Canada Oct-05 2005 100% N/A 
































Cayman Is. Aug-07 2007 100% 1.54% 
Lincoln Gold 
Corp. 
NV Self Canada Sep-07 2007 100% N/A 
Western Gold-
fields Inc. 
ID Self Canada May-07 2007 100% N/A 
Hungarian Tel. 








DE Self Marshall Is. Jun-08 Failed 100% -0.10% 
InterAmerican 
Acquisition 
DE Self BVI Jul-08 2008 100% N/A 
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Marshall Is. Sep-08 2008 52% N/A 
Foster Wheeler 
Ltd. 
Bermuda Self Switzerland Dec-08 2009 100% 7.64% 
Alpha Security DE 
Soya China 
Pte. Ltd. 






Cayman Is. Apr-09 2009 56% 0.23% 
Tim Hortons 
Inc. 






BVI May-09 2009 51% 1.69% 
ENSCO Int'l 
Inc. 
DE Self UK Nov-09 2009 100% -8.77% 
Plastinum Pol-
ymer Tech Corp. 






Canada Jun-10 2010 50% 28.10% 






Ireland Sep-11 2011 79% 7.19% 
Tronox Inc. DE 
Exxaro Res. 
Ltd. 
Australia Sep-11 2011 62% N/A 
AON Corp. DE AON PLC UK Jan-12 2012 100% -0.20% 
Pentair, Inc. MN 
Tyco Inter-
national Ltd.
Switzerland Mar-12 2012 48% 19.11% 
Stratasys Inc. DE Objet Ltd. Israel Apr-12 2012 55% 17.67% 
Eaton Corp. OH 
Cooper In-
dustries PLC














UK Feb-13 2013 64% -7.04% 




Ireland May-13 2013 77% 4.11% 
Perrigo Co. MI 
Elan, 
Blisfont Ltd.
Ireland Jul-13 2013 71% -4.32% 
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Ireland Mar-14 2014 74% 17.71% 
Chiquita Brands 
Int'l, Inc. 
NJ Fyffes PLC Ireland Mar-14 2014 51% 11.16% 
Theravance Inc. DE Self 
Cayman 
Islands 






Ireland Apr-14 2014 50% 13.95% 






Netherlands May-14 2014 49% 7.00% 
Medtronic Inc. MN 
Covidien 
PLC 
Ireland Jun-14 2014 70% 0.51% 











Bermuda Jun-14 2014 53% 1.12% 






Canada Aug-14 2014 51% 15.67% 
Auxilium Phar-
maceuticals Inc. 






Ireland Oct-14 2014 76% 0.49% 
Wright Medical 
Group, Inc. 
DE Tornier N.V. Netherlands Oct-14 2014 52% -2.29% 
Steris Corp. OH 
Synergy 
Health PLC
UK Oct-14 2014 70% -1.47% 
 

